On 28 Jul 2015, at 03:46, chris peck wrote:
@ Bruno
>> Not at all. And John Calrk agrees with what I will say here.
personal identity is not a Leibnizian notion.
You need to focus on what these factors govern:
1) international tariffs.
2) the state of the chinese economy.
3) international demand for tea grown in china.
?
btw. I wasn't talking about Leibnizinan notions of identity. If you
were committed to that you wouldn't be you, let alone H, W or M, one
moment to the next. Even I don't think your metaphysics is that silly.
I can give you arguments but I can't understand them for you. You
have to do that bit.
Ah! OK. But then give the arguments. The one you gave up to now was a
C13 confusion.
That error has some interest, as its translation in arithmetic gives
the []p versus []p & p confusion, which is the main mistake made by
people who are unaware that Gödel's theorem imposes a different logic
for the 3-self (G) and the 1-self (S4Grz). I call it the Lucas-Penrose
error. It has been done by Emil Post and Benacerraf, who saw that by
themselves and correct it, unlike Lucas and Penrose. Well, Penrose saw
it, but did not take it into account for his philosophical conclusion.
UDA is for the babies, so, if, like some scientist, you have a problem
in thought experiment and philosophy of mind, you can look at its
translation in computer science and arithmetic. You can study the
logic of sef-reference in good books (Smullyan, Smorynski, Boolos
1979, Boolos 1993). The 3-view is given by []p (Gödel's beweisbar
predicate) and the 1-view is given by []p & p (the Theaetetus'
definition of the knower). Incompleteness, as I have explained,
differentiate them. The self-correctness implies that they prove the
same ([]p <-> []p & p, at the truth (G*) level), but the machine
cannot justify this, and indeed G and G* shows them to be very
different logics: a logic of representable belief, and a logic of non-
representable knowledge).
Still, you might try to give your argument. I will not answer it if it
is just the C13 error, as this is becoming boring given that everyone
on the list have understood this since a long time. So find a genuine
error, if you think there is one, or move to step 4, as your present
post here seems to be only literature without arguments at all.
Bruno
I don't think you'll ever fix step 3 unless you try a bit harder.
From: [email protected]
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark
Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2015 18:45:40 +0200
On 27 Jul 2015, at 05:04, chris peck wrote:
@ Bruno
[John] >> >> Bruno Marchal is correct, that is not ambiguous,
that is a flat out logical contradiction.
[Bruno] >> Where?
The problem arises because if "You" = "person who remembers
Helsinki" then you ought to be able replace one for the other
without truth values altering. Thats just logic 101.
Not at all. And John Calrk agrees with what I will say here.
personal identity is not a Leibnizian notion.
That is why in the math we wuse modal logic, which is not
Leibnizian. Let "Arthur believe p" be []p
zeta(2) = pi^2 / 6 entails zeta(2) is irrationaL IFF pi^2 / 6 is
irrational,
but [](zetat(2) is irrational) is not entailed by [](pi^2 / 6 is
irrational.
In intensional context, the Leibniz identity rule (two quantities
equal to a same third one are equal) is no more true.
John agrees with this, and he agrees explicitly on the fact that the
M guy and the H guy are the H guy, despite the M guy and the W guy
are different guy. Nothing weird here: personal identity is a modal
or intensional notion. The math exemplifies this in all details, and
all this ultimately related to pure simple extensional relation
between numbers.
But, according to you one of these two phrases is false:
"{You} will see only one city" <--- true according to Bruno.
"{person who remembers Helsinki} will see only one city". <--- false
according to Bruno.
No. I have never said that. All I say is that in Helsinki, i expect
myself to have the unique experience of being in a unique city. The
problem is not in the pronom, but in the undersanding that the
question bears on first person experiences, and not on third person
localization of the experience.
Since all you have done is replace one phrase for another you have
to accept that those phrases mean something different, otherwise
where does the difference in truth value come from?
Well, in modal context, it is doubly grave to not quote the chole
context. I never say what you, perhaps John, attriubute to me here,
but even if I said, it we are in a modal, intensional context, where
John and me agree that we cannot use the Leibniz identity rule.
"you" can not equal "person who remembers Helsinki", otherwise you
are contradicting yourself. You are saying it is true and false that
"you will see only one city".
You will see two cities. That is true for the third person points of
view.
You will see only one city. That is true as a prediction of the
subjective, first person, experience.
