Bruno, sorry for the delay as usual -- I really appreciate your replies but life gets in the way...
On Sun, Aug 13, 2017 at 7:25 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 13 Aug 2017, at 01:46, Telmo Menezes wrote: > > > On Sat 12. Aug 2017 at 03:12, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> > wrote: >> >> On 12/08/2017 3:22 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> > On 11 Aug 2017, at 13:40, Bruce Kellett wrote: >> >> >> >>> Are you telling us that P(W) ≠ P(M) ≠ 1/2. What do *you* expect when >> >>> pushing the button in Helsinki? >> >> >> >> I expect to die, to be 'cut', according to the protocol. The guys in >> >> W and M are two new persons, and neither was around in H to make any >> >> prediction whatsoever. >> > >> > Fair enough. >> > >> > You think the digital mechanism thesis is wrong. >> >> Correct. >> >> There is a fundamental problem with your person-duplication thought >> experiments. This is that the way in which you interpret the scenario >> inherently involves an irreducible 1p-3p confusion. The first person >> (1p) concerns only things that the person can experience directly for >> himself. It cannot, therefore, involve things that he is told by other >> people, because such things are necessarily third person (3p) knowledge > > > Things that are told by othet people reach us as 1p experiences. We accept > them (or not) based on our own internal models of reality. Some people trust > evangelical preachers, others trust what is published in Nature. It is only > by personal cognitive processes that we can make such choices. There is no > such thing as pure 3p knowledge, that is nonsensical. > > > There is no 3p knowledge as such. But there is still a 3p Theaetetical > possible knowledge, in a theoretical frame. > > For example, just imagine that 2 + 2 = 4 is really really really really true > (imagine!), then I would say that if a machine is such that > > (B_(that machine) "2 + 2 = 4") is true about that machine, then, assuming > Mechanism, (or not, I am not sure) we can say that the machine has a correct > 3p knowledge, even 0p knowledge if the machine itself bet on Mechanism. Isn't this the same as assuming an independent reality, that remains consistent even when nobody is looking? I'm not disagreeing -- nor an I saying that such a reality does not exist. Just that it's an untestable assumption (albeit a very common and useful one). Assuming mechanism, ISTM that one would then assume that we are "inside" the machine for which 2 + 2 = 4, which is what we do but then Gödel has something to say.. Right? > So, we don't have third person (3p) knowledge, OK, it would be non sensical. > In fact knowledge is pure 1p. > > But, in the frame of some axiom in metaphysics, like Mechanism, I think that > a part of mathematics becomes a 3p knowledge (arithmetic!). You can someone > observe the arithmetical truth from outside, and "see" all the "diaries" of > all machines, and their astonishment when "opening" the doors, or just > through birth, when they find themselves in this or that galaxy or city ... Assuming we're not crazy, ok. > I think that for a believer in mechanism, who would based his belief from > studying computer science (and not just obeying his doctor!), arithmetic and > the core of computer science is 3p knowledge, and even 0p knowledge: Nagel's > point of view of nowhere. Ok, but I'm not sure what you mean by the distinction between 3p and 0p, or what you mean by 0p exactly. Is it something you can map to "your" hypostases? > That 3p knowledge, is of course still only an 1p belief, from the 1p view. I > agree with you from the 1p view! I just make precise that in a theoretical > frame, God can see that sometimes, some-relative-states I should say, some > of our belief are true. I do think that this is the case for 2 is a divisor > of 24. Ok, I think we agree. I have no qualm here. My point remains: the argument that Bruce makes against your theory can be made against any theory, or the scientific endeavor itself. For me, John Clark is more mysterious. I don't bother with the circular discussion anymore (we've been through the loop too many times). I think he's just playing games with language, but I'm not sure why. Maybe a protection mechanism. Some conclusions are indeed scary, All the best to you and everyone else here, Telmo. > > >> >> -- knowledge which he does not have by direct personal experience. So >> our subject does not know the protocol of the thought experiment from >> direct experience (he has only been told about it, 3p). When he presses >> the button in the machine, he can have no 1p expectations about what >> will happen (because he has not yet experienced it). He presses the >> button in the spirit of pure experimental enquiry -- "what will happen >> if I do this?" His prior probability for any particular outcome is zero. >> So when he presses the button in Helsinki, and opens the door to find >> himself in Moscow, he will say, "WTF!". In particular, he will not have >> gained any 1p knowledge of duplication. In fact, he is for ever barred >> from any such knowledge. >> >> If he repeats the experiment many times, he will simply see his >> experiences as irreducibly random between M and W, with some probability >> that he can estimate by keeping records over a period of time. If you >> take the strict 1p view of the thought experiment, the parallel with the >> early development of QM is more evident. In QM, no-one has the 3p >> knowledge that all possible outcomes are realized (in different worlds). >> >> So, before pressing the button in H, his prior probabilities are p(M) = >> p(W) = 0, with probably, p(H) = 1. On the other hand, if you allow 3p >> knowledge of the protocol to influence his estimation of probabilities >> before the experiment, you can't rule out 3p knowledge that he can gain >> at any time after pressing the button. In which case, the 1p-3p >> confusion is complete, p(M) = p(W) = 1, and he can expect to see both >> cities. In that case, the pure 1p view becomes irrelevant. > > > This argument can be applied to any scientific theory whatsoever. That is > what hardcore postmodernists do. Ok, but then you are just rejecting science > as a whole. > > Also, you are in profound disagreement with John Clark. The only thing your > positions have in common is your disagreement with Bruno. > > > Good point. > > Bruno > > > > Telmo. > >> >> >> Bruce >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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