On 07 Aug 2017, at 00:25, John Clark wrote:

On Sun, Aug 6, 2017 at 12:54 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

​> ​you don't give any credit to what both copies say.

I do give them credit, I give BOTH copies ​equal ​credit

We are all OK with this.



and that's why it's so silly to expect one and only one correct answer to the question "What will I see tomorrow after I am duplicated?".


Nobody expect one answer , but everybody can see that BOTH agrees having one obtained one answer, and both vindicates the fact that they were unable to predict it in advance.


​>> ​To ask which one ​of the two ​is the real Helsinki man​ ​and​ ​who has the "THE 1p"​ ​is just silly.

​> ​Nobody has ever disagree on this.

​Good. So you must also agree the Helsinki mans vocalization "what one and only one city will I see after I am duplicated?" is not a question, it's just a noise the Helsinki man made with his mouth. ​


Not at all. P(I will see one city and not the other) = 1, for the same reason P(coffee) = 1. So, the Helsinki man knows that he will see only one city, and the question "which one I can expect" makes sense. In fact the reasonable answer is P(W) = P(M) = 1/2, and P(Vienna) = 0, for example.







​> ​the point you seem to deny is that both copies have got a bit of information. They knew it would be W v M, and each copy got a precise answer. One has the W answer, and the other has the M answer.

​But that is exactly what I predicted​ would happen, even you correctly predicted it. Mr.W will see W and Mr.M will see M.

OK. But we have agreed that Mr. W is Mr H, and Mr. M is Mr H, and the point is that we have now

Mr H see W *and* Mr H see M, but none can see them simultaneously from the 1p view, so now, there is a Mr H in W saying that he see W and not M, and vice versa. In M, and in W, they BOTH admit that what they see in particular was not predictable when they were(fused, so to speak) in Helsinki.



What more is there to say? What have we failed to predict that will be revealed after the duplication?

The city is which you, both of you, find themselves. You don't see the determinacy because you go out of your body after pushing on the button, but you need to reintegrate each body to see that both get one bit of information.






​> ​Here, the closer continuer theory of Robert Nozick, in his Philophical Explanation,

​Nozick is nuts. Suppose I'm not the "closest continuer", does that mean I have no identity even though I vividly remember being John Clark as a child?

OK.


Has some mysterious force emanated from that closer guy reach out and found me and destroyed my consciousness? ​If the closest ​ continuer​ is killed do I suddenly inherit his consciousness? ​

So we agree, but then your position is simply refuted by all copies in presence, and yopur non-listening to them is even more astonishing.



​> ​What do you expect will you live when doing the WM duplication. You expect to meet St-Peter or what?

Yes, ​I'm sure many people, perhaps most people, would expect to meet St.Peter when they go into that duplicator. But I don't care what anyone expects to happen, I care about what does happen. ​I'd much rather interview the 2 people that came out of the duplicator than the one person that went in.

OK. So you interview them, and both explains that they have obtained one bit of information, illustrating the indeterminacy they both have lived in Helsinki, at the time they were still a single non duplicated individual.





​> ​Take the iterated case:

​No I don't want to take the iterated case​. ​Iterated​ idiocy is still ​idiocy​.​


But that experience is helfpful to realise that the first person indeterminacy is of the type "algorithmically incompressible" for the vast majority of the 2^n copies, when n is big enough.

Let us choose one copy in the pool. His first person memory has an history like

100011000010001101001100010011000110011000101000101110000000110

and does witness a personal experience of indeterminacy.





​>>​ persons, that's plural, that means there are more than one, and yet the "question" demands one and only one answer.

​> ​The question ask a mean to evaluate what you can expect from the first person

​If there are 2 people there is no THE ​first person​, and that's why it's not a question, and without a question there can be no answer.​

There are two people, but they have both incompatible first person experience, so it makes sense to predict which will be lived.

We have accepted that a good prediction, or theory, is supposed to remain correct after the duplication)

So,  In H the best prediction was "W v M".

Then both the W-man and the M-man confirms it, and got the each the precise result expected but not predictable in advance (W for the W- man, and M for the M-man); Both confirms they could not have predicted it in advance.



​> ​You are not doing the experience, or not listelming to the question,

​I have answered every question I've heard. I have not answered gibberish. ​

Do you agree or not that each copies have got one bit of information. If this is gibberish, it means that you consider what both copies talk gibberish after the duplication, and so computationalism is itself gibberish. But that is a good reductio ad absurdum that if we consider computationalism not gibberish, you are denying the first person experience in each copy. BOTH recognize having got one bit of information, and living a non symmetrical experience: this city and not the other one.




​> ​but the question is very simple,

​Very simple indeed. ​

​> ​what do you expect​ [...]​

​I would expect that even you would be more interested in what will happen to you than what you expect will happen to you.​

Those pronouns! Please distinguish if the question is what will happen to my body localization, or to my future personal experience (which will exist, by computationalism, and be unique in one city, and this in the two cities. That is made precise by distinguish the 1p from the 3p view, and step 3 asks the prediction on that personal singular experience that anyone can live in such duplication.

Bruno





​ John K Clark​




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