On 22 Jul 2015, at 01:11, chris peck wrote:
>> Two mutually exclusive first person experiences cannot be a first
person experience.
Obviously. if I could experience M and W simultaneously they would
not be exclusive by definition .
If anyone besides you thinks I would argue any different they should
look again.
Nice. But then you can't avoid the FPI.
I argued that in worlds with duplication machines I can expect my
future to involve numerous mutually exclusive perspectives. That
isn't the same.
Sure, that is the correct 3p answer, but if you agree that the
experience W is exclusive with the experience M, then the FPI (the
objective indeterminacy on the subjective experiences) follows.
The probability of me seeing Moscow from a first person perspective
after duplication is governed by two things which have nothing to do
with 1p or 3p perspectives:
That is self-contradictory.
whether or not, prior to duplication, I am justified in thinking the
person post duplication will be me ... and your set up insists upon
this.... and whether at least one duplicate will be in Moscow and
your set up also guarantees this. Neither of these statements are
dependent on perspective. Tegmark's bird and frog would agree on
both. But nevertheless, it follows directly from these two
statements that the probability of me seeing Moscow would be 1. Its
just guaranteed by your set up and the way you define your terms.
You have not answer Quentin question. Do you think that if we send a
beam of polarized photon on an analyser in the oblic direction, the
probability that eleven photon go through the analyser is equal to 1?
Interviewing the W-guy is enough to see that P(M) = 1 was wrong. In W
the guy is forced to agree with this, or to confuse 1p and 3p, or to
ignore that the question was about his next 1p, seen in the 1p view
(not on the 1p seen in the 3p view).
The specter of chance in step 3 stems from the idea of there being 1
person and two cities. But that is an incomplete description of the
set up. There is 1 person and then that person in each city.
And as nobody can be in two cities at once from an 1p view, this
confirms the FPI.
You are not betting on a flicked coin you are placing bets on red
and black and then spinning a roulette wheel.
Nobody will bet on "red and black", as P("red and black") = 0.
Bruno
Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2015 18:02:58 -0400
Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark
From: [email protected]
To: [email protected]
On Tue, Jul 21, 2015 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
> Two mutually exclusive first person experiences cannot be a
first person experience.
They can if the first person experience has been duplicated
because that's what the word "duplicated" means.But of course
ICT1PWT3P,
> So I guess this is just the traditional John Clark's
confusion between the 1-1 and 3-1 views.
Yep, as you've pointed out many many MANY times, all the problems
with your theory and all the mysteries of the universe can be
solved by ICT3PWT1P.
> To explain the error here, sometimes I imagine a guy who win
a price: going to Mars, but the law of his country forbid self-
annihilation, and so he can only be copied and pasted on Mars.
Why is it that in all such thought experiments it's always the
original's viewpoint that is followed and never the copies?
> "--No problem" he said, I expect to live both experiences
No problem, I expect to live both experiences provided that
"I" means whoever remembers being in Helsinki right now. And what
else could "I" mean?
> he go in the copy machine, is read, and pasted on Mars. But
the "copy" on Mars is disappointed, because when he
opened the door and sees only Mars. in front on me on Earth,
So he goes into the copy machine, is read, and
pasted on Mars. And the "copy" on Mars is not
disappointed when "he" (somebody who remembers
being in Helsinki) opened the door and "he" sees only Mars and no
sign of Earth because that is exactly what "he"expected to
happen. If Bruno Marchal does not like that fact then
Bruno Marchal is going to need to change the meaning of "he".
> He asked: did the copy occur? We told him that "yes" his copy
is on Mars.
He asked: did the original survive? We told him that "yes"
his original is on Earth.
> he realized that the one staying on Erath, will just not
experience the adventure on Mars.
Not being a complete imbecile the copy realized that the original
on Earth will just not experience the adventure on Mars.
> He can intellectually conceive that he survived on Mars
through that doppelganger, but that is a meagre consolation
Although that is what "he" expected to happen when "he" diverged
because that's what "diverged" means.
> If he repeat that experience, the probability that he
[...]
A example of personal pronoun addiction.
> See above.
Why?
> Let us read the diary.
Why?
> In Helsinki he wrote "I expect to have both experiences in
the first person sense".
And Mr.I did indeed have both experiences in the first person
sense, for proof of that just ask the two people who call themselves
Mr. I.
> In Moscow, well, he sees only Moscow
Another example of personal pronoun addiction.
> and so conclude that he was wrong.
And John Clark concludes that "he" doesn't know what "he"
means.
> (even if he sees a video showing that he has successfully
been reconstituted in Washington; but he cannot feel the W experience
Not true, for proof just ask a Mr. He. A Mr. He who says "I
feel the W experience" can always be found.
> even Clark admits, there are two streams of consciousness,
Well of course there are two streams of consciousness after the
duplication because HE has been duplicated and that's what
"duplicated means.
But of course ICT1PWT3P,
John K Clark
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