> On 9 Apr 2018, at 18:19, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote: > > On Mon, Apr 9, 2018 at 8:30 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be > <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote: > On 9 Apr 2018, at 03:19, Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au > <mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote: > > >> Yes, Bruno is terminally confused about non-locality. He refused to even > >> comment on my simple proof of non-locality in an Everettian context. > > > ? I did answer to your remarks, anyone can verify this by looking at the > > archive. > Bruce get used to it, Bruno has done the same thing with me for years. I've > lost count of how many times I've presented a long argument and Bruno > responds with "I've already debunked that argument in a previous post" but he > never says where all those brilliant posts are, > It is easy to find them in the archive, but as you are stuck in the step 3 of the universal dovetailer, and claim to have debunked where everyone on the list point to you that you were dismissing the distinction between the first person (1p) view and the third person view.
> or give any hint of what was in them, or point to anybody who has actually > seen one of them. As far as Everett is concerned long ago I tried to explain > to Bruno that a Everettian other world was about as non-local as you can get, > Phenomenologically only. But that non-locality does not allow any physical influence at a distance. Even those not exploitable for communication at a distance. But, contrary to what you said, only Bruce has tried to show that we keep some influence at a distance in Everett, but convince nobody, and his “Everett interpretation” used a notion of “world” which has been shown inconsistent already with Mechanism. > but once again he just said he already proved that was not true > ? Never said that. On the contrary I have always referred, for this non locality question in Everett, to either Deustch and Hayden paper, or Tipler’s paper, or Price Webpage https://www.hedweb.com/manworld.htm <https://www.hedweb.com/manworld.htm> > in yet another mysterious post nobody has ever seen. > > > As usual, he is ruled by dogmatic beliefs rather than logical argument. > Yes, > Yes? Which dogmatic belief. You are the one who invoke his ontological commitment to stop reasoning (cf step 3). You might try to explain this to Grayson, as he did not follow those discussions, and seems like many to ignore the metaphysical consequence of indexical computationalism. I doubt you will succeed to be franc, as you are the only person I met who have a problem at this stage. Step seven is more often criticised, because people, especially physicists tend to confuse a computation with a physical computation, like they confuse the notion of reality with the notion of physical reality, which is basically the Aristotelian theology/metaphysics. > and yet Bruno claims to be a logician. Very odd. > > I have never claim anything like that. I did refer to my PhD thesis in mathematical logic, for obvious reason. Bruno > John K Clark > > > > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org > <mailto:email@example.com>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.