On 14 Aug 2017, at 20:35, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/14/2017 10:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 14 Aug 2017, at 18:25, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/14/2017 1:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Aug 2017, at 21:25, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/13/2017 10:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Aug 2017, at 19:06, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/13/2017 8:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 12 Aug 2017, at 17:55, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/12/2017 12:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Aug 2017, at 20:45, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/11/2017 10:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
One of these sequences will be N occurrences of M, and
one will be N occurrences of W. So the prediction of the
person with N occurrences of M, based on induction from
his past experiences, will be M, with p =1.
Not if the person is rational and understand mechanism.
Even if you have thrown a perfect coin 1000 times and get
head, the probability to get head is still 1/2.
But that's not the way to bet.
Only because we would think that the coin is not fair. But
if the coin is fair, it is the way we *should* bet, at least.
Sure. And IF it's two-headed we should bet on heads. But in
fact we only know it came heads 1000 times in a row.
And that the coin is fair. In the duplication case, we "know"
this from mechanism + numerical identity. (I guess you are
aware we are out-of-line).
But the person who has experience Moscow a 1000 times in a row
has only someone's word that it's really due to duplication -
as we only have someone's word that the coin is fair.
Yes. It is a thought experience.
Your remark did not invalidate the theoretical point made. Or I
miss something.
You're missing the point that the thought experiment is supposed
to prove something about Everett's MWI,
Not about Everett, about the nature of physical reality.
Well it's weak on that point since it has no empirical content; it
starts from some hypotheticals (CT+YD) and trys to infer that
duplication of persons will cause them to experience randomness.
I think it's a reasonable thought experiment to argue that point
and I suspect JKC's grammatical objections are disingenuous. I
wonder what he thinks of the conclusion FPI~randomness aside from
the thought experiment.
I have no clue what JKC tries to do. You reassure me when you see
he is disingenuous.
so it's significant whether it is strictly analogous or not. In
the world of Everett there is no one we can rely on to tell us
that there's a duplicate - that's a theory and it can only be
hypothesized and empirically supported.
What does that change for P(W) = 1/2?
It doesn't change it, given all the premises and assumptions.
Good. That is my modest contribution, and we have a problem,
compare Z1* (and co) with the empirical physical reality.
But those don't exactly parallel the real world.
Ah? Where is the discrepancy? I discovered the "universal (Turing-
Church) machinery" in the bacteria,
As far a I know bacteria only have finite "tapes".
That is the case of all computers, our brain too. But that is the case
of all Turing machine, even the Universal one. By definition a Turing
machine is a finite set of quadruples. The tape is not part of it.
That was only a pedagogical tool by Turing, which helps the engineers
but is misleading in philosophy. But even Turing makes clear that his
"universal machine" is a finite set of quadruple, and indeed a pure
arithmetical object.
To avoid this mistake, I prefer to talk about Universal Number. It is
the code, or the plan, of a universal machine or universal
interpreter. We can buy some on them on the net, today.
and nobody can detect primary matter, so, I am not sure which real
world you are talking about.
The one where we experience randomness and duplication is just
proposal to avoid it.
Yes.
As I say, my point (in the math part) is that up to now nature
obeys Z1*.
A category mistake. Z1* is about propositions, not Nature.
?
Z1* is a set of proposition ... about Nature, or Nature appearances.
Bruno
Brent
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