John,
The vulgarity and the insults hides hardly that you are doing the C13
confusion again.
Oh, sorry, by C13, I mean your YCT1PAT3P, of course.
You really begin to look like this little guy, except it is adorable
(I am less sure for you, to be honest):
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lsqt2ywSqTQ
Hmm... taking the risk to annoy a bit Quentin, I will still comment
this:
If it's important then provide it. Obviously the definition
of "you" as being somebody who remembers being a man in Helsinki is
not getting the job done, so lets have some extra verbiage in that
definition so it could be logically said "you will see only one city".
"you" refer to the guy in Helsinki, and its copies which are in W and M.
But, in Helsinki, the question is about what you expect to live as
next first person experience. And here computationalism provides the
solution: it can only be one experience among W and M. Not both, as a
computer in one room cannot get the information of another computer in
another room without being connected to it.
You are in W and you are in M, but that say nothing about the
subjective first person experience, which is what we are looking about
in step 3. To get it, we can interview both copies.
You have agreed that their subjective experiences, being in M and
being in W, have become incompatible. so the next possible
experiences, when in Helsinki, can only be either W or M.
Usually, we can confuse 3-you and 1-you, as it looks like there is a
bijection between them, but that is not the case after the duplication
(nor before, actually). Each 3-you is in both places (W & M), but each
1-you feels to be in either W, or M, satisfying both "W v M".
Now, what you do, is, instead of listening to the 1-you, you ask
yourself where those 1-you are, but this gives the 3-1 view, not the 1-
view asked (or the 1-1-view, or the 1-1-1-view ...).
You see, C13 again and again and again and again ... The question is
not on the 3-you, not even on the 1-you, but to the 1-you, in
Helsinki, about what he expects to live as next experience. This makes
the only way to verify it into interviewing *all* copies. In this
case, a child can see that they all agrees with the W v M prediction,
and they all refute the W & M prediction.
Bruno
On 27 Jul 2015, at 00:22, John Clark wrote:
On Sun, Jul 26, 2015 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>>> "you" always denotes the guy who remember pushing the
button at Helsinki.
>> That is actually a pretty good definition of "you" in
that it's similar to the intuitive feeling we have for the pronoun
that we get from everyday life; it would be even better if Bruno
used it consistently.
> You say that often, but never show the inconsistency
Bullshit!.
> Obviously I agree that one person can not have a first person
experience with 2 different cities at the safe time, but 2
people certainly can.
> But two people is not a person.
That is usually the case, but people duplicating machines are
not usual.
> There is no unique first person attached to it, unless you
introduce telepathy
Again with the idiot telepathy!
> that is contradicted directly by the two persons whose diaries
Again with the idiot diaries!
>>The only way out is for Bruno to add some verbiage to the
definition of "you". Then maybe Bruno could logically say "you will
only see one city even though John Clark will see 2", although
I'm not entirely sure what that extra verbiage would be.
> That "verbiage" is the important distinction between the first
person account of experience, and a third person
If it's important then provide it. Obviously the definition
of "you" as being somebody who remembers being a man in Helsinki is
not getting the job done, so lets have some extra verbiage in that
definition so it could be logically said "you will see only one city".
> You have agreed that you don't die in the process,
John Clark has agreed that Bruno Marchal will not die in the
process, and "you" will not die in the process either, at least not
under the old definition of "you"; but under the new improved
definition of "you" with the extra verbiage (which nobody has seen
yet) it is unknown if "you" will survive.
> 1) you live your life up until you arrive at Helsinki and push the
button, open the door, and observe the city of Washington.
2) you live your life up until you arrive at Helsinki and
push the button, open the door, and observe the city of Moscow.
Both can see that P(W & M) was 0 in Helsinki,
Both can see that the symbol "P" in the above is ambiguous.
The probability of who seeing what? And both can also see that the
probability of Bruno Marchal clearing up that ambiguity without
introducing person pronouns with their own ambiguity or using "the"
instead of "a" is zero.
> Some could even say that P(W & M) is not even zero, but a non-
sensical question
Yes some could say that. And some would say that P(W)=1 because
the probability of the Washington Man seeing Washington is 1, and
some would say that P(M) =1 because the probability of the
Moscow Man seeing Moscow is 1, and Bruno himself says that H=
W&M, so some would say that P(W&M) =1 means that the probability The
Helsinki Man will see W and M is 1. But then Bruno says that is not
what P(W&M) means.... what it does mean remains ambiguous.
> you seems to not realize that after the duplication, the
experience has diverged into two quite different experiences:
Don't be ridiculous, of course I realize that because that is what
"diverged" means, one thing becoming 2 things. The point of
divergence occurs when past experiences are the same but future
experiences are different.
> The experience of living in W or in M, and not
in both,
But the question was not asked of the man in W or of the man in M,
it was asked of the man in H.
> Do you understand now?
Oh yes. Do you?
John K Clark
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