On 05 Aug 2017, at 18:30, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Aug 5, 2017 at 9:24 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
> That is why we have to make the question more precise, and
replace "1)" by either 1') "What will 1-you end up seeing?" or by
1'') "What will 3-you end up seeing?". In that case, given
that we assume computationalism (so we know that 1-we survive in one
unique city), the answer to 1') is "1-I expect to find myself in W
or in M", and the answer to 1") is I expect anybody to see 3-me in
both W and M.
Wow, that's a lot of homemade jargon crammed into a very small
space :
1) 1
2) 1'
3 1-I
4) 1-you
5) 3-you
6) 3-me
7) 1-we
I give you credit for not getting into the peepee this time but I
think 1-we is new.
Of course not, it is the first person plural. It is what you get when
we duplicate population of person. You have some friend in Helsinki
which desire accompany you in the experience. You are duplicate
together, and can make some bets on what they can expect to live.
The linear contagiousness of the quantum superposition makes the
quantum indeterminacy into a "mechanist" first person plural notion,
in Everett formulation of Quantum Mechanics.
If you want to be precise then say exactly what each of the above
end up seeing and how what they end up seeing differs from what all
the others see.
You can do it yourself easily, or ask, politely, what exactly you
don't understand. Stathis showed you that even a rat makes the
difference.
Once you said that the subjective experience is important, it is just
not understandable why you don't give any credit to what both copies
say.
> the person in Helsinki expect to survive
Expects? I have no idea what the person in Helsinki expects to
happen, nor do I care what he expects.
Ah! OK. You should have told us this before. You stop at step 3
because you are not interested in reasoning on fundamental matters.
However I do care about what does happen and that is that
2 PEOPLE not one will remember being the Helsinki man.
Excellent.
But that is part of the enunciation of the problem. Given what you say
here, what do you expect or can expect, or can evaluate, predict,
hope, fear, ... in Helsinki just before pushing on the button. That is
the question. I think you did agree that if coffee is offered two both
copies in each city, you can, at least, keeping in mind we assume
computationalism, expect soon drinking some cup of coffee, at least. OK?
To ask which one of the two is the real Helsinki man
and who has the "THE 1p" is just silly.
Nobody has ever disagree on this. Ever. We could say that
computationalism, well understood, is the agreement that both copies
opinion counts, and that they are both genuine continuers of the
"Helsinki" person.
But the point you seem to deny is that both copies have got a bit of
information. They knew it would be W v M, and each copy got a precise
answer. One has the W answer, and the other has the M answer.
> BTW you did not answer my last messages where this has been
explained. I also asked you a question there. I copy the message
below for your ease(*). Take all your time, but please avoid the ad
hominem stuff.
I did not give an answer because I was not asked a question.
You may have included a question mark in your remarks but you also
specifically said the following"
"The question is on the first person experience which will be
lived."
That's like claiming the discovery of a new form of indeterminacy
because the following "questions" have no answer:
I claim nothing, just pursue the reasoning instead of playing
semantical trick to hide your understanding.
In step 4 a delay of reconstitution is made in Moscow, and the guy in
Helsinki is warned about this. He knows the whole protocol. And the
question is does this introduces a difference in the WM expectations?
Here, the closer continuer theory of Robert Nozick, in his Philophical
Explanation, would suggest that P(W) is bigger than P(M), but ... that
would contradict step 2 (which you have agreed, at least once, and
which shows that delay of reconstitution in teleportation are not
first person noticeable.
How long is a piece of string?
How many eggs?
Which red blueberry is instantaneously redacted inside a jukebox?
Look, if you ask me a question I will do one of the following 3
things:
1) Give the correct answer.
2) Give a incorrect answer.
3) Say I don't know.
But I can't do any of those 3 things if I don't get a question, and
although a question mark is necessary to type a question it is not
sufficient.
What do you expect will you live when doing the WM duplication. You
expect to meet St-Peter or what?
Take the iterated case: you expect to see the developpement in binary
of pi, or an incompressible string?
With mechanism it is easy to predict that you will see a string, and
the question is to evaluate which one is more probable, or evaluate
the probable number of visit to Moscow when doing the experience 100
times.
You agree that both copies must be listened to, but then why you don't
listen to them. To each of them. You seem to be able to do it in
Everett QM, so you do have the cognitive ability to do that, and the
meeting or not of the copies is irrelevant, as you could judge if you
could pursue the reasoning.
Self-duplication, when the output are distinguishable, entails that
from the two first person point of view of the copies they did get one
bit of information. They were ignorant about "W v M", but now BOTH
knows better, the experience is done, and gave a definite result, W,
or M, from each first person obtained and which was *obviously*
unpredictable before pushing the button.
> The result has been known in the future by the first
person(s) involved.
Yes persons, that's plural, that means there are more than one,
and yet the "question" demands one and only one answer.
The question ask a mean to evaluate what you can expect from the first
person point of view. We want the best prediction possible, but they
can be distribution of probability, or measure of plausibility, etc.
You are not doing the experience, or not listelming to the question,
which might need some courage, I don't know, but the question is very
simple, what do you expect to live when you push on the button. You go
out of the body and only describe the 3p picture of the 1p
experoiences of the copies, not listening that what they say is that
they did got that bit of information. They can move on step 4 !
And that's why it's not a question. Specify which the "THE 1p" you
want to know about, the one in W or the one in M, and I'll give you
an answer, probably the correct answer.
> There is nothing paradoxical, as long as we distinguish the
1p and 3p discourses.
I agree, talking about the "THE 1-p" in a world that contains 1-p
duplicating machines is not paradoxical, it's not even odd, it's
just gibberish. Paradoxes and odd things are interesting and fun,
gibberish is not.
> the question was on the unique first person experience that
anyone can live in a self-multiplication scenario
I know, and that's why it's not a question. It doesn't specify
which unique first person the "question" is about. If a question
about the future can't be answered, not even approximately, not
even in retrospect, then it's not a question.
Confusing semantic scramble.
Bruno
John K Clark
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