On 08 Jul 2015, at 03:16, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Jul 7, 2015 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>> that's a pretty dull thought experiment. if everything in
the universe will get a cup of coffee then it doesn't matter what
the referent to "you" is because whatever it is he she or it will
get some coffee. What's your point?
> If you agree that P(experience of getting a cup of coffee
soon") = 1,
If everything and everyone will get coffee then obviously I
will get coffee too regardless of what "I" means. And I still don't
see your point.
> then you have to agree that P(experience of opening the
door and writing W or opening the door and writing M in a personal
diary) = 1,
Or? Is that a exclusive or? If it's a OR gate then P=1. If it's a
XOR gate then P=0.
> and that P(experience of writing "W and M" in a personal
diary) = 0.
Nonsense. I can show you the diaries proving that the Helsinki Man
did write "I see Moscow" AND did write "I see Washington".
Yes, but
[(I see Moscow) and (I see Washington)]
describes two different, and exclusive, first person experience. It is
not the same as
(I see Washington and Moscow).
None write "I see Moscow and Washington". Each one see, as you say
here, only one city. So, if you agree that P(coffee) = one because
both get coffee, you have to agree that both confirms in the same way
that P("one city") = 1 and P("W or M") = 1 (with "or" being any "or"
you want: the usual logical non exclusive or, or the "xor"). And P("W
and M") is zero as the experience (I see Washington and Moscow) never
occurs to anybody.
So, you are here again confusing the 3-1 view (an outsider description
of the first person experiences (plural) of the two copies, and the 1-
views, which both (thus all, at that time), like the coffee
experience, have the experience of feeling to be in one city.
> you can predict in advance that after pushing the button, you
are in front of *one* door, and that behind that door there is *one*
precise city, and that you have no clue which one it could be.
Maybe that's what you would predict only you know that, but I know
for a fact that's not what I would predict. I would say "I the
Helsinki Man predict that I will see Moscow AND Washington"
Sure, but that does not entail that after pushing the button the
helsinki man will see both city at once. Whoever the Helsinki man will
feel to be, it can only be either the W-man, or the M-man, and never
both at once.
You keep confusing the 3-1 view and the 1-views accessible to the
Helsinki man.
; and events would later prove that the prediction was correct.
...because you put it in an ambiguous way.
"I the Helsinki Man predict that I will see Moscow AND Washington"
is correct if "I-the helsinki man" refers to two persons, but after
the duplication, "I-the Helsinki man" refers to two exclusive and
incompatible FIRST-PERSON EXPERIENCES, as you have just said to
Terren. And in that sense, which is the sense of the question asked in
Helsinki, the events later prove that the "and" prediction was
incorrect. Both refute that they see W and M. Both confirms that they
get coffee and that in only one city.
Not that predictions, good bad or mediocre, have anything to do with
the nature of personal identity or consciousness.
This is wrong, and irrelevant, also. to have a persistent personal
identity, some amount of prediction must be verified. But that has
nothing to do with UDA and its goal.
Bruno
John K Clark
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