This has nothing to do with 1-p, 3-p, p-p confusions
It has everything to do with 1p and 3p pov, as I just illustrated
above. That's obvious as the question is about what you expect to
live from the first person point of view, and you don't expect to
have the experience of being in W and in M, but, as we assume comp,
you expect to live with certainty in either W or in M (as both
copies confirms after).
but is a direct consequence of how you define your terms, Bruno.
Sorry, but you just illustrate well that your and Clark's
misunderstanding comes from the 1p and 3p confusion.
The John Clark in Washington cannot deny he is the one having the
experience to live Washington and not in Moscow.
The John Clark in Moscow cannot deny he is the one having the
experience to live Moscow and not in Washington.
Both admits that the duplication has introduced an asymmetry, and
that they each got one bit of information.
Bruno
From: [email protected]
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark
Date: Fri, 24 Jul 2015 19:52:22 +0200
On 24 Jul 2015, at 19:03, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, Jul 24, 2015 at 1:11 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
>> Yes, after the duplication but before the door of the
duplicating chamber is opened John Clark may have a hunch that he
(at this point the personal pronoun is not ambiguous because
although there are 2 bodies they are identical so there is still
just one John Clark) will see Moscow when the door is opened and
make a bet. One of the John Clarks will win the bet and one will
not; it can never be determined if "he" won the bet because as soon
as the door was opened the 2 bodies were no longer identical, they
had different memories, so that personal pronoun becomes ambiguous.
> That contradict the fact that you have agreed that both
copies are the Helsinki guy.
After the bodies are duplicated but before the door is opened
there are 2 bodies but still only one Helsinki guy because they
are identical, when the door is opened they see different things
and thus diverge. They both remain the Helsinki guy because they
have equally vivid memories of being a guy in Helsinki, but they are
no longer each other because they diverged as soon as the door was
opened. I understand how that state of affairs would be strange, but
please explain how it is contradictory.
There is nothing contradictory.
On the contrary, that is a good explanation why P(W v M) = 1, when W
and M refer to the self-localization experience. As you said, the
experience diverge. For one Helsinki guy the measurement is W, and
so write W in the diary, and for the other the measurement gives M,
and he write M in his diary. Both agree that they could not have
predicted that result, except by betting "W v M", which is
undermined but true at both place, and obviously the experience "W
and M" is, well, not even an experience at all. It is half an
experience, and half an intellectual belief.
> There is no ambiguity, you are both guys.
"You" is both guys.
Intellectually. The experience have diverged, The outcome of the
self-localization are different. From now on, you are either a guy
living in Moscow having a doppelganger in Washington, OR a guy
living in Washington having a doppelganger in Moscow. You don't
become a mysterious entity experiencing both place simultaneously.
Both got one bit of information from the push+self-localization
measurement.
One guy will be in Moscow. One guy will be in Washington. But "you"
will see only one city.
yes, in Helsinki, you can be sure of that/ You push on a button,
open a door, and see only one city, and get a cup of coffee.
You have guessed right the other day. P(coffee) = 1 because "coffee"
is satisfied in both place. But "W or M" is also satisfied in both
place, and "W and M" is false in both place, as W and M refers to
the incompatible experience of seeing Moscow and seeing Washington
from the direct first person experience. Indeed, only the mysterious
entity experiencing both places could wriite W and M, by the
definition of the FIRST person experience denoted by W and M.
Bruno Marchal is correct, that is not ambiguous, that is a
flat out logical contradiction.
Where? it is W & M which is a flat out contradiction, when W and M
refers to the first person experience. One diary contains M, the
other contain W. None contain W and M. I hope you are OK with this.
I said it before I'll say it again, if Bruno Marchal wants the
words "you will only see one city" to be true Bruno Marchal is
going to have to change the meaning of the personal pronoun "you" ;
I don't have to change the meaning. Right at the start, the question
is about the expected outcome of a first person experience. You
agree that there is a divergence, so I guess you understood that one
write in the diary W, and the other write M. Those are what makes
the divergence to exist. I keep the meaning of "you", and you are in
both city, but the point is that in both city you see only once
city, so the bet P(one city) = 1 was correct, and P(I see two cities
at once when opening the box) = 0. The prediction is on the personal
experience of what is seen when opening the door. It is NOT on the
third person localization of those experiences.
somebody who remembers being a man in Helsinki just won't work.
It works perfectly well. After the duplication, I interviewed all
the guys who remember having been the guy pushing on the button in
Helsinki, and they all told me that indeed, as predicted, the self-
localizaton measurement gave as a result only once city. P(one city)
was equal as P(coffe), for the exact same reason: that is what is
lived by all the continuations.
Bruno
John K Clark
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
