On 09 Aug 2016, at 01:03, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Aug 08, 2016 at 09:06:20PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 8/08/2016 8:38 pm, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sun, Aug 07, 2016 at 09:24:31AM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
However, still no justification has been given for the assumption
that the duplicated consciousness differentiates on different
inputs. And consciousness is what computationalism is supposed to
be
giving an account of.
Obviously different inputs does not entail the differentiation of
consciousness.
In duplication there is still only one consciousness: and as you
say, different inputs do not entail the differentiation of a single
consciousness (associated with a single brain/body). So why would it
be different if the body were also duplicated?
However computational supervenience does imply the
opposite: differentiated consciousness entails a difference in
inputs.
There is no difficulty in understanding that differentiated
consciousness entails different persons, who may or may not
experience different inputs, but I doubt that differentiation of
consciousness necessarily entails different inputs - two people can
experience the same stimuli.
This directly contradicts computational supervenience. I'm pretty sure
that if you read the fine print, you'll find that computational
supervenience is part of the YD assumption, although that fact is
often glossed over. I vaguely recall challenging Bruno on this a
couple of years ago.
The computationalist assumption is, a priori: the physical-and-
computational supervenience, then step 8 shows that the "physical", in
this case, is not usable if not derived from arithmetic. That means
that physics is a branch of universal number theology (itself
derivable from Peano Arithmetic, or meta-derivable from Robinson
Arithmetic).
And that theology get testable through its physical part that we can
compare with nature.
I think our disagreement was on a subtler question concerning the very
sense of supervenience. But it is prematured to discuss this, I think,
with respect of the current thread.
Bruno
In the W/M experiment we are asked to suppose that the
duplicated persons do, in fact, notice that they've been
teleported to
a different city, and recognise where they they've been teleported
to.
There is no difficulty in accepting that there is consciousness of
two cities, but is that one consciousness, or two? You beg the
question by referring to plural 'persons'.
Two, because each consciousness is aware of different cities. They
each answer the question "Which city I am in?" in a different way, iw
it is a difference that makes a difference.
--
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Dr Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Senior Research Fellow [email protected]
Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au
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