On 18 Jul 2015, at 18:54, John Clark wrote:
And if "he" means a being who remembers being a man in Helsinki, and Bruno Marchal has said more than once that is what is meant, then the probability of "he" experiencing one and only one city is zero.
The probability of he (or anyone, actually) *experiencing* one and only one city is one.
Proof: let do the experience and ask after the duplication has been completed to all the guys---who remembers being the guy who was in Helsinki before the duplication---how many cities they have seen behind the door. All can only answer I have seen (experience) only one city. So P(W and M) = 0 was correct for both, and P(W v M) = 1 was correct for both, when, of course, "W" and "M" each refers to the first person experience content, and not to the third person description of those possible first person experiences.
"W and M" for the first person apprehension by a machine of its self- localisation is simply meaningless, when we assume digital mechanism. In particular, the guy would have been lied and told that it is a simple (without duplication) tele-transportation to W or M with a random coin, he would not have known that he has been duplicated at all. From a first person view, a duplication does not duplicate, in any first person sensible way, the first person experience. Then the indeterminacy does not depend if the duplicate is in a far away galaxy, in a parallel universe, or even (as is shown later) in the very elementary (Sigma_1) arithmetical reality. If not you add either new Turing emulable relations, and the level was just wrong; or you add non Turing emulable relations, but then we have to compare them with the non Turing emulable reality with which all machines are already confronted too, by theoretical computer science and the First Person Indeterminacy.
You are just not taking the definition given. It is very simple, if you take the definition of the third person definition of first person notions used here. The only way to confirm the expectations is in interviewing the copies, about their experience (not about what they imagine).
Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
