On 6/22/2015 8:11 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 23 June 2015 at 10:05, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>
wrote:
On 6/22/2015 2:56 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Tuesday, June 23, 2015, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net
<mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:
On 6/22/2015 3:11 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 22 June 2015 at 17:33, Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>
wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
The "closest continuer" idea is wrong on many counts.
Both
copies consider themselves to be the original - both
are wrong
in your view. But if one copy was 0.1% different from
the
origina, that copy would not be the continuation of the
original, despite thinking that he was, just a bit
taller and a
bit happier for the experience. On the other hand, if
one copy
was 1% different and the other 0.1% different, the 0.1%
copy
would be a continuation of the original. And if the
0.1% copy
was in a coma when created, the 1% copy would be the
continuer
until the 0.1% copy was revived.
How are you going to measure these fine differences? If
there is a
tie according to any appreciable measurement, then there
are two new
persons. Don't forget that the duplication is only accurate
at the
level of replacement, which is never assumed to be exact -- we
cannot have exact copies because of the quantum cloning
restrictions. The odd difference in the number of atoms in
your big
toe is not a relevant difference.
It's easy to measure differences. One of the new JC's is taller
and
better looking. Naturally, he claims that he is the true JC,
but improved.
What he claims is irrelevant. The copies diverge almost
instantaneously,
so there are essentially always two new persons in these scenarios.
If
they are made to be different by the machine, then there is no
duplication!
I diverge from my previous self from moment to moment in ordinary life,
but I
still consider that I remain me. If I woke up tomorrow taller because I
had a
growth spurt during the night I would still consider that I was me; yet
by the
"closest continuer" theory, I would stop being me if a copy that hadn't
grown
was made somewhere else.
I think waking up somewhere else would count strongly against being the
closest
continuation.
What if, while both are asleep, the original is moved to another location
and the
copy moved to the original's bed?
That would help, but there's an implicit assumption that asleep=mindless.
Anesthetic
would make a better example. But won't both the original and the copy find
himself
in a disjoint location incompatible with where he was before?
The copy will find himself in the bed he fell unconscious in, and the original will find
himself moved. Both would feel they were a continuation of the original, but not knowing
about the switch they might guess wrong as to which was which.
In what sense would they be wrong. They would have different memories and be different
persons.
Brent
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