On Wednesday, June 24, 2015, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > On 6/22/2015 11:18 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > On 23 June 2015 at 14:19, meekerdb <[email protected] > <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','[email protected]');>> wrote: > >> On 6/22/2015 8:11 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> >> >> On 23 June 2015 at 10:05, meekerdb <[email protected] >> <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','[email protected]');>> wrote: >> >>> On 6/22/2015 2:56 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Tuesday, June 23, 2015, meekerdb <[email protected] >>> <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','[email protected]');>> wrote: >>> >>>> On 6/22/2015 3:11 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 22 June 2015 at 17:33, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> The "closest continuer" idea is wrong on many counts. Both >>>>>> copies consider themselves to be the original - both are wrong >>>>>> in your view. But if one copy was 0.1% different from the >>>>>> origina, that copy would not be the continuation of the >>>>>> original, despite thinking that he was, just a bit taller and >>>>>> a >>>>>> bit happier for the experience. On the other hand, if one copy >>>>>> was 1% different and the other 0.1% different, the 0.1% copy >>>>>> would be a continuation of the original. And if the 0.1% copy >>>>>> was in a coma when created, the 1% copy would be the continuer >>>>>> until the 0.1% copy was revived. >>>>>> >>>>>> How are you going to measure these fine differences? If there is a >>>>>> tie according to any appreciable measurement, then there are two >>>>>> new >>>>>> persons. Don't forget that the duplication is only accurate at the >>>>>> level of replacement, which is never assumed to be exact -- we >>>>>> cannot have exact copies because of the quantum cloning >>>>>> restrictions. The odd difference in the number of atoms in your >>>>>> big >>>>>> toe is not a relevant difference. >>>>>> >>>>>> It's easy to measure differences. One of the new JC's is taller and >>>>>> better looking. Naturally, he claims that he is the true JC, but >>>>>> improved. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> What he claims is irrelevant. The copies diverge almost >>>>> instantaneously, so there are essentially always two new persons in these >>>>> scenarios. If they are made to be different by the machine, then there is >>>>> no duplication! >>>> >>>> >>>> I diverge from my previous self from moment to moment in ordinary >>>> life, but I still consider that I remain me. If I woke up tomorrow taller >>>> because I had a growth spurt during the night I would still consider that I >>>> was me; yet by the "closest continuer" theory, I would stop being me if a >>>> copy that hadn't grown was made somewhere else. >>>> >>>> >>>> I think waking up somewhere else would count strongly against being the >>>> closest continuation. >>>> >>> >>> What if, while both are asleep, the original is moved to another >>> location and the copy moved to the original's bed? >>> >>> >>> That would help, but there's an implicit assumption that >>> asleep=mindless. Anesthetic would make a better example. But won't both the >>> original and the copy find himself in a disjoint location incompatible with >>> where he was before? >>> >> >> The copy will find himself in the bed he fell unconscious in, and the >> original will find himself moved. Both would feel they were a continuation >> of the original, but not knowing about the switch they might guess wrong as >> to which was which. >> >> >> In what sense would they be wrong. They would have different memories >> and be different persons. >> > > One would be the copy and the other would be the original, but there > would be no way to tell which was which without referring to a record of > the procedure. > > > ISTM there's an equivocation here between a continuation in consciousness > and continuation in body. If we say "the person" is just a continuum of > conscious thoughts, then they are both continuations of the original. If > we take into account the physical instantiation then we can say which is > the original (assuming he's not destroyed and reconstructed in the > duplication process) even though they are both continuations, by different > means, of the original. >
Surely continuation in consciousness is what we mean when discussing personal identity. The atoms making up my body last year have mostly dispersed in the biosphere, but I don't consider that a great loss. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
