On 05 Sep 2017, at 02:01, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 5/09/2017 12:49 am, David Nyman wrote:
On 4 Sep 2017 13:11, "Bruce Kellett" <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>
wrote:
On 4/09/2017 9:15 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 03 Sep 2017, at 18:46, Brent Meeker wrote:
On the contrary, we can only speculate on a primary physical
reality for which there are no evidences at all.
You can't prove primary arithmetic either.
Indeed.
But there are many evidences that 2+2=4. There are no evidence for
primary matter. Not one.
"Primary" is just a word you stick on "physical" to make it seem
inaccessible. I don't need to prove the physical, I observe it.
?
Nobody can observe a metaphysical idea. You can observe matter, and
that is an evidence for matter, not for primary matter.
Primary means "not deducible" from something else.
Bruno, you are just playing with words. I observe matter - that is
evidence for matter, so the observation is primary, not the matter.
But then I assume matter and deduce that I will observe it - so the
matter becomes primary. You claim arithmetic is primary, because
2+2=4 independent of you and me. But I can deduce arithmetic from
observation, making observation primary again, and arithmetic
merely derivative. But then I assume that matter is primary - I
can then deduce both observation and arithmetic.
It is all a matter of choice. You choose to make arithmetic
primary, but you can't prove that this is necessarily the case. I
can assume that quarks and electrons, etc, are primary, and else
follows from this. Maybe I can't prove that either, but I have a
hell of a lot more evidence for the possibility of deriving
arithmetic from the existence of matter than you have of proving
the existence of quarks from pure arithmetic. The evidence is all
in my favour.
Honestly, Bruce, I think it's you who is playing with words here.
The sense in which Bruno is using primary here is perfectly clear -
i.e. the fundamental ontological assumption in a comprehensive
theory of origins.
That is not what Bruno says above. I quote: "Primary means 'not
deducible' from something else." Given that definition, then what I
say is perfectly logical. Primacy has nothing to do with ontology
according to Bruno's definition.
Except that I define the ontic level by what we take as primary. How
to proceed differently? (without ontological commitment).
It doesn't aid comprehension to substitute a quite different
meaning - that of primary sense perception - in 'rebuttal'. As to
choice of primary ontological assumption, that is fixed by the
prior choice of mechanism as the theory of mind.
But I do not assume mechanism as the theory of mind.
Then, I guess we talk on different things.
It seems to me begging the question to assume the answer before you
begin the investigation.
That does not make sense. I study the consequence of the mechanist
hypothesis. Now, you loss me. I am not sure what you are arguing for.
You can assume a physical primary universe, but then the result is
that you need a non computationalist theory of mind.
One's choice of "primary ontological assumption" is a choice, and I
am not constrained to assume your ontology in order to discuss your
theory. As has been said, "Epistemology precedes ontology", so
constraining one's ontology from the outset is not necessarily the
brightest strategy.
OK. But with mechanism, the TOE does not need to assume more than:
0 ≠ (x + 1)
((x + 1) = (y + 1)) -> x = y
x = 0 v Ey(x = y + 1)
x + 0 = x
x + (y + 1) = (x + y) + 1
x * 0 = 0
x * (y + 1) = (x * y) + x
which is assumed in all physical theory, and also many non physical
theory.
I think frankly that this is the sticking point for you. You want
to claim that computation can equally well be 'inferred' from the
primary ontological assumption of physics. But unfortunately this
amounts to egregious question begging, since the phenomenon of
inference, and a fortiori any perceptible phenomenon that depends
on it, is itself already part of the mental spectrum whose
provenance we're seeking to explain in the first place.
Consciousness is a necessary prerequisite for the understanding of
consciousness. This might be true, but it is an unhelpful
observation. Just as unhelpful as your observation that logic and
inference are necessary for the understanding of logic and
inference. I am not begging the question, I am doing the opposite,
and not assuming the answer before I begin the investigation.
What are you assuming? You will be in trouble, because the theory
above can be proved to be not deducible from any other theory (unless
Turing equivalent: all the axiom above can be deduce from Kxy = x +
Sxya = xz(yz)).
In science, one has to observe the phenomenon before seeking to
explain it -- it if is not observed, what is there to explain?
Here you do beg the question. We do that in physics, but in
metaphysics we just cannot equate "real" and "observable", or we
assume Aristotle metaphysics. No problem but it refute
computationalism, and again we go out of the theory that I am studying.
The Cartesian attempt at a solution to the conundrum of explaining
consciousness does not really work: I might not be able to doubt
that I doubt, but that doesn't explain anything.
Well, consciousness is hard to define, so if you can agree that it has
the property of being undoubtable, then, it is interesting to notice
that all machine looking inward discover the undoubtable (Bp & p),
that it obeys to S4 and intuitionistic logic, and to quantum logic on
the p belonging to the universal dovetailing, etc.
You might try to put all your hypothesis and rule of reasoning on the
table, but I am aware that even just this requires a bit of knowledge
of mathematical logic. It is just that I am no more sure what you
assume or in which theory you reason. When we do philosophy or
theology with the scientific method, we must avoid the temptation to
mix our personal opinion and the axioms. I am aware that my criteria
of rigor is high: I do not allow second order logic, nor even first
order set theory, which contains already a lot of implicit conception
of reality. Only first order logic can make us writting our
metaphysical axioms without metaphysical hidden baggage (a point made
by Tenneson on this list some times ago).
Bruno
Bruce
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