On Fri, 11 Aug 2017 at 4:44 am, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Thu, Aug 10, 2017 at 11:36 AM, Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> ​> ​
>>> I've asked the following question 4 times and you've refused to answer 4
>>> times but I'm going to ask for a fifth time because it gets to the very
>>> heart of the topic:
>>>
>>> *Are the following 2 questions equivalent?*
>>>
>>> 1) What will I see tomorrow?
>>> 2) Tomorrow what will the person who remembers being me right now see?
>>>
>>> I can answer that question and the answer is YES. You should be able to
>>> answer it too with a simple YES or NO, and I don't want to hear any pee
>>> dodges of the question because the same level of pee and iterations of pee
>>> and any other convolutions of pee applies equally to both questions. So are
>>> they equivalent or are they not? If you can't provide a simple one word
>>> answer to that question then you quite literally don't know what you're
>>> arguing in favor of and you're wasting your time and ours.
>>>
>>
>> ​> ​
>> The two questions are not equivalent. Question 2) implies that there will
>> be a unique individual who remembers being me, whereas in fact there will
>> be two of them. Question 2) therefore includes a false proposition about
>> the world.
>> ​
>>
>
> If I understand you correctly you
> ​must ​
> think, because Mr. I is about to be duplicated, question 2
> ​ ​
> should be rephrased as:
>
> "Tomorrow what will the people who remember being me right now see?​"
>
> And yes I agree that might make things a little clearer.
>
>
>> ​> ​
>> Question 1) does not include any false proposition.
>>
>
> ​
> I'm not primarily worried about propositions that are false, I'm much more
> worried about proposition
> ​s ​
> that are gibberish. The question "What will I see tomorrow?"
> ​ ​doesn't
>  contain any gibberish propositions if "I" means anyone tomorrow who
> remembers being "I" today; but that is obviously not what Bruno means by
> "I" because he thinks you could set up a bet in which the payoff depends on
> what a unique individual,
> ​ ​
> the one and only Mr. I,
> ​ ​
> will and will not see. Nobody knows what Bruno means by "I" when projected
> into the future nor who judges who won and who lost the bet, and until he
> tells us we're just spinning our wheels.
>

"What will I see tomorrow?" is meaningful and does not contain any false
propositions.  Humans who are fully aware that there will be multiple
copies understand the question and can use it consistently, and as I have
tried to demonstrate even animals have an instinctive understanding of it.
Probabilities can be consistently calculated using the assumption that I
will experience being one and only one of the multiple future copies, and
these probabilities can be used to plan for the future and to run
successful business ventures. If you still insist it is gibberish that
calls into question your usage of the word "gibberish ".
-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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