On 14 Jul 2015, at 19:33, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
> when the Helsinki guy is in the two cities, BOTH feels to be
in once place.
Yes, and one place plus one place equals two places.
But a place is a 3p notion.
One first person experience + one first person experience remain one
first person experience from all first person experience. To get a
doppelganger is like the split in Everett: you will not suddenly be
aware of a second first person experience. That is why "we cannot feel
the split". For the M-guy, the presence or absence of the W guy will
not change anything in its immediate experience (on which the
prediction was asked).
> You interpret like if we were asking where the first person
experience are from a third person point of view, in which case you
would be correct
I don't even know what a first person experience from a
third person point of view is.
It is what you are using all the time. I call that the 3-1 view. It is
the first experience that we attriubute to other person, like when you
say that you will be in both W and M. It is because you attribute a
first person experience to the two reconstitutions. But the question
is asked about the first person experience from the first person
experience view. As you said both feel unique, and so P(one city) = 1,
as both will confirm that from they first person pov content, they
both see only one city, and that was the point.
>>Then "he" will see BOTH cities! End of story.
> In the eyes of God, but the question is asked about what he,
the guy in helsinki, will feel,
Today the guy in Helsinki feels like the guy in Helsinki,
But that guy in Helsinki believes in computationalism, and so believe
that as a person he will survive, and he knows that wherever he will
feel to have survived, he will feel to be in one city, so he expect
one city when he will open the door.
tomorrow the guy in Helsinki means whoever remembers being the guy
in Helsinki yesterday, and you said there are now 2 people who
remember that, and they are in different cities.
In the third person view, that is correct, but avoid the question
asked, which is about the first person that he expects to live. And,
as you agreed, he will never make the experience of being two persons.
he might intellectually believe he will be two persons, but the word
"intellectually" betrays that it is a 3p view on itself, not the
actual content of the experience possible. Without telepathy, he might
still (after the duplication) doubt that his doppelganger has been
reconstituted. That "intellectual" experience is not the actual
experience of any of the reconsitutions.
So if 2 cities is not the correct answer to the question "how many
cities will the guy in Helsinki see?" you're going to need to change
the meaning of "the guy in Helsinki".
I don't have to change the meaning of "the guy in Helsinki" (or
better: the guy who remember being or having be the guy in Helsinki").
I have only to interview them in W and in M to see that the experience
possibles have all a content describing only one city. The guy in M
told me: "I expected to be in both city, but I have to admit I was
wrong, as clearly, I experienced only M, when opening the door. The
same occurs for the W guy, who told me that after opening the door he
saw only W. Both confirms the experience of seeing only one city.
> and children already get the point
Professional logicians are supposed to be more rigorous in
their use of logic than children, but you are not.
You just want a change of definition of personal identity, when all we
have to do is to look at the content of the diaries, or their
memories, and both confirms "I see only once city". So P(one city) = 1
for the same reason that P(coffee) = 1. The first person experience
predicted (drinking coffee, seeing one city) occurs in both branches,
and sp their probability = 1.
>>> after duplication he (both "he") will see only one
city.
>> SO WHAT? Each "he" will see one, both will see 2,
> Come on. "Both" is not a person.
Why not? If the Helsinki Man has been duplicated then both is a
person,
That is not even grammatically correct. Both *are* person. Both is not
a person, or the entire humanity is a person. may be in colloquial or
poetical sense, but you can't use such sense for the prediction of the
first person experience. You have agreed that there are two stream of
consciousness, and that the person have become different from each
other, even if both are the same person as the Helsinki guy. No
problem as personal identity is an intensional modal indexical notion,
which are known to not obey Leibniz identity rule. There is no
paradox, no ambiguity, just an impossibility to predict a particular
outcome of an experience.
if not then the Helsinki Man has NOT been duplicated. I admit
that both being a person is odd, but odd is not the same as
logically contradictory.
>> and you just agreed that "The Helsinki Man" is both,
> But not at once. That's the point you forget to take into
account.
There was a delay between the appearance of the Moscow Man and the
appearance of the Washington Man?
Nice, you are moving to step 4 by yourself. In step 3 there is no
delays (or no explicit delay). Step four is when we introduce an
explicit and long delay (say one year). Do you think that such a delay
would change anything in the Probability evaluated in Helsinki? Is
that possible when we assume computationalism?
Bruno
John K Clark
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