On 14 Jul 2015, at 03:19, John Clark wrote:
>> you just said BOTH the W-guy AND the M-guy are the H-guy.
Yes, but after the split, they *FEEL* to be only one of them.
That is irrelevant if they both are the H-guy, and you just said
they are;
It is relevant because the question is asked to the Helsinki guy about
the expectation of its experience/feeling.
If you missed this, then read again the posts or the paper. That is
explaiend in all details.
then the things that deserve the label "H-guy" will *FEEL* to be
in W AND M.
Total non sense. Assuming mechanism there will never be any person
ever feeling to be in W AND M.
Unless you change what you mean by "The Helsinki Man" a logical
person could form no other conclusion.
Only because you abstract your self from the question asked. One
individual can have his body (3-I) in many places, but his first
person self can only be in only one place FROM that first person view.
> The Helsinki man is in the two cities, but [...]
Why on earth is a "but" needed? If the Helsinki man is in the
two cities after duplication then before the duplication then the
correct answer to the question "what will the Helsinki Man see after
the duplication?" would be "Moscow AND Washington" and no "but" is
required. Given your statement above I don't see how this is even a
debatable question.
Because when the Helsinki guy is in the two cities, BOTH feels to be
in once place. As they know that in advance, P(W and M) = 0. You
interpret like if we were asking where the first person experience are
from a third person point of view, in which case you would be correct,
but that is not what was asked, which is about the 1p as seen by the
1p themselves.
> We do agree on the the notion ofpersonal identity, but your
problem is that you just avoid the fact that
1) the experiencer will surivive
I agree, and if the experiencer is duplicated there will be 2
experiencers. I mean...what else could "duplicated" mean?
Yes, and there are 7 billions of experiences on this planet, all
belonging to the initial amoeba, somehow, but once we have
differentiated, we don't mix the experience and they are orthogonal.
Same for the W and M person, none of them feels W and M.
> 2- and know in advance that from his first person pov he will
be unique in one city
I know that tomorrow when my future experiencers (plural) in
Moscow and Washington look into the past to today they (plural)
will see 2 unique paths leading up to them, but I would also know
that if I am to be duplicated then when I look toward the future
there is no unique path to be seen because "I" (aka The Helsinki Man
of today) has no unique future.
There is two (in the 3p) unique (in the 1p) paths to be seen.
Your are just pursuing your 1/3 distinction dismissal.
> They are both the Helsinki man, that is why in Helsinki the
experiencer is unable to predict his next PERSONAL first person
experience.
Who's next PERSONAL first person experience are you talking
about? Oh yes, "*his*".
The Helsinki guy. Both will feel to be in once city, so P(W or M) = 1,
and P(W & M) = 0, as everyone understand except those who me crackpot
for some reason of personal notoriety or something.
Those personal pronouns really come in handy, they're great at
hiding irrationality
You still fail to see that using names or 3p description can't work
either. The reasoning is based on the definition provided for the 1p
and 3p discourses or view.
If you don't read the reasoning, it is not astonishing that you fail
to understand.
> There is not an atom of ambiguity. The ambiguity comes only
from the fact that after the soplit, you decide to not read the
person diary.
I have never disputed the validity of memories tn the thought
experiment, so could you please explain the value and purpose of
those stupid diaries?
The diaries are used to better invoke the difference between the 3p
views and the 1p views? Memories in the brain works well here too.
Now, you DO dispute the validity of memories, as you dismiss them both
for the W and M guy. none of them ever memorized having been in two
cities from the 1p view, and so conclude that the bet P(W v M) should
have been equal to 1, and P(W & M) = 0. You can deny this only by
dismissing the memories.
> I recall that the prediction is on the future experience of
the experiencer.
As opposed to what, the future experience of the non-
experiencer?
As opposed to a 3p description of the future experiences or body's
positions, fro which "W & M" would be correct, but that is not what is
asked, as we ask about the 1p (as seen by the 1p).
>>> In the 3-1 view, but "he" will never see
"two cities”
>> Then “he” doesn’t mean what you just said it does,
“he” can’t mean somebody who remembers being the Helsinki Man.
> false. It always mean the guy who remember seeing Helsinki,
Then "he" will see BOTH cities! End of story.
In the eyes of God, but the question is asked about what he, the guy
in helsinki, will feel, and children already get the point that it is
impossible that he, the guy in Helsinki, will feel to see two cities
in any of its futures.
> after duplication he (both "he") will see only one city.
SO WHAT? Each "he" will see one, both will see 2,
Come on. "Both" is not a person.
You are inventing a new concept. the concept of a person having two
bodies. Why not, but then you and me are already the same person. yet
this does not work for predicting any experiences, and physics would
become trivial.
and you just agreed that "The Helsinki Man" is both,
But not at once. That's the point you forget to take into account.
so The Helsinki Man will see both. What more needs to be said?
Then when I look at a particle in the up + down state, in the (up,
down} base, I should predict that I will see the particle in both the
up and down state. This is pretty ridiculous. If you say that the
situation id different here, read up to step seven, as there the
copies, can no more interact too, making your argument quite
irrelevant. Or just modify the protocol in a way which guarantie that
the copies will never met.
> So P(one city) = 1.
Explain what the "P" means in the above, the probability of *who*
seeing one city? Oh yes I forgot, the probability that "he" will see
one city. Good old "he".
Yes, but the question is asked to him, when in Helsinki (no
ambiguity), and by definition of the 1p, it is verified (or not) by
each copies. It is simple to see that "W & M" lost all the time, and
that "W v M" win all the time. Indeed, once opening the door, each see
only one city, and is forced to write either M or W, never both.
> The Helsinki man can be sure of this; whoever he will become,
he will become a guy seeing only one city,
NO! The Helsinki man will become TWO guys
each seeing only one city;
So each will say "I see only city", and as the question was about the
expectation on what they will see, we get the P(one city) = 1 in
Helsinki.
It is very simple. Indeed, I know only one guy who take that much time
to get the point, and worst, who seem to never read the question
asked, which is on the future 1p view *content* (not on the
localization, or 3p description, of those 1p views).
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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