> On 10 Apr 2018, at 17:14, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
> On Tuesday, April 10, 2018 at 2:32:50 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> On Mon, Apr 9, 2018 at 8:30 AM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be
>> On 9 Apr 2018, at 03:19, Bruce Kellett <bhke...@optusnet.com.au
>> >> Yes, Bruno is terminally confused about non-locality. He refused to even
>> >> comment on my simple proof of non-locality in an Everettian context.
>> > ? I did answer to your remarks, anyone can verify this by looking at the
>> > archive.
>> Bruce get used to it, Bruno has done the same thing with me for years. I've
>> lost count of how many times I've presented a long argument and Bruno
>> responds with "I've already debunked that argument in a previous post" but
>> he never says where all those brilliant posts are,
> It is easy to find them in the archive, but as you are stuck in the step 3 of
> the universal dovetailer, and claim to have debunked where everyone on the
> list point to you that you were dismissing the distinction between the first
> person (1p) view and the third person view.
>> or give any hint of what was in them, or point to anybody who has actually
>> seen one of them. As far as Everett is concerned long ago I tried to explain
>> to Bruno that a Everettian other world was about as non-local as you can get,
> Phenomenologically only. But that non-locality does not allow any physical
> influence at a distance. Even those not exploitable for communication at a
> But, contrary to what you said, only Bruce has tried to show that we keep
> some influence at a distance in Everett, but convince nobody, and his
> “Everett interpretation” used a notion of “world” which has been shown
> inconsistent already with Mechanism.
>> but once again he just said he already proved that was not true
> Never said that. On the contrary I have always referred, for this non
> locality question in Everett, to either Deustch and Hayden paper, or
> Tipler’s paper, or Price Webpage https://www.hedweb.com/manworld.htm
>> in yet another mysterious post nobody has ever seen.
>> > As usual, he is ruled by dogmatic beliefs rather than logical argument.
> Yes? Which dogmatic belief. You are the one who invoke his ontological
> commitment to stop reasoning (cf step 3).
> You might try to explain this to Grayson, as he did not follow those
> discussions, and seems like many to ignore the metaphysical consequence of
> indexical computationalism.
> I have no clue what it is, to ignore or not. Also, in saying physics is a
> work in progress, I didn't necessarily mean that consciousness couldn't
> eventually be included in a Final Theory. So I am not an Aristotelian if that
> means necessarily believing in the primary nature of physical matter. For me,
> it's an open question. AG
Good. Then all you need to study is the (mathematical, indeed arithmetical)
notion of computations. Then you might understand a little theory of
everything, which I prefer to call “theology” for diverse reason.
But I do not propose that theory. I extracted it in two ways.
In one way, I start from the intuitive indexical understanding of mechanism: it
means practically that you survive with your brain/body substituted by a
(indeed physical) computer. It is the idea that the basic process of my brain,
at some level of description, are computable, in the precise mathematical sense
allowed by the Church-Turing Thesis.
In the second way, I show that incompleteness forces the sound universal
machine to distinguish the Platonic definitions of how the One get Multiple
when observing itself, basically truth (p), belief (Bp), know (Bp & p), Observe
(Bp & ~Bf (f is for 0 = 1)), feels (Bp & ~Bf & p).
With Church thesis it is an easy exercise, indeed solved in all textbook of
mathematical logic, to figure out that the proof of the arithmetical
existential relation, of the type ExP(x, y, z) with P decidable, emulates all
computable processes. That’s the sigma_1 formula.
Now all computations are emulated in Arithmetic, indeed in all Models of
But for the first person views, with rather simple thought experiences you can
understand what happens, which is that we (we the universal numbers) cannot,
below our substitution level, determine which computations our consciousness
differentiates on). We are distributed in a vast (infinite) ocean of dreams,
which follows from a set of reason of the type (3^3) + (4^3) + (5^3) = (6^3).
If you have enough faith and courage to believe this!
Church thesis implies a very precise, and arithmetical, notion of universality,
The mind body problem becomes an interesting body appearance problems, but the
modal nuances imposed by incompleteness, and, amazingly enough completely
axiomatised, at the propositional logical level (the two arithmetical
completeness theorem of Solovay for the modal logic G and G*), we can test
quickly the platonic definition of matter (intuitively understandable with the
thought experience), by comparing the logic of the “observe” modality with
quantum logic, and it fits.
If you don’t like Everett, that is bad news! This extends Everett on the whole
(sigma_1) arithmetic. The physicists will still obeys to the laws of physics
(Everett) but the sleepy mathematical dreamer he really is belongs to its won
The Universal Dovetailer is a program which generates and execute all programs.
It exemplifies the truth and provability of the sigma_1 sentences. It generates
also many non halting computations, and we are determined by a relative
statistics and renormalisation. With computationalism dreams have laws,
dictated by computer science and/or Arithmetic.
Only a con man can claim that science has decided between Aristotle (reality is
WYSIWYG) and Plato (Perhaps not).
And with computationalism and Everett, it becomes testable, and, thanks to QM
(without collapse) we can’t say that we detect evidence for non computable or
non “non computable recoverable by the measure on the limits of computations.
In arithmetic, the universal machines “lives” on the border of the true sigma_1
sentences. By looking at themselves they are already confronted to the non
If the physical appears to much computable, that could make digital-mechanism
in trouble, as mechanism implies the importance of diverses degrees of non
computability, playing some role in physics (relative measures).
You might try to read a sum up easily accessible here:
I published more detailed versions. Before 2007 see my URL, after, see
To bad the God/Non-God debate hides the original question of the antic Chinese,
Indians and Greeks (and I guess other) which was more like
Universe/Non-Universe, or one/multiple, or awaken/dream, etc.
Take your time. The platonist universal number are infinitely patient :)
> I doubt you will succeed to be franc, as you are the only person I met who
> have a problem at this stage. Step seven is more often criticised, because
> people, especially physicists tend to confuse a computation with a physical
> computation, like they confuse the notion of reality with the notion of
> physical reality, which is basically the Aristotelian theology/metaphysics.
>> and yet Bruno claims to be a logician. Very odd.
> I have never claim anything like that. I did refer to my PhD thesis in
> mathematical logic, for obvious reason.
>> John K Clark
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