On 07 Aug 2017, at 00:25, John Clark wrote:
On Sun, Aug 6, 2017 at 12:54 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
> you don't give any credit to what both copies say.
I do give them credit, I give BOTH copies equal credit
We are all OK with this.
and that's why it's so silly to expect one and only one correct
answer to the question "What will I see tomorrow after I am
duplicated?".
Nobody expect one answer , but everybody can see that BOTH agrees
having one obtained one answer, and both vindicates the fact that they
were unable to predict it in advance.
>> To ask which one of the two is the real Helsinki
man and who has the "THE 1p" is just silly.
> Nobody has ever disagree on this.
Good. So you must also agree the Helsinki mans vocalization "what
one and only one city will I see after I am duplicated?" is not a
question, it's just a noise the Helsinki man made with his mouth.
Not at all. P(I will see one city and not the other) = 1, for the same
reason P(coffee) = 1. So, the Helsinki man knows that he will see only
one city, and the question "which one I can expect" makes sense. In
fact the reasonable answer is P(W) = P(M) = 1/2, and P(Vienna) = 0,
for example.
> the point you seem to deny is that both copies have got a bit
of information.
They knew it would be W v M, and each copy got a precise answer. One
has the W answer, and the other has the M answer.
But that is exactly what I predicted would happen, even you
correctly predicted it. Mr.W will see W and Mr.M will see M.
OK. But we have agreed that Mr. W is Mr H, and Mr. M is Mr H, and the
point is that we have now
Mr H see W *and* Mr H see M, but none can see them simultaneously from
the 1p view, so now, there is a Mr H in W saying that he see W and not
M, and vice versa. In M, and in W, they BOTH admit that what they see
in particular was not predictable when they were(fused, so to speak)
in Helsinki.
What more is there to say? What have we failed to predict that will
be revealed after the duplication?
The city is which you, both of you, find themselves. You don't see the
determinacy because you go out of your body after pushing on the
button, but you need to reintegrate each body to see that both get one
bit of information.
> Here, the closer continuer theory of Robert Nozick, in his
Philophical Explanation,
Nozick is nuts. Suppose I'm not the "closest continuer", does that
mean I have no identity even though I vividly remember being John
Clark as a child?
OK.
Has some mysterious force emanated from that closer guy reach out
and found me and destroyed my consciousness? If the closest
continuer is killed do I suddenly inherit his consciousness?
So we agree, but then your position is simply refuted by all copies in
presence, and yopur non-listening to them is even more astonishing.
> What do you expect will you live when doing the WM
duplication. You expect to meet St-Peter or what?
Yes, I'm sure many people, perhaps most people, would expect to
meet St.Peter when they go into that duplicator. But I don't care
what anyone expects to happen, I care about what does happen. I'd
much rather interview the 2 people that came out of the duplicator
than the one person that went in.
OK. So you interview them, and both explains that they have obtained
one bit of information, illustrating the indeterminacy they both have
lived in Helsinki, at the time they were still a single non duplicated
individual.
> Take the iterated case:
No I don't want to take the iterated case. Iterated
idiocy is still idiocy.
But that experience is helfpful to realise that the first person
indeterminacy is of the type "algorithmically incompressible" for the
vast majority of the 2^n copies, when n is big enough.
Let us choose one copy in the pool. His first person memory has an
history like
100011000010001101001100010011000110011000101000101110000000110
and does witness a personal experience of indeterminacy.
>> persons, that's plural, that means there are more than one,
and yet the "question" demands one and only one answer.
> The question ask a mean to evaluate what you can expect from
the first person
If there are 2 people there is no THE first person, and
that's why it's not a question, and without a question there can be
no answer.
There are two people, but they have both incompatible first person
experience, so it makes sense to predict which will be lived.
We have accepted that a good prediction, or theory, is supposed to
remain correct after the duplication)
So, In H the best prediction was "W v M".
Then both the W-man and the M-man confirms it, and got the each the
precise result expected but not predictable in advance (W for the W-
man, and M for the M-man); Both confirms they could not have predicted
it in advance.
> You are not doing the experience, or not listelming to the
question,
I have answered every question I've heard. I have not answered
gibberish.
Do you agree or not that each copies have got one bit of information.
If this is gibberish, it means that you consider what both copies talk
gibberish after the duplication, and so computationalism is itself
gibberish. But that is a good reductio ad absurdum that if we consider
computationalism not gibberish, you are denying the first person
experience in each copy. BOTH recognize having got one bit of
information, and living a non symmetrical experience: this city and
not the other one.
> but the question is very simple,
Very simple indeed.
> what do you expect [...]
I would expect that even you would be more interested in what will
happen to you than what you expect will happen to you.
Those pronouns! Please distinguish if the question is what will happen
to my body localization, or to my future personal experience (which
will exist, by computationalism, and be unique in one city, and this
in the two cities. That is made precise by distinguish the 1p from the
3p view, and step 3 asks the prediction on that personal singular
experience that anyone can live in such duplication.
Bruno
John K Clark
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