On Sun, Jul 26, 2015 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > >> > "you" always denotes the guy who remember pushing the button at Helsinki. >
> > > > > That is actually a pretty good definition of "you" in that it's similar > to the intuitive feeling we have for the pronoun that we get from > everyday life; it would be even better if Bruno used it consistently. > > You say that often, but never show the inconsistency Bullshit!. > Obviously I agree that one person can not have a first person experience > > with 2 different cities at the safe time, but 2 people certainly can. > > But two people is not a person. That is usually the case, but people duplicating machines are not usual. > > > There is no unique first person attached to it, unless you introduce > telepathy Again with the idiot telepathy! > that is contradicted directly by the two persons > > > whose diaries Again with the idiot diaries! >> > The only way out is for Bruno to add some verbiage to the definition of > "you". Then maybe Bruno could logically say "you will only see one city > even though > > John Clark will see 2", although I'm not entirely sure what that extra > > verbiage would be. > > That "verbiage" is the important distinction between the first > person account of experience, and a third person If it's important then provide it. Obviously the definition of "you" as being somebody who remembers being a man in Helsinki is not getting the job done, so lets have some extra verbiage in that definition so it could be logically said "you will see only one city". > > You have agreed that you don't die in the process, John Clark has agreed that Bruno Marchal will not die in the process, and "you" will not die in the process either, at least not under the old definition of "you"; but under the new improved definition of "you" with the extra verbiage (which nobody has seen yet) it is unknown if "you" will survive. > 1) you live your life up until you arrive at Helsinki and push the button, > > open the door, and observe the city of Washington. > > 2) you live your life up until you arrive at Helsinki and push the button, > > open the door, and observe the city of Moscow. > > B > oth can see that P(W & M) was 0 in Helsinki, Both can see that the symbol "P" in the above is ambiguous. The probability of who seeing what? And both can also see that the probability of Bruno Marchal clearing up that ambiguity without introducing person pronouns with their own ambiguity or using "the" instead of "a" is zero. > > Some could even say that P(W & M) is not even zero, but a non-sensical > question Yes some could say that. And some would say that P(W)=1 because the probability of the Washington Man seeing Washington is 1, and some would say that P( M ) =1 because the probability of the Moscow Man seeing Moscow is 1, and Bruno himself says that H= W&M, so some would say that P(W&M) =1 means that the probability The Helsinki Man will see W and M is 1. But then Bruno says that is not what P(W&M) means.... what it does mean remains ambiguous. > > > you seems to not realize that after the duplication, the experience > > has diverged into two quite different experiences: Don't be ridiculous, of course I realize that because that is what "diverged" means, one thing becoming 2 things. The point of divergence occurs when past experiences are the same but future experiences are different. > > T > > he experience of > > living in W or in M, and not in both, But the question was not asked of the man in W or of the man in M, it was asked of the man in H. > Do you understand now? Oh yes. Do you? John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
