On 14 Aug 2017, at 04:03, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 14/08/2017 3:25 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Aug 2017, at 01:46, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Sat 12. Aug 2017 at 03:12, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]
> wrote:
On 12/08/2017 3:22 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 11 Aug 2017, at 13:40, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>
>>> Are you telling us that P(W) ≠ P(M) ≠ 1/2. What do *you*
expect when
>>> pushing the button in Helsinki?
>>
>> I expect to die, to be 'cut', according to the protocol. The
guys in
>> W and M are two new persons, and neither was around in H to
make any
>> prediction whatsoever.
>
> Fair enough.
>
> You think the digital mechanism thesis is wrong.
Correct.
There is a fundamental problem with your person-duplication thought
experiments. This is that the way in which you interpret the
scenario
inherently involves an irreducible 1p-3p confusion. The first person
(1p) concerns only things that the person can experience directly
for
himself. It cannot, therefore, involve things that he is told by
other
people, because such things are necessarily third person (3p)
knowledge
Things that are told by othet people reach us as 1p experiences.
We accept them (or not) based on our own internal models of
reality. Some people trust evangelical preachers, others trust
what is published in Nature. It is only by personal cognitive
processes that we can make such choices. There is no such thing as
pure 3p knowledge, that is nonsensical.
There is no 3p knowledge as such. But there is still a 3p
Theaetetical possible knowledge, in a theoretical frame.
I think you and Telmo are losing sight of the basic grammatical
meaning of first, second, and third person. First person = 1/we;
second person = you/you; third person = he/they (to retain the
nominative case!).
The papers and the posts makes clear what 3p and 1p notions are used,
and the difference is very simple: 3p = the discourse of those who do
not enter the duplication boxes, and the 1p = the discourse of those
who enter in the duplication devices.
Essentially all of science is third person knowledge:
... then the consequence is that physics, nor any natural science, is
no more science. Only mathematics. Why not, this is vocabulary issue.
they did this experiment; he wrote this paper/text book; etc. Of
course, I can read the paper or the text book and I then gain first
person knowledge about the experiments/results/theories. But this is
knowledge about, and it is about third person knowledge: it is not
first person knowledge because I did not do the experiments, write
the papers, and so on.
OK. No problem. That is distracting issue. Is P(W) ≠ 1 or not, etc.
So you accuse scientists of seeking to eliminate the first person,
Only JC, and the materialists metaphysicists/theologians (since 1500
years).
while you explicitly eliminate the third person!
Where? I just exp^lained that with mechanism, arithmetic is 3p.
It is the fact that you include 3p knowledge in the duplication
experiments -- by claiming that the subject has full knowledge of
the protocol, which is 3p knowledge -- but then deny that the
duplicates can exchange information, thus excluding 3p knowledge
after the duplication in an arbitrary and ad hoc way.
Only to show to JC that the meeting is not relevant. Personally I have
no problem if they met. Even if they get married, the probabilities
will not change.
You refer to talk out of the context.
It would seem that this is why you have your duplicates
reconstructed in remote cities -- a smoke-and-mirrors trick to make
the reader believe that the copies cannot communicate.
Not at all. Sometimes I propose the duplication in closed room, that
just change nothing. We assume comp. If a change was introduced by the
meeting/non-meeting, we get influence at a distance between programs
on different classical computers. That is just ridiculous, and
distracting from the question asked.
But there is no reason why the same experiment could not be
performed with the duplicates appearing in adjacent rooms, or even
the same room, so that direct communication between them is evident.
Once the copies communicate, they can see that both possibilities
are in fact realized, so the probabilities before duplication are
all unity.
They know in advance that they have been both realized given they have
been given the protocol. But here, you do confuse the 1p and the 3p.
Even if they meet, none of them because identical to their
doppelganger. The W-man will not, after meeting the M-man, change his
mind/memory that he has been reconstituted in W.
The only escape, then, is to accept that the copies are different
distinct persons, and neither is the same person as the original.
So the argument through steps 3, etc., are all based on the
elimination of the third person. This is an unjustifiable ad hoc
manoeuvre, and the argument collapses.
You are back at the confusion between 1p and 3p. If they meet, they
will on the contrary realize that p = 1/2 is confirmed by both.
Bruno
Bruce
For example, just imagine that 2 + 2 = 4 is really really really
really true (imagine!), then I would say that if a machine is such
that
(B_(that machine) "2 + 2 = 4") is true about that machine, then,
assuming Mechanism, (or not, I am not sure) we can say that the
machine has a correct 3p knowledge, even 0p knowledge if the
machine itself bet on Mechanism.
So, we don't have third person (3p) knowledge, OK, it would be non
sensical. In fact knowledge is pure 1p.
But, in the frame of some axiom in metaphysics, like Mechanism, I
think that a part of mathematics becomes a 3p knowledge
(arithmetic!). You can someone observe the arithmetical truth from
outside, and "see" all the "diaries" of all machines, and their
astonishment when "opening" the doors, or just through birth, when
they find themselves in this or that galaxy or city ...
I think that for a believer in mechanism, who would based his
belief from studying computer science (and not just obeying his
doctor!), arithmetic and the core of computer science is 3p
knowledge, and even 0p knowledge: Nagel's point of view of nowhere.
That 3p knowledge, is of course still only an 1p belief, from the
1p view. I agree with you from the 1p view! I just make precise
that in a theoretical frame, God can see that sometimes, some-
relative-states I should say, some of our belief are true. I do
think that this is the case for 2 is a divisor of 24.
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