On 23 Jul 2015, at 05:09, chris peck wrote:
Quentin
>> Then under MWI, same thing you're garanteed to see all results,
so probability should also be one
Deterministic branching leads to trouble rendering the idea of
probability coherent. Go figure! Who would ever have guessed
determinism and chance were difficult to marry...
Computationalism, once the 1p/3p distinction is made clear, put
transparent, 3p describable, light on this.
(Determinism + ontology rich enough to duplicate oneself) ===> chance.
Even Tegmark "rediscovered" this in his recent book, as Jason Resch
quoted once.
Then elementary arithmetic confirms the quantum probabilities logic(s)
with the []p & <>t (and some others) views. That is, at the exact
place(s) forced by the UD Argument.
This is pure math and has been thoroughly verified. It is not well
known because few physicists dare to think on Gödel's theorem
(especially after Penrose), and few logicians knows about Everett.
Well, there are other factors which are more contingent.
The point is that computationalism explains that 3p-determinism
entails 1p-indeterminism.
Bruno
Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark
To: [email protected]
From: [email protected]
Date: Wed, 22 Jul 2015 16:25:00 -0700
On 7/22/2015 12:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Jul 2015, at 19:42, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/21/2015 10:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
So maybe one could see W AND W the same way I can see my computer
screen AND my dog - just by attending to one or the other.
You will need a long neck to attend a conference in Moscow, and a
party in Washington. You can use a tele-vision system, and
communicate by SMS, but unless you build a new corpus callosum
between the two brains, and fuse the limbic system, by comp, the two
"original" persons have become two persons, having each its unique
experience. That follows from mechanism, and so P(W xor M) = 1, and
P(W & M) = 0, as no one can open door in Moscow, and see some other
city in the direct way of the first person experience.
It follows from physics.
We don't know that.
Then why did you assert the necessity of a physical connection: "You
will need a long neck to attend a conference in Moscow, and a party
in Washington."
We just assume that the physics is rich enough to implement locally
universal machine, so that comp make sense, but then we arrive at
the computationalist difficulties. Physics assume a brain/mind link
which has to be justified, and the UDA shows the change we have to
introduce.
But you have effectively asserted that the duplicate persons at
different locations do not experience both locations - their minds
are separate because their brains are. If that is more than just an
assumption it is because it is relying on the physical basis of
mind. If you reject the physical basis of mind then you might
expect the duplicates to share one mind.
Brent
But does it follow from UD computations?
It should, (at step 7 and 8) and the point is only that it is
testable.
Up to now, it is working well. But to explain this, we need to dig
deeper in computer science.
Are you OK with the steps 0-6? 0-7? From your other posts, I think
you were OK. So we can perhaps come back on step 8. I think Bruce
Kellet has also some problem there. That can only be more intersting
than the nonsense about step 3 that we can hear those days.
Bruno
Brent
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