On 16 Jul 2015, at 03:38, chris peck wrote:
>> Simple comp predicts that in W, the H-guy opens the door and sees
only W and ~M (as those letters refers to the first person
experience, not the intellectual belief), and that in M, the H-guy
opens the door and sees only M and ~W. Both concludes that P(W & M)
was 0, and know better, now (hopefully).
Nah. The Helsinki guy predicts that he will see both cities and that
encompasses the prediction that both his duplicates will
individually see only one.
Precisely, the Helsinki guy predicts that 3-he (or 3-I) will see both
cities, and that implies that both his 1-he (or 1-I) will see only one.
Now the question was about his 1p view (1-I, or 1-he), so this entails
P(W v M) = 1, and P(W & M) = 0.
The fact neither duplicate will see two cities doesn't effect
Helsinki guy's expectancies.
It does when you remind that the question is about his expectation
about his first personal experience, not about where his body (or the
1p associated to it) will be. Once you get that, it is obvious that in
Helsinki, "W & M" will be refuted at both place.
They can not be in two places at once,
That's the key point leading to the 1p indeterminacy, as the
prediction is about its experience, and he will never experience being
in the two places, making immediately P(W & M) = 0.
but through the magic of duplication Helsinki guy will be. He
expects to be both of his future selves even though they would not
expect to be each other.
Then we are already all the same person, which is probably true, but
useless to make any prediction for any personal experiences. For
example, in QM, this strategy predicts I will see both the electron
(supposed to be in the 1/sqrt(2)(up+down) in the (up* and* down) state
where both Copenhagen and Everett gives a probability one half.
But when 3-1 is in both W and M (or seeing up and down), the 1-I can
see either up OR down, respectively either W or M.
There is no contradiction here as Clark has pointed out with
excruciating and what must amount to inhuman patience over many many
years. Neither duplicate would conclude that P(W & M) was 0 for
their mutual ancestor and the fact they only see one city wouldn't
be considered by either of them to be evidence that he was wrong.
Only by dismissing the question asked, and confusing the third person
description of the first person experience and their explicit content.
Its painfully obvious you have confused P(W||M)(W&M) with P(H)(W&M)
and this is about P(H)(W&M). 1p 3p 1p-3p 3p-1p or even no pee pee.
No clue what you say here. But above you seem to painfully imitate
John Clark's persistent confusion about the 3p view on the 1p views,
and the 1p-views themselves on which the question was all about.
You don't refute the 1p indeterminacy, you just change the original
question, like if it would have been asked about the third person
description of where he will be localized? But he is asked to predict
what he will see from his first person view, which by comp, as you say
yourself above, cannot feel the split and cannot feel to be at both
place at once, making P(W v M) = 1, and P(W and M) = 0.
Bruno
From: [email protected]
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark
Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 19:34:18 +0200
On 15 Jul 2015, at 18:08, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Jul 15, 2015 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
>> one place plus one place equals two places.
>But a place is a 3p notion.
"I" is 1p and I have a notion of place.
Actually this contradicts your statement that consciousness is not
localized from its pov. But that might be not relevant here.
"I" is 1p, well the 1-I is, OK, and that does not prevent it
localise itself, sure. But the point is that adding another "1-I"
elsewhere will not make any 1-one feeling being two.
> For the M-guy, the presence or absence of the W guy will not
change anything in its immediate experience
Agreed.
OK.
> (on which the prediction was asked).
No, the prediction was about what would happen to the H-guy and
the M-guy's fate is only part of the story, the W-guy's tale is just
as important.
That is why in all illustration I interview always both the M-guy
and the W-guy. Did you see one or two city, in your direct sensula
experience? Both told me; we have seen only one city behind the
door. That confirms P(one-city) = 1. And thus P(W v M) = 1. Even
with the exclusive OR.
> that guy in Helsinki believes in computationalism, and so
believe that as a person he will survive,
OK.
OK.
> and he knows that wherever he will feel to have survived,
That guy in Helsinki knows that that guy in Helsinki
will feel to have survived in TWO cities.
How could anyone FEEL to have survived in both city. Both will FEEL
to survive in one city, and as far as they know, the doppelganger
might not yet exist, nor ever exist. They both have to wait for a 3p
confirmation, and both will wrote in the diary: I survived in M
(resp W) and I am waiting the news that the doppelganger has been
well reconstituted in W (resp M).
