On Thu, Aug 10, 2017 at 8:11 PM, Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>
> Not everyone will be successful in this scenario.
It's not even clear to me that *anyone* would win the bet. Today you are
about to be duplicated and you bet me $10 that tomorrow you, that is to say
the person who remembers being you today, will see Moscow. So what
happens? Tomorrow you come up to me and make the case that Bruce Kellett
sees Moscow and so should get the $10, but you also come up to me and make
a equally strong case that Bruce Kellett does not see Moscow and so should
not get the $10. What to do? It depends on the details of the bet and I've
never seen them spelled out.
Or perhaps you could make a bet not with me but with yourself, if you see
Moscow then your doppelganger who doesn't see Moscow must give you $10, if
you see Washington then your doppelganger who doesn't see Washington must
give you $10. But then you'd just be passing the money back and forth
> :-)). This is the problem of "monster sequences" that is so troublesome
> for understanding probability in Everett QM.
I think the main sticking point in Everett's idea
s how to obtain probabilities
, such as the
, when infinity is involved. Perhaps the multiverse doesn't contain an
infinite number of branches just a astronomically large number of them.
John K Clark
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