On 6/21/2018 3:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 5:10 PM, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net
<mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:
On 6/21/2018 7:47 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 12:59 AM, Brent Meeker
<meeke...@verizon.net <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:
On 6/20/2018 9:48 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 5:24 PM, Brent Meeker
<meeke...@verizon.net <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:
On 6/19/2018 7:10 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 12:21 AM, Brent Meeker
<meeke...@verizon.net <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:
On 6/18/2018 4:27 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 9:57 PM, Brent Meeker
<meeke...@verizon.net
<mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:
On 6/17/2018 4:43 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On 17 June 2018 at 13:26,
<agrayson2...@gmail.com
<mailto:agrayson2...@gmail.com>> wrote:
On Sunday, June 17, 2018 at 10:15:05
AM UTC, Jason wrote:
On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 12:12 AM,
<agrays...@gmail.com
<mailto:agrays...@gmail.com>> wrote:
why do you prefer the MWI
compared to the Transactional
Interpretation?
I see both as absurd. so I
prefer to assume the wf is
just epistemic, and/or
that we have some holes in the
CI which have yet to be
resolved. AG
--
1. It's the simplest theory: "MWI"
is just the Schrodinger equation,
nothing else. (it doesn't say
Schrodinger's equation only
applies sometimes,
or only at certain scales)
2. It explains more while assuming
less (it explains the appearance of
collapse, without having to assume
it, thus is preferred by Occam's
razor)
3. Like every other successful
physical theory, it is linear,
reversible
(time-symmetric), continuous,
deterministic and does not require
faster than
light influences nor retrocausalities
4. Unlike single-universe or
epistemic interpretations, "WF is
real" with
MWI is the only way we know how to
explain the functioning of quantum
computers (now up to 51 qubits)
5. Unlike copenhagen-type
theories, it attributes no special
physical
abilities to observers or
measurement devices
6. Most of all, theories of
everything that assume a reality
containing
all possible observers and
observations lead directly to
laws/postulates of
quantum mechanics (see Russell
Standish's Theory of Nothing,
Chapter 7 and
Appendix D).
Given #6, we should revise our
view. It is not MWI and QM that should
convince us of many worlds, but
rather the assumption of many
worlds (an
infinite and infinitely varied
reality) that gives us, and
explains all the
weirdness of QM. This should
overwhelmingly convince us of MWI-type
everything theories over any
single-universe interpretation of
quantum
mechanics, which is not only
absurd, but completely devoid of
explanation.
With the assumption of a large
reality, QM is made explainable and
understandable: as a theory of
observation within an infinite
reality.
Jason
You forgot #7. It asserts multiple,
even infinite copies of an observer,
replete with memories, are created
when an observer does a simple quantum
experiment. So IMO the alleged "cure"
is immensely worse than the disease,
CI, that is, just plain idiotic. AG
It is important to make the distinction
between our intuition and
common sense and actual formal reasoning.
The former can guide the
latter very successfully, but the history
of science teaches us that
this is not always the case. You don't
provide an argument, you just
present your gut feeling as if it were the
same thing as irrefutable
fact.
I think Scott Aaronson has the right attitude
toward this:
https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=326
<https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=326>
As such a strong believer in quantum computers
(he's staked $100,000 of his own money on the
future construction of large scale quantum
computers), I would love to ask Scott Aaronson
what he thinks about running a conscious AI on
such a quantum computer. That trivially leads to
"many worlds" at least as seen by that AI.
If it's so trivial maybe you can explain it.
1. A quantum computer is isolated from the environment
so as to remain in a super position of many possible
states.
2. Quantum computers are Turing universal, anything
that can be programmed on a classical computer can be
programmed on a quantum computer
3. Assuming Computational Theory of mind, a quantum
computer can execute the same conscious program as
"Brent Meeker's Brain"
4. The quantum computer can be arranged to entangle an
unmeasured particle with Brent Meeker's quantum brain
emulation,
a) by feeding in spin up as an auditory tone in Brent
Meeker's left auditory nerve
b) by feeding in spin down as an auditory tone in Brent
Meeker's right auditory nerve
5. The quantum brain simulation, being isolated from
the environment, remains in a super position of the
Brent Meeker brain emulation hearing an auditory tone
in his left and right ears.
You can repeat this process 30 times, with 30 different
measurements of different electrons, and end up with
over 1 billion Brent Meeker brain emulations, each
remembering a different pattern of auditory tones.
For the Brent Meeker quantum brain emulation, many
worlds is definitely true.
No. If decoherence occurs when there a many degrees of
freedom in which to disperse entanglements then my brain
is plenty big enough to decohere the signal; and you
seem to assume this when supposing that I form different
memories. Otherwise I wouldn't form any definite memory,
my memory would merely exist in a superposition of a
billion different patterns.
That is the whole point of (and difficulty) of making a
quantum computer. Its qubits must remain isolated from the
rest of the environment such that it does not decohere while
it is computing something. You seem to be postulating some
upperbound on how large quantum computers can get. This is
the exact thing Scott Aaronson has staked $100K on (that
large scale quantum computers /can/ be built), which is why
I find his antipathy towards MWI so paradoxical. If they
can be built, then we can create many-experiences by running
an AI emulation on a quantum computer, where some of the
qubit registers are prepared in an undetermined state.
How will you know it has many experiences?
If computationalism is true (which Aarson has defended), it will
have an experience.
An experience is not many experiences. And what does
computationalism mean; it gets used sloppily on this list,
sometimes meaning only that "saying yes to the doctor" is
justified, other times meaning that Bruno's whole theory is true?
By computationalism, I mean there exists a computation that if
performed/implemented by any machine, it is sufficient to instantiate
a given conscious experience.
By the way, I e-mailed Scott Aaronson asking about the thought
experiment I gave above regarding running a conscious AI/brain
emulation on a quantum computer that enters a superposition, and just
got a reply.
He said that he agrees that if consciousness is inherent to a
particular computation (including a computation restricted to only one
branch of the wave function), and if large-scale quantum computers are
possible, then you could have a superposition of different conscious
experiments and this appears to force one to a many-worlds picture. He
said he has made this same point before in some of his blog posts and
writings.
What he thought what least clear from my proposed thought experiment
concerned what is necessary for