On 6/21/2018 7:47 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 12:59 AM, Brent Meeker <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 6/20/2018 9:48 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 5:24 PM, Brent Meeker
<[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 6/19/2018 7:10 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 12:21 AM, Brent Meeker
<[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 6/18/2018 4:27 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 9:57 PM, Brent Meeker
<[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 6/17/2018 4:43 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On 17 June 2018 at 13:26,
<[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On Sunday, June 17, 2018 at 10:15:05 AM
UTC, Jason wrote:
On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 12:12 AM,
<[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
why do you prefer the MWI
compared to the Transactional
Interpretation?
I see both as absurd. so I prefer
to assume the wf is just epistemic,
and/or
that we have some holes in the CI
which have yet to be resolved. AG
--
1. It's the simplest theory: "MWI" is
just the Schrodinger equation,
nothing else. (it doesn't say
Schrodinger's equation only applies
sometimes,
or only at certain scales)
2. It explains more while assuming less
(it explains the appearance of
collapse, without having to assume it,
thus is preferred by Occam's razor)
3. Like every other successful physical
theory, it is linear, reversible
(time-symmetric), continuous,
deterministic and does not require
faster than
light influences nor retrocausalities
4. Unlike single-universe or epistemic
interpretations, "WF is real" with
MWI is the only way we know how to
explain the functioning of quantum
computers (now up to 51 qubits)
5. Unlike copenhagen-type theories, it
attributes no special physical
abilities to observers or measurement
devices
6. Most of all, theories of everything
that assume a reality containing
all possible observers and observations
lead directly to laws/postulates of
quantum mechanics (see Russell
Standish's Theory of Nothing, Chapter 7 and
Appendix D).
Given #6, we should revise our view. It
is not MWI and QM that should
convince us of many worlds, but rather
the assumption of many worlds (an
infinite and infinitely varied reality)
that gives us, and explains all the
weirdness of QM. This should
overwhelmingly convince us of MWI-type
everything theories over any
single-universe interpretation of quantum
mechanics, which is not only absurd,
but completely devoid of explanation.
With the assumption of a large reality,
QM is made explainable and
understandable: as a theory of
observation within an infinite reality.
Jason
You forgot #7. It asserts multiple, even
infinite copies of an observer,
replete with memories, are created when an
observer does a simple quantum
experiment. So IMO the alleged "cure" is
immensely worse than the disease,
CI, that is, just plain idiotic. AG
It is important to make the distinction between
our intuition and
common sense and actual formal reasoning. The
former can guide the
latter very successfully, but the history of
science teaches us that
this is not always the case. You don't provide
an argument, you just
present your gut feeling as if it were the same
thing as irrefutable
fact.
I think Scott Aaronson has the right attitude
toward this:
https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=326
<https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=326>
As such a strong believer in quantum computers (he's
staked $100,000 of his own money on the future
construction of large scale quantum computers), I would
love to ask Scott Aaronson what he thinks about running
a conscious AI on such a quantum computer. That
trivially leads to "many worlds" at least as seen by
that AI.
If it's so trivial maybe you can explain it.
1. A quantum computer is isolated from the environment so as
to remain in a super position of many possible states.
2. Quantum computers are Turing universal, anything that can
be programmed on a classical computer can be programmed on a
quantum computer
3. Assuming Computational Theory of mind, a quantum computer
can execute the same conscious program as "Brent Meeker's Brain"
4. The quantum computer can be arranged to entangle an
unmeasured particle with Brent Meeker's quantum brain emulation,
a) by feeding in spin up as an auditory tone in Brent
Meeker's left auditory nerve
b) by feeding in spin down as an auditory tone in Brent
Meeker's right auditory nerve
5. The quantum brain simulation, being isolated from the
environment, remains in a super position of the Brent Meeker
brain emulation hearing an auditory tone in his left and
right ears.
You can repeat this process 30 times, with 30 different
measurements of different electrons, and end up with over 1
billion Brent Meeker brain emulations, each remembering a
different pattern of auditory tones.
For the Brent Meeker quantum brain emulation, many worlds is
definitely true.
No. If decoherence occurs when there a many degrees of
freedom in which to disperse entanglements then my brain is
plenty big enough to decohere the signal; and you seem to
assume this when supposing that I form different memories.
Otherwise I wouldn't form any definite memory, my memory
would merely exist in a superposition of a billion different
patterns.
That is the whole point of (and difficulty) of making a quantum
computer. Its qubits must remain isolated from the rest of the
environment such that it does not decohere while it is computing
something. You seem to be postulating some upperbound on how
large quantum computers can get. This is the exact thing Scott
Aaronson has staked $100K on (that large scale quantum computers
/can/ be built), which is why I find his antipathy towards MWI so
paradoxical. If they can be built, then we can create
many-experiences by running an AI emulation on a quantum
computer, where some of the qubit registers are prepared in an
undetermined state.
How will you know it has many experiences?
If computationalism is true (which Aarson has defended), it will have
an experience.
An experience is not many experiences. And what does computationalism
mean; it gets used sloppily on this list, sometimes meaning only that
"saying yes to the doctor" is justified, other times meaning that
Bruno's whole theory is true?
It won't be able to say what they are.
Sure it can, within its virtual reality it can say or do anything.
Whether or not it can tell us what it sees is another question. I
would say if we decide to cause the quantum computer to decohere and
entangle ourselves with its state, we will hear what it is saying (but
in each branch we will hear it say only one thing).
Exactly my point.
It won't be able to act intelligently in more than one world.
Scott also notes that quantum computers solve problems by having
destructive interference zero out the probability of incorrect
solutions...which means computation all happens in the same world.
That is when quantum computers are used to obtain a single definite
result in all branches. This is what can make quantum computers more
powerful. But I am not using this, I am merely riding off the quantum
computer's ability to maintain a large scale superposition by virtue
of a quantum computer's ability to remain isolated from its
environment while it computes what it does.
But then it doesn't actually compute anything. In the words of
Schroedinger it is jellified.
Brent
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