>he will feel to be in one city,
If that guy in Helsinki believes in computationalism then
that guy in Helsinki knows that the personal pronoun "he" in the
above is ambiguous
It is not ambiguous. He refers to both guys, and they are those that
we will interview to confirm or refute the prediction. "he" is the
guy in helsinki and is the guy who will remember having been the guy
in Helsinki. Once duplicated the 1p diverge, and that is why we ask
what he (that guy) expects to FEEL after pushing on the button.
You will claim that we change the definition, only when we remind
that the prediction bear on the first person experience content.
That is all the precision we need, and that changes the 3-1 "and"
into the 1p "or", as nobody can feel to be in both city
simultaneously. You said yourself, there are two persons after the
duplication. each has its own unique first person experience,
despite being both a legitimate Helsinki-guy.
and that is why Bruno Marchal insists on using so many of them,
they paint over flaws in the logical edifice of Bruno Marchal.
>> So if 2 cities is not the correct answer to the question
"how many cities will the guy in Helsinki see?" you're going to need
to change the meaning of "the guy in Helsinki".
> I don't have to change the meaning of "the guy in
Helsinki" (or better: the guy who remember being or having be the
guy in Helsinki").
So the guy who remembers being the Helsinki Man yesterday will see
TWO cities but the guy who remembers being the Helsinki Man
yesterday will see only one city. Mr. Marchal, it's going to take
more than ICT3PWT1P to get out of that logical black hole.
You repeat yourself, see above. Once again, you dismiss the 1p and
3p difference to introduce an ambiguity which is not there.
> I have only to interview them in W and in M to see that the
experience possibles have all a content describing only one city.
If both are interviewed then TWO cities will be described
In the diary of the interviewer. But in the diary of each survivors,
you will see only "W", or "M", not "or I feel to be in two cities at
once" (that asks for telepathy).
and both descriptions come from the Helsinki Man, unless you've
changed the definition of "The Helsinki Man" yet again.
Both comes come from the Helsinki man, yes, but as you know, he has
been duplicated, and now the H-man has become the HM-man in M, and
the HW-man in W, and both told me that they have seen, from their
direct first person experience (liked asked) that they saw only once
city. If they do the experience again, both told me that they would
bet P(one-city) = P(W v M) = 1.
> You just want a change of definition of personal identity,
I'm not picky, you are free to give any definition to personal
identity that you like, all I ask is that you use it consistently,
but apparently that is too much to ask.
You dismiss the 3-1 p and the 1p content of the experience. You just
did it even more explicitly than usual above. You confused the
interviewer's diary, containing the description of the two diaries,
containing each one only one city, with the diaries of each, which
indeed contains only one city.
Yopu don't do the tought experiement. If you do it, you know that it
leads to a set of two incompatible first person experience
"surviving in M" and "surviving in W". They are incompatible from
the first person experience. That both experience exist in the third
person view of the experiencers makes it determinist for that third
party, but not for the first person view of the experiencers.
> In step 3 there is no delays (or no explicit delay). Step
four is when we introduce an explicit and long delay (say one year).
Do you think that such a delay would change anything in the
Probability evaluated in Helsinki?
No, the probability that the Helsinki Man would see BOTH cities in
the future would remain at 100%, provided of course that "The
Helsinki Man" still means somebody who remembers being a man in
Helsinki.
In the 3-1 view, but complete non-sense for the 1-views, on which
the question was asked.
My feeling is that you really fake to not understand the question,
as you systematically refuse to revise your opinion after the
following simple refutation. The Helsinki guy write "W and M" in its
diary. he pushed on the button, which cut him+diary and paste them
in W and in M.
Simple comp predicts that in W, the H-guy opens the door and sees
only W and ~M (as those letters refers to the first person
experience, not the intellectual belief), and that in M, the H-guy
opens the door and sees only M and ~W. Both concludes that P(W & M)
was 0, and know better, now (hopefully).
Both actually remained in the respective city, as they both met the
woman of their life, and both married them, and they lived happily
ever after. Their will be one entry in the biography, but two
different lives after the duplication. God can know you live them
both (but then you are living mine also, btw), but each of them have
two very different lives from their first person perspective,
definitely in M, or W, and not in something like "W and M" from that
first person perspective. Just keep that distinction, and the
ambiguity you see is solved, with the obvious price here of
indeterminacy on the content of the first person experience in the
self-duplications.
Then what is interesting, is that this 1p-indeterminacy remains
invariant for a sequence of transformations of the protocols,
leading eventually to the problem of justifying the physical laws
from theoretical computer science or number theory (or combinator
theory, ...).
(and then "AUDA" (the Arithmetical Universal Doevtailer Argument)
just does that: it extracts a quantum-like quantization from machine
self-referential bet on the consistent sigma_1 extensions).
Bruno
John K Clark
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