On 06 Sep 2017, at 18:38, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Sep 6, 2017 at 4:21 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
It contradicts nothing. We're not talking about the H-person,
you're complaining that neither the Moscow Man nor the Washington
Man could have made a prediction, and they couldn't because
they didn't exist before the duplication.
> That contradicts your statement that the H-episode belongs to
the life of both copies.
My statement was if "the H man" is anyone tomorrow who remembers
being in H today then tomorrow "the H man" will be in 2 cities.
That is right in some third-person description. But the two H-man will
feel to be in only one city, and so, the H-man, when in still in
Helsinki, can be sure that his first person experience will be of
being in once city, and that he cannot prdict which one.
My statement is crystal clear and as I said contradicts nothing.
Only because you confuse "where will you be from an outsider pov" with
the question asked: "where do you expect to feel to be after pushing
the button". Obviously you do not expect to *feel* to be in the two
cities simultaneously.
Your statement is, today before the duplication "he" can't predict
that "he" will be in Moscow tomorrow after the duplication;
No. My statement is, today before the duplication "he" can't predict
where "he" will feel to be.
and nobody will ever know if your statement contradicts something or
not because nobody will ever know who "he" is suposed to be.
That is false, "he" will very well know where "he" feel to be after
pushing the button.
>>> indeed, in both cities).
>> Yes, in BOTH cities!! So will the Helsinki
Man see both cities? I say yes, Bruno says no. Go figure.
> He will see both cities from the 3-1 view.
Good old Mr. He, don't you just love him! What a great job "he"
does at sweeping logical absurdities under the rug.
> Obviously, The H-man will see only one city in his first
person views accessible from Helsinki,
Yes. If it's before the duplication, and I assume that's when you
want the prediction to be made because otherwise it's not a
prediction,
Of course. But the prediction is about his *future* first person
experience.
then that one and only one city the H-man sees is Helsinki.
Not after pushing the button. The first person experiences available
are "feeling to be in Moscow" and "feeling to be in Washington", and
only one of them can occur for any of its future first person
experience.
You just continue to ignore that the question is on a future first-
person experience.
There is no ambiguity, thanks to the numerical precision we have with
the digital hypothesis.
The H-man knows, with probability 1, that he will feel to have
survived in one city among two possible one. He knows in Helsinki that
after pushing the button, and opening the door, he will see only one
city, and get a cup of coffee. But after pushing the button, and
before opening the door, he cannot know which city is behind the door.
He can look at a screen telling him that the reconstitution has been a
success, but he (wherever "he" is now) cannot know which city is
there. He is in a state of complete uncertainty, and then he open the
door, see one city, and write its name in the diary, and, as predicted
in Helsinki, he got that one bit of information he expected. "he"
refers always to the H-man, and its sense only differ according to the
first or third person view in consideration. After pushing the button,
we can say, to be short, that "he" is in two city, and "he" feels to
be in one city, indeed, "he" feels that in the two cities. Now, just
take into account that the question is about what he expect to live,
feel, experience, ... always in the FIRST-PERSON sense.
Bruno
John K Clark
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