On 11 Aug 2016, at 20:18, John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Aug 11, 2016 at 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
>> in general it's not true that they will perceiving
different things, if you were the identical copy and in a
symmetrical environment and facing your original the two of you
would see identical things, and if your position was instantaneously
exchanged with the original there would be no change in your
consciousness or of that of the original, neither of you could even
tell an exchange had occurred. So in that situation how could it
make sense to talk of "two different consciousnesses" when there
is clearly no difference between them?
> And this shows that you agree (implicitly at least) that in
the step 3 case, the two identical bodies interact with quite
different environment, and get their consciousness bifurcating/
differentiating.
Well of course I agree with that! One is conscious of Moscow and
the other is conscious of Washington, how could anyone say that's
not a difference, how could anyone say they're still identical?
> The "identical copies"
They were once identical but after seeing different cities they
are now nonidentical copies. And yet both are the Helsinki man. And
that is why establishing a personal sense of self can only come from
remembering the past and never from trying to predict the future.
> could not predict the first person result of the
differentiation.
Nobody and nothing will ever be able to predict "THE first
person result of the differentiation"
And given that we survive such duplication (assuming computationalism)
all what you say in this post confirms the unavoidable existence of
the First Person Indeterminacy.
"The" first person experience you will live is "the" experience, that
both copies witnesses when I interview them both, on their personal
experience, using my mobile phone, after their reconstitution. QED.
Bruno
because after differentiation "THE first person result of the
differentiation" is pure triple distilled extra virgin 100%
gibberish. Nobody will ever be able to predict "sjhfhzbawhfd" either.
John K Clark
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