On 23 Jul 2015, at 01:25, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/22/2015 12:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Jul 2015, at 19:42, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/21/2015 10:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
So maybe one could see W AND W the same way I can see my
computer screen AND my dog - just by attending to one or the
other.
You will need a long neck to attend a conference in Moscow, and a
party in Washington. You can use a tele-vision system, and
communicate by SMS, but unless you build a new corpus callosum
between the two brains, and fuse the limbic system, by comp, the
two "original" persons have become two persons, having each its
unique experience. That follows from mechanism, and so P(W xor M)
= 1, and P(W & M) = 0, as no one can open door in Moscow, and see
some other city in the direct way of the first person experience.
It follows from physics.
We don't know that.
Then why did you assert the necessity of a physical connection: "You
will need a long neck to attend a conference in Moscow, and a party
in Washington."
Because we are at the step 3 protocol. The point is logical. Comp
assumes a physical reality stable enough to have computer working
deterministically, without anything non Turing emulable in them.
Only later we will understood, from the reasoning, that such a physics
needs to be extracted from arithmetic.
We just assume that the physics is rich enough to implement locally
universal machine, so that comp make sense, but then we arrive at
the computationalist difficulties. Physics assume a brain/mind link
which has to be justified, and the UDA shows the change we have to
introduce.
But you have effectively asserted that the duplicate persons at
different locations do not experience both locations - their minds
are separate because their brains are.
Yes, as we assume computationalism (and thus some amount of physics
needed to be able to say yes to a doctor). What is not assumed is that
such a physical reality is primitive. Later, we get the proof that it
cannot be primitive, and that such physics has to be derived from RA,
or, if it contradicts it, we will refute computationalism.
If that is more than just an assumption it is because it is
relying on the physical basis of mind.
I don't think so. At this stage it relies on some physics, to
implement computer. It does not rely on the fact that such physics is
primitive, and so it does not rely on the existence of a physical
basis of mind. By definition of comp, it relies only on the fact that
we are in a physical universe in which we can implement locally
universal machine. No possibility to say "yes" to a doctor without it.
If you reject the physical basis of mind then you might expect the
duplicates to share one mind.
Not at all, because we know, or have good reason to believe, that our
brain are physical, and that our human consciousness needs it to
manifest itself relatively to others and relatively to the physical
universe. The conclusion of the UDA never put any doubt on this. It
rejects only the idea that physicalism is true. No problem at all with
physics, as long as the empirical world confirms the physics extracted
from Robinson Arithmetic (and computationalism) as it does up to now.
At some point we use only that
(p -> ~p) -> ~p.
(with p being for example the physical supervenience thesis.
Bruno
Brent
But does it follow from UD computations?
It should, (at step 7 and 8) and the point is only that it is
testable.
Up to now, it is working well. But to explain this, we need to dig
deeper in computer science.
Are you OK with the steps 0-6? 0-7? From your other posts, I think
you were OK. So we can perhaps come back on step 8. I think Bruce
Kellet has also some problem there. That can only be more
intersting than the nonsense about step 3 that we can hear those
days.
Bruno
Brent
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