On 13 Aug 2017, at 01:46, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Sat 12. Aug 2017 at 03:12, Bruce Kellett
<[email protected]> wrote:
On 12/08/2017 3:22 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 11 Aug 2017, at 13:40, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>
>>> Are you telling us that P(W) ≠ P(M) ≠ 1/2. What do *you*
expect when
>>> pushing the button in Helsinki?
>>
>> I expect to die, to be 'cut', according to the protocol. The guys
in
>> W and M are two new persons, and neither was around in H to make
any
>> prediction whatsoever.
>
> Fair enough.
>
> You think the digital mechanism thesis is wrong.
Correct.
There is a fundamental problem with your person-duplication thought
experiments. This is that the way in which you interpret the scenario
inherently involves an irreducible 1p-3p confusion. The first person
(1p) concerns only things that the person can experience directly for
himself. It cannot, therefore, involve things that he is told by other
people, because such things are necessarily third person (3p)
knowledge
Things that are told by othet people reach us as 1p experiences. We
accept them (or not) based on our own internal models of reality.
Some people trust evangelical preachers, others trust what is
published in Nature. It is only by personal cognitive processes that
we can make such choices. There is no such thing as pure 3p
knowledge, that is nonsensical.
There is no 3p knowledge as such. But there is still a 3p Theaetetical
possible knowledge, in a theoretical frame.
For example, just imagine that 2 + 2 = 4 is really really really
really true (imagine!), then I would say that if a machine is such that
(B_(that machine) "2 + 2 = 4") is true about that machine, then,
assuming Mechanism, (or not, I am not sure) we can say that the
machine has a correct 3p knowledge, even 0p knowledge if the machine
itself bet on Mechanism.
So, we don't have third person (3p) knowledge, OK, it would be non
sensical. In fact knowledge is pure 1p.
But, in the frame of some axiom in metaphysics, like Mechanism, I
think that a part of mathematics becomes a 3p knowledge (arithmetic!).
You can someone observe the arithmetical truth from outside, and "see"
all the "diaries" of all machines, and their astonishment when
"opening" the doors, or just through birth, when they find themselves
in this or that galaxy or city ...
I think that for a believer in mechanism, who would based his belief
from studying computer science (and not just obeying his doctor!),
arithmetic and the core of computer science is 3p knowledge, and even
0p knowledge: Nagel's point of view of nowhere.
That 3p knowledge, is of course still only an 1p belief, from the 1p
view. I agree with you from the 1p view! I just make precise that in a
theoretical frame, God can see that sometimes, some-relative-states I
should say, some of our belief are true. I do think that this is the
case for 2 is a divisor of 24.
-- knowledge which he does not have by direct personal experience. So
our subject does not know the protocol of the thought experiment from
direct experience (he has only been told about it, 3p). When he
presses
the button in the machine, he can have no 1p expectations about what
will happen (because he has not yet experienced it). He presses the
button in the spirit of pure experimental enquiry -- "what will happen
if I do this?" His prior probability for any particular outcome is
zero.
So when he presses the button in Helsinki, and opens the door to find
himself in Moscow, he will say, "WTF!". In particular, he will not
have
gained any 1p knowledge of duplication. In fact, he is for ever barred
from any such knowledge.
If he repeats the experiment many times, he will simply see his
experiences as irreducibly random between M and W, with some
probability
that he can estimate by keeping records over a period of time. If you
take the strict 1p view of the thought experiment, the parallel with
the
early development of QM is more evident. In QM, no-one has the 3p
knowledge that all possible outcomes are realized (in different
worlds).
So, before pressing the button in H, his prior probabilities are
p(M) =
p(W) = 0, with probably, p(H) = 1. On the other hand, if you allow 3p
knowledge of the protocol to influence his estimation of probabilities
before the experiment, you can't rule out 3p knowledge that he can
gain
at any time after pressing the button. In which case, the 1p-3p
confusion is complete, p(M) = p(W) = 1, and he can expect to see both
cities. In that case, the pure 1p view becomes irrelevant.
This argument can be applied to any scientific theory whatsoever.
That is what hardcore postmodernists do. Ok, but then you are just
rejecting science as a whole.
Also, you are in profound disagreement with John Clark. The only
thing your positions have in common is your disagreement with Bruno.
Good point.
Bruno
Telmo.
Bruce
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