On 19 Sep 2017, at 04:21, John Clark wrote:
On Mon, Sep 18, 2017 at 7:16 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
> Both copies saw only one city,
Yes.
>and both were unable to predict in advance which one they
would feel to see.
Unable to predict in advance who would see what? Today I can
predict what one and only one city the Moscow man will see tomorrow
and today I can predict what one and only one city the
Washington man will see tomorrow and, depending on what you
mean by "the Helsinki man", I can predict that too. I honestly
don't know what more there is to predict.
> The point is that the two copies were not able to predict
their specific experience.
That's because before their specific experiences there were not
two copies, neither the Washington man nor the Moscow man existed,
only the Helsinki man existed. You can't make a prediction, or do
anything else, IF YOU DON'T EXIST!
That does not make sense to me. That would refute the coin throwing
statistics too. We agreed that the W-man and the M-man are the
Helsinki man, as we suppose we survive teleportation and duplication.
So there is no guy who ever cease to exist. Only their situations
differentiate.
> which is the criteria for verifying a prediction of a first
person experience?
By far the most important criteria needed to verify a
prediction is to make it clear and unambiguous which first person
experience the prediction is all about, and that you have not even
come close to doing. Is it the first person experience of the person
that will experience Moscow tomorrow, or the first person experience
of the person that will experience Washington tomorrow, or the first
person experiences of the people tomorrow who remember being in
Helsinki today?
> Mr His is both the W-guy and the M-guy for any third person
looking at the experience from outside.
And Mr His is the W-guy from the W-guy's first person
experience and Mr His is the M-guy from the M-guy's first
person experience. So I ask again for the 999th time, who is the
prediction supposed to be about?
> You just need to make precise
I don't need to do that, you do. And I know your mantra, you chant
it all the time as if it will solve all problems "you confuse the 1p
and the 3p"; but is it really surprising I'm confused when you
demand people predict things BEFORE they exist??
> But from Mr. His' personal view point after the duplication,
he [...]
And that is a great example of what needs to be made precise. Are
you talking about Mr. His personal view point in Moscow or
Mr. His' personal view point in Washington? Yesterday when
there was only one who was the prediction supposed to be about?
>> Then the question is of no scientific of philosophic
significance
> You could have said this before
I have said it before!
> as it has always been that same question.
No there are two things involved. You ask what some bozo
expects to happen, and that is of no scientific or
philosophic significance whatsoever but at least it's a real
question with a real answer. But you also say "What one and only
one city will you see after you have been duplicated and become
two?" and that is not a question, that is just a sequence of words
that ends with a question mark at the end, so obviously there is no
answer to it.
>> A far far more profound question than "Where do you expect
he will live?" is "Where will he live?" or even better "Today where
are the people who remember being in Helsinki yesterday?".
> That is the 3p question.
OK then please explain exactly what the 1p question is and how
it differs from the 3p question.
> the person undergoing the split cannot feel the split, nor
predict his self-localization measurement.
The Moscow man can't predict anything before his localization
measurement because before he sees Moscow the Moscow man did not
exist, and its very hard to make good predictions if you don't exist.
> The point is that you cannot predict in Helsinki if you will
be the Moscow man *from your first person subjectyive experience".
(and there are no problem with pronouns here).
If there are no problem with pronouns then please explain what one
and only one thing "you" tomorrow means if I am to be duplicated
today.
>> The only reason more can't be predicted is because you can't
say exactly what it is you want predicted.
> That is not correct. "it" refers to the very precise outcome
"I open the door and see W" and "I open the door and see M".
Well OK then, you just correctly predicted the very thing that you
said could not be predicted.
> It is isomorphic to the coin throwing.
Nope, not even close. Tomorrow everybody can say with 100%
certainty how the coin flip turned out, but tomorrow everybody will
be as clueless as they are today about what one and only one city I
ended up seeing. "Will the coin fall heads or tails?" is a real
question and although I might not know it the answer the answer
exists. The problem with "What city will I see?" isn't that I don't
know the answer it's that the answer doesn't exist today and it
won't exist tomorrow either. The answer will NEVER exist because
there NEVER was a question.
>> Nothing can be verified if its not know who the prediction was
supposed to be about,
> It is not a question of "who".
Of course it is! If nobody knows whose future is being predicted
what good is it? And how will anybody ever know if it was correct?
> it is about the experience of the people who remember having
been asked the question in Helsinki.
Then we're talking about the Helsinki man having 2 experiences
in two cities, unless of course you backtrack on your statement that
the Helsinki man is "the people who remember having been asked the
question in Helsinki". But I am quite sure you will backtrack on
that, you will backtrack so much that "The Helsinki man" will no
longer have any meaning.
>> I have no idea who the prediction is about and thus have no
way of knowing if any prediction was right or wrong.
> In the 3p.
1p, 3p or frozen peas I have no idea who or what the prediction
is about.
> Obviously, only the W-guy and the M-guy knows the answers,
The answer? They don't even know the question and neither do I.
> On the first person indeterminacy, I know only one
person having a problem here: you.
It's strange, you keep repeating that same line over and over
again almost as if popularity has something to do with the truth. I
can be persuaded to change my position by logical argument but peer
pressure makes no impression on me. This isn't the first time I've
been in the minority on a mailing list and I don't expect it will be
the last.
>> I think you're the one who is confused, you're confused by
the fact that there are two the first person views, one in
Washington and one in Moscow and both of them are the H-guy.
> That is not confusing when you keep in mind that the question
is about the 1p-expectation.
My 1p-expectation is Santa Claus Workshop.
Now please explain why that is worth talking about.
>> If it's a real question then there is a one
word answer, and I don't need to read one word carefully.
> Listen to the copies. They all give the one word answer
I agree, so I must conclude that the root cause of our
disagreement is I think 1+1 =2 and you don't.
> you put the 1p experience under the rug.
Which THE 1p experience do I sweep under the rug, the one in
Helsinki, the one in Moscow or the one in Washington?
>> I will tell you the one and only one name of that city
just as soon as you tell me who "he" is.
He is the guy remembering Helsinki.
I see. Well then the name of that one and only one city happens to
have the same name as the name of the one and only one integer that
is larger than five but less than six.
> From outside, they are two of them, but they feel unique and
the question was about that feeling.
That is not clear, what about that feeling, what do you want to
know about it?
> After the duplication there are TWO first person,
Yes, and they are both the Helsinki man.
> and they each say one precise answer.
Yes, and I'm pretty sure 1+1=2.
> You talk again like if the person could feel being in two
places at once.
If "the person" is the Helsinki man and if the Helsinki man
has been duplicated and if one copy saw Moscow and the other saw
Washington then the the Helsinki man will see 2 cities at once, and
all the peas in the world won't change that fact, only changing what
"the person" means could do that.
> Either you ignore the 1p view, or
Which THE 1p experience should I ignore, the one in Helsinki,
the one in Moscow or the one in Washington?
> you introduce a non computable element in the mind.
Even a non computable element in the mind can't turn
gibberish into a question. And neither can a question mark.
> No third person can feel the experience of another person.
But there is a "it", for both copies, as we can directly see in
their diaries.
There is nothing in those idiotic diaries that couldn't have been
easily predicted long ago. Nothing.
>>> Just listen to the copies.
>> I did, and they named 2 cities not one.
> That is plainly wrong, or a word play. They both cited 1 city.
Would it also be plainly wrong to say for the equation
X=(4)^1/2 there is one and only one correct value for X? Would a
question about the one and only one solution to that equation be a
real question or would it just be words and a question mark?
> You cannot treat the multiple copies like if they were still
one person.
Yes, and that is exactly why "What one and only one city will you
see after you becomes two?" is not a question; question marks just
don't have enough power to give meaning to gibberish. Nobody can
give an answer if there is no question.
> They have differentiated.
Yes.
> They both are still the H-guy,
Yes.
> but none of the W (resp M) guy is the M (resp W) guy.
Yes. So what on earth does "What one and only one city will you
see?" mean, what is it asking???
Your comment and ways of expression are confusing. Let me ask you some
question in step.
Do you agree that in the case you are told (you, the guy in Helsinki,
before duplication) that the two copies will be offered a cup of tea
in W and in M, you can predict in Helsinki that after you push on the
button, you will drink a cup of tea?
Bruno
John K Clark
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