Bruno, don't bother, he will not understand, because he already does, and he will never admit it, because he's a troll. Case closed, ignore him, he won't go from this list, seems to joyful for him, so the only way is to ignore him.
Quentin 2015-07-26 11:58 GMT+02:00 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>: > > On 25 Jul 2015, at 22:38, John Clark wrote: > > On Sat, Jul 25, 2015 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > > >> Please, quote the whole text I wrote > > > No. Anybody who wants to read everything you wrote can find it in about > .9 seconds, they don't need me. > > > > It is the answer to them that we ask for. > > > > > > > "you" always denotes the guy who remember pushing the button at Helsinki. > > That is actually a pretty good definition of "you" in that it's similar > to the intuitive feeling we have for the pronoun that we get from everyday > life; it would be even better if Bruno used it consistently. > > > You say that often, but never show the inconsistency, nor reply to the > ragument showing your own inconsistency. > > > > > > > > Its only *first* person experience accessible are the incompatible W and M > *experience* > > Obviously I agree that one person can not have a first person > experience with 2 different cities at the safe time, but 2 people certainly > can. > > > But two people is not a person. There is no unique first person attached > to it, unless you introduce telepathy, and that would contradict the > protocol and the hypothesis. > > > > And there are now two people who remember pushing the button at Helsinki, > and if "you" really does "always denotes the guy who remember pushing the > button at Helsinki" then "you" will see Moscow *and *Washington, the > logic is inescapable. > > > > But that is contradicted directly by the two persons, whose diaries > confirms both that they were wrong, they BOTH see only once city. > > > > > > > > Bruno Marchal may find that conclusion repugnant > > > It is just invalid, and directly refuted by the facts. > > > > but logic doesn't care about human tastes, it remains true regardless. The > only way out is for Bruno to add some verbiage to the definition of "you". > Then maybe Bruno could logically say "you will only see one city even > though John Clark will see 2", although I'm not entirely sure what that > extra verbiage would be. > > > That "verbiage" is the important distinction between the first person > account of experience, and a third person account of it, when we attribute > a consciousness to a different person than oneself. > > Such a third person description confirms what you are saying: I will be in > the two cities, there are no problem there, but it avoids answering the > question which is about the subjective experience. > Using computationalism, it is just obvious that only two computational > histories are possible, and they are incompatible as you say above. Those > two experiences are: > > 1) you live your life up until you arrive at Helsinki and push the button, > open the door, and observe the city of Washington. > > 2) you live your life up until you arrive at Helsinki and push the button, > open the door, and observe the city of Moscow. > > Both can see that P(W & M) was 0 in Helsinki, and so learn that it was > erroneous. But the prediction of W v M is satisfied by both outcome, and > so, in Helsinki, the prediction P(W v M) will be believed, and if the > protocol is respected, the prediction is correct. > > Similarly, the prediction of the subjective experience in the iterated > case is "white noise", and it is indeed confirmed by all possible fair > sample of the population of the copies. On the contrary, despite it makes > sense to say that you are all copies in the 3p view on the 1-view, it is > simply false as a prediction of the subjective experiences accessible to > you from Helsinki. > > You just seems to omit that the question is a practical question of what > you can expect to experience. You have agreed that you don't die in the > process, and that the only two possible outcomes are incompatible from the > first person pov. As W and M represents those outcomes (and not the > localization of those outcomes) the answer "W & M" is simply inconsistent. > > You persist in not listening to the question asked in Helsinki (what first > person, subjective, experience do you expect to LIVE after pushing the > button, clarified notably by the means of verification given: "looking at > the diaries", which are described above, and describe incompatible > experiences. > > In fact, you seems to not realize that after the duplication, the > experience has diverged into two quite different experiences: one get W, > the other get M. For an outsider you (in the 3-1 sense, thus) are at both > places, but for the experiencer itself, in all case, it has become "I see a > precise city among {W, M} and imagine intellectually that I have a > doppelganger in the other city". As the question bears on the subjective > experience, the simple prediction P(W v M) = 1, and P(W & M) = 0. Some > could even say that P(W & M) is not even zero, but a non-sensical question > as for them it is directly obvious that W & M does not even describe a > possible experience. That is a splitting hair detail, as the point is that > P(W v M) = 1. The experience of living in W or in M, and not in both, is > lived by all the people concerned that we will interview. > > All right? There is no ambiguity on the personal identity. There is only, > in your way to address the question, an ambiguity about the question, that > you introduce by forgetting that we have, for all creature, distinguish the > possible first person account of the subjective experience (contained in > the diaries), and the 3-1 intellectual description of the person. It is not > verbiage, it is elementary computationalist cognitive science. It works as > well with robots than with human. > > Do you understand now? > > Bruno > > > John K Clark > > > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
