On 19 Jul 2017, at 00:55, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Jul 18, 2017 at 3:51 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
>> I don't know what you're talking about, I haven't even
figured out what "the 1p view" is supposed to be much less agreed
that such a thing exists.
> Then you suffer from amnesia, or it is just a peak in your
bad faith attitude. In the UDA, the first person is described by the
content of the personal diary (the one which is duplicated in the
experience as the candidate takes it with him in the "cut and copy"
box.
Talk about amnesia! Just last post you said the 2 step out
of the person duplicating booth with identical memories and
holding identical diaries, so bad faith or not I haven't figured out
which one of the two has "THE 1p view" and its clear you haven't
figure that out either.
> Which of the 2 has THE 1p view?
> Of course, both.
Then it can't distinguish between the 2, then science has no use
for "THE 1p view" and it's just a waste of time.
Of course they can distinguish it. It is as easy as seeing the
difference between Moscow and Washington.
> Since day one, we have agreed that both copies have an 1-
view, and it is *the* 1-view in each of those perspective.
And for that very reason from day one in Bruno Marchal's very
elaborate "you" duplicating experiment where predictions about
"you" and "THE 1p view" are made in nearly every sentence John Clark
has been asking which of the two who step out that "you"
duplicating machine Bruno Marchal is referring too.
And everybody told you that both are that you. They are just different
now, and that explain why the ambiguity you describe is just the
inability toà make the prediction. You make my point in every
paragraph you write.
If it's both the the fancy duplicating machine serves no purpose and
is just a pointless distraction and neither the words "you" or " THE
1p view" contain any information.
> But the two identical brains bemongs to two different
cities, so when they open the door of the reconstitution boxes, each
brain imprint quite different input (indeed, one is W, the other is
M). It is *because* the brains are 100% identical, and then
differentiate, that the H-Guy, or the one in the
reconstitution boxes before the opening of the door, cannot
predict the specific city they will find themselves in.
Cannot predict? But you just correctly predicted it and so can the
man (singular) in the boxes (plural). The M guy will be the one that
sees M and the W guy will be the one that sees W. Where is the
mystery? There is nothing else to predict.
Well, either you thoink that the H-guy dies, and computationalism is
false, or that he survives, in which case, both are the H-guy, and
both admit they have differentiated when seeing which city is in front
of them, and both agrees they could not, for obvious computationalist
reason, predict their current experience. Again, you make my point
I don't remember if it was step 3 or not but it was at this point I
stopped reading your "proof".
>>If they have differentiated that means the way the
atoms are arranged in the 2 brains are no longer identical,
therefore what those 2 brains are doing (mind) is also no longer
identical, so it would be correct to say there are now two separate
conscious beings.
> Exactly. And both are the H-guy.
Yes both are the H-guy because both remember seeing H, but only
one of them is also the W-guy because only one of them also
remembers W. So which one will be the W-guy?
Of course, if we could answer this to the H-guy, there would be no
indeterminacy.
You are playing with words, and I am still trying to understand why.
The one that will see W of course.
That is correct, but the point is that this does not help the H-guy to
make the prediction.
Look, John, if there is no mystery, and no first person indeterminavy,
just give the algorithm for doing the prediction of the first person
experience. Don' come back with your "W and M", because a 10 year old
kid already can see this is nonsense: at no time ever comes a guy
claiming having seen the two cities, in that protocol.
You may say that is a stupid answer and you'd be right, but then it
was a stupid question. Nevertheless there is no mystery in any of
this and everything has been correctly predicted.
?
> It is the usual failure of the Leibniz identity rule.
The Leibniz identity rule applies to identical things, so
exchanging the two after the duplication but before the doors are
opened would make no difference to them or to the universe, but
after the doors are opened they are no longer identical so
exchanging them would make a difference. But Leibniz wasn't dumb
enough to say his rule applied to things that were different.
>>> The qualia, conscious part of the experience, is true, but
unexpressible.
>> Then why why why do you write post after post expressing
your opinion on the nature of consciousness?? Philosopher
Ludwig Wittgenstein had good advice when he said " What
we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence".
> What was Wittgenstein talking about?
I thought that was self evident what Wittgenstein was talking
about, it was was things "we cannot speak". And according to
what you say above that would include unexpressible things like
"the qualia, conscious part of the experience".
> See the math part of how this paradoxical state of affair is
solved by [...]
There is nothing to solve because there is nothing paradoxical.
Nobody said there was something paradoxical. Step 3 is just a
prelimnary step to understand why we have to derive physics from
arithmetical self-reference, and the math is needed to formalize the
notion of first person and third person.
A "you" duplicating machine would create a lot of
very strange situations unlike anything we see in ordinary life, but
none of them would be paradoxical, they'd just be odd.
Indeed. And they provide an expanlation of how a pure 3p determinist
situation gives rise to a strong form of first person (plural if
needed) indeterminacy. That is odd, but there is no mystery, as it
follows from computationalism.
>> You're talking about consciousness and belief is a
subjective emotional state with little or no relationship with
proof, just look at any religious believer.
> "belief" in the mundane sense is not used with the same
meaning than "belief" in religion.
I think it's the same thing, it's only a question of how strong
the evidence needs to be for someone to believe it; a logician may
believe that a mathematical relation is true because the proof seems
pretty ironclad, but he is always willing to entertain the
possibility, however remote, that the proof contains a error he
failed to see. However for everyday people and even for
mathematicians when they're not thinking about mathematics there is
usually a inverse relationship between the intensity of belief and
the evidence in support of it, and if there is actual evidence that
the belief is false then the belief it is true is the strongest of
all. Just listen to a 5 minute conversation about religion or
politics and see what I mean, the scientific method plays no part
whatsoever.
For the contingent reason that theology-the-science has been forbidden
by violent means, either by fundamentalist , left or right, christian,
atheist or islamist, that we still tolerate, sometimes, in some
academies.
>> When the doors are opened one sees Moscow and the
other sees Washington
> Exactly. That is why we have a prediction exercise to solve.
Exactly? Then exactly what is the prediction being sought and
exactly who is the prediction about? Please don't use personal
pronouns in response to this unless the personal pronoun duplicating
machine is removed from the thought experiment, then you can use
personal pronouns all you want. If the referent is always crystal
clear as you claim it should be a easy matter to humor me and simply
use the referent and not the personal pronoun, the only downside is
you'd have to type a few more letters but I think your fingers could
take the wear and tear.
See my numerous preceding posts, or read the papers which answers all
of this.
> It is equivalent with the H-guy saying that he will not see
two cities at once, which makes the point.
If the referent to the personal pronoun "he" in the above was "the
H-guy" then the prediction turned out not to be true, but if the
referent was something else then it could be true, and that
ambiguity will always happen if sloppy personal pronouns are used
around a personal pronoun duplicating machine. And that makes my
point.
> The prediction is about what will be seen after the self-
localization is made, of course.
What is "THE self-localization" and which one of the two
has it?
The one that both H-guy will discover after the duplication. It is
just plain obvious that it could not have been predicted. If the H-guy
predicted W, the M-guy existence refutes it. And vice versa. W & M is
impossible (as it is not a first person experience). Only "W v M" is
correct, (i.e. both copies necessarily agree on it), and it
exemplifies well the 1p indeterminacy.
Bruno
John K Clark
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