>> Simple comp predicts that in W, the H-guy opens the door and sees only W and >> ~M (as those letters refers to the first person experience, not the >> intellectual belief), and that in M, the H-guy opens the door and sees only >> M and ~W. Both concludes that P(W & M) was 0, and know better, now >> (hopefully).
Nah. The Helsinki guy predicts that he will see both cities and that encompasses the prediction that both his duplicates will individually see only one. The fact neither duplicate will see two cities doesn't effect Helsinki guy's expectancies. They can not be in two places at once, but through the magic of duplication Helsinki guy will be. He expects to be both of his future selves even though they would not expect to be each other. There is no contradiction here as Clark has pointed out with excruciating and what must amount to inhuman patience over many many years. Neither duplicate would conclude that P(W & M) was 0 for their mutual ancestor and the fact they only see one city wouldn't be considered by either of them to be evidence that he was wrong. Its painfully obvious you have confused P(W||M)(W&M) with P(H)(W&M) and this is about P(H)(W&M). 1p 3p 1p-3p 3p-1p or even no pee pee. From: [email protected] To: [email protected] Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 19:34:18 +0200 On 15 Jul 2015, at 18:08, John Clark wrote:On Wed, Jul 15, 2015 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >> one place plus one place equals two places. >But a place is a 3p notion. "I" is 1p and I have a notion of place. Actually this contradicts your statement that consciousness is not localized from its pov. But that might be not relevant here."I" is 1p, well the 1-I is, OK, and that does not prevent it localise itself, sure. But the point is that adding another "1-I" elsewhere will not make any 1-one feeling being two. > For the M-guy, the presence or absence of the W guy will not change anything in its immediate experience Agreed. OK. > (on which the prediction was asked). No, the prediction was about what would happen to the H-guy and the M-guy's fate is only part of the story, the W-guy's tale is just as important. That is why in all illustration I interview always both the M-guy and the W-guy. Did you see one or two city, in your direct sensula experience? Both told me; we have seen only one city behind the door. That confirms P(one-city) = 1. And thus P(W v M) = 1. Even with the exclusive OR. > that guy in Helsinki believes in computationalism, and so believe that as a person he will survive, OK. OK. > and he knows that wherever he will feel to have survived, That guy in Helsinki knows that that guy in Helsinki will feel to have survived in TWO cities. How could anyone FEEL to have survived in both city. Both will FEEL to survive in one city, and as far as they know, the doppelganger might not yet exist, nor ever exist. They both have to wait for a 3p confirmation, and both will wrote in the diary: I survived in M (resp W) and I am waiting the news that the doppelganger has been well reconstituted in W (resp M). >he will feel to be in one city, If that guy in Helsinki believes in computationalism then that guy in Helsinki knows that the personal pronoun "he" in the above is ambiguous It is not ambiguous. He refers to both guys, and they are those that we will interview to confirm or refute the prediction. "he" is the guy in helsinki and is the guy who will remember having been the guy in Helsinki. Once duplicated the 1p diverge, and that is why we ask what he (that guy) expects to FEEL after pushing on the button. You will claim that we change the definition, only when we remind that the prediction bear on the first person experience content. That is all the precision we need, and that changes the 3-1 "and" into the 1p "or", as nobody can feel to be in both city simultaneously. You said yourself, there are two persons after the duplication. each has its own unique first person experience, despite being both a legitimate Helsinki-guy. and that is why Bruno Marchal insists on using so many of them, they paint over flaws in the logical edifice of Bruno Marchal. >> So if 2 cities is not the correct answer to the question "how many cities will the guy in Helsinki see?" you're going to need to change the meaning of "the guy in Helsinki". > I don't have to change the meaning of "the guy in Helsinki" (or better: the guy who remember being or having be the guy in Helsinki"). So the guy who remembers being the Helsinki Man yesterday will see TWO cities but the guy who remembers being the Helsinki Man yesterday will see only one city. Mr. Marchal, it's going to take more than ICT3PWT1P to get out of that logical black hole. You repeat yourself, see above. Once again, you dismiss the 1p and 3p difference to introduce an ambiguity which is not there. > I have only to interview them in W and in M to see that the experience possibles have all a content describing only one city. If both are interviewed then TWO cities will be described In the diary of the interviewer. But in the diary of each survivors, you will see only "W", or "M", not "or I feel to be in two cities at once" (that asks for telepathy). and both descriptions come from the Helsinki Man, unless you've changed the definition of "The Helsinki Man" yet again. Both comes come from the Helsinki man, yes, but as you know, he has been duplicated, and now the H-man has become the HM-man in M, and the HW-man in W, and both told me that they have seen, from their direct first person experience (liked asked) that they saw only once city. If they do the experience again, both told me that they would bet P(one-city) = P(W v M) = 1. > You just want a change of definition of personal identity, I'm not picky, you are free to give any definition to personal identity that you like, all I ask is that you use it consistently, but apparently that is too much to ask. You dismiss the 3-1 p and the 1p content of the experience. You just did it even more explicitly than usual above. You confused the interviewer's diary, containing the description of the two diaries, containing each one only one city, with the diaries of each, which indeed contains only one city. Yopu don't do the tought experiement. If you do it, you know that it leads to a set of two incompatible first person experience "surviving in M" and "surviving in W". They are incompatible from the first person experience. That both experience exist in the third person view of the experiencers makes it determinist for that third party, but not for the first person view of the experiencers. > In step 3 there is no delays (or no explicit delay). Step four is when we introduce an explicit and long delay (say one year). Do you think that such a delay would change anything in the Probability evaluated in Helsinki? No, the probability that the Helsinki Man would see BOTH cities in the future would remain at 100%, provided of course that "The Helsinki Man" still means somebody who remembers being a man in Helsinki. In the 3-1 view, but complete non-sense for the 1-views, on which the question was asked. My feeling is that you really fake to not understand the question, as you systematically refuse to revise your opinion after the following simple refutation. The Helsinki guy write "W and M" in its diary. he pushed on the button, which cut him+diary and paste them in W and in M. Simple comp predicts that in W, the H-guy opens the door and sees only W and ~M (as those letters refers to the first person experience, not the intellectual belief), and that in M, the H-guy opens the door and sees only M and ~W. Both concludes that P(W & M) was 0, and know better, now (hopefully). Both actually remained in the respective city, as they both met the woman of their life, and both married them, and they lived happily ever after. Their will be one entry in the biography, but two different lives after the duplication. God can know you live them both (but then you are living mine also, btw), but each of them have two very different lives from their first person perspective, definitely in M, or W, and not in something like "W and M" from that first person perspective. Just keep that distinction, and the ambiguity you see is solved, with the obvious price here of indeterminacy on the content of the first person experience in the self-duplications. Then what is interesting, is that this 1p-indeterminacy remains invariant for a sequence of transformations of the protocols, leading eventually to the problem of justifying the physical laws from theoretical computer science or number theory (or combinator theory, ...). (and then "AUDA" (the Arithmetical Universal Doevtailer Argument) just does that: it extracts a quantum-like quantization from machine self-referential bet on the consistent sigma_1 extensions). Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
