On 25 Jul 2015, at 22:38, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Jul 25, 2015 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
> Please, quote the whole text I wrote
No. Anybody who wants to read everything you wrote can find it in
about .9 seconds, they don't need me.
It is the answer to them that we ask for.
> "you" always denotes the guy who remember pushing the button
at Helsinki.
That is actually a pretty good definition of "you" in that it's
similar to the intuitive feeling we have for the pronoun that we get
from everyday life; it would be even better if Bruno used it
consistently.
You say that often, but never show the inconsistency, nor reply to the
ragument showing your own inconsistency.
>Its only *first* person experience accessible are the
incompatible W and M *experience*
Obviously I agree that one person can not have a first person
experience with 2 different cities at the safe time, but 2 people
certainly can.
But two people is not a person. There is no unique first person
attached to it, unless you introduce telepathy, and that would
contradict the protocol and the hypothesis.
And there are now two people who remember pushing the button at
Helsinki, and if "you" really does "always denotes the guy who
remember pushing the button at Helsinki" then "you" will see Moscow
and Washington, the logic is inescapable.
But that is contradicted directly by the two persons, whose diaries
confirms both that they were wrong, they BOTH see only once city.
Bruno Marchal may find that conclusion repugnant
It is just invalid, and directly refuted by the facts.
but logic doesn't care about human tastes, it remains true
regardless. The only way out is for Bruno to add some verbiage to
the definition of "you". Then maybe Bruno could logically say "you
will only see one city even though John Clark will see 2", although
I'm not entirely sure what that extra verbiage would be.
That "verbiage" is the important distinction between the first person
account of experience, and a third person account of it, when we
attribute a consciousness to a different person than oneself.
Such a third person description confirms what you are saying: I will
be in the two cities, there are no problem there, but it avoids
answering the question which is about the subjective experience.
Using computationalism, it is just obvious that only two computational
histories are possible, and they are incompatible as you say above.
Those two experiences are:
1) you live your life up until you arrive at Helsinki and push the
button, open the door, and observe the city of Washington.
2) you live your life up until you arrive at Helsinki and push the
button, open the door, and observe the city of Moscow.
Both can see that P(W & M) was 0 in Helsinki, and so learn that it was
erroneous. But the prediction of W v M is satisfied by both outcome,
and so, in Helsinki, the prediction P(W v M) will be believed, and if
the protocol is respected, the prediction is correct.
Similarly, the prediction of the subjective experience in the iterated
case is "white noise", and it is indeed confirmed by all possible fair
sample of the population of the copies. On the contrary, despite it
makes sense to say that you are all copies in the 3p view on the 1-
view, it is simply false as a prediction of the subjective experiences
accessible to you from Helsinki.
You just seems to omit that the question is a practical question of
what you can expect to experience. You have agreed that you don't die
in the process, and that the only two possible outcomes are
incompatible from the first person pov. As W and M represents those
outcomes (and not the localization of those outcomes) the answer "W &
M" is simply inconsistent.
You persist in not listening to the question asked in Helsinki (what
first person, subjective, experience do you expect to LIVE after
pushing the button, clarified notably by the means of verification
given: "looking at the diaries", which are described above, and
describe incompatible experiences.
In fact, you seems to not realize that after the duplication, the
experience has diverged into two quite different experiences: one get
W, the other get M. For an outsider you (in the 3-1 sense, thus) are
at both places, but for the experiencer itself, in all case, it has
become "I see a precise city among {W, M} and imagine intellectually
that I have a doppelganger in the other city". As the question bears
on the subjective experience, the simple prediction P(W v M) = 1, and
P(W & M) = 0. Some could even say that P(W & M) is not even zero, but
a non-sensical question as for them it is directly obvious that W & M
does not even describe a possible experience. That is a splitting hair
detail, as the point is that P(W v M) = 1. The experience of living in
W or in M, and not in both, is lived by all the people concerned that
we will interview.
All right? There is no ambiguity on the personal identity. There is
only, in your way to address the question, an ambiguity about the
question, that you introduce by forgetting that we have, for all
creature, distinguish the possible first person account of the
subjective experience (contained in the diaries), and the 3-1
intellectual description of the person. It is not verbiage, it is
elementary computationalist cognitive science. It works as well with
robots than with human.
Do you understand now?
Bruno
John K Clark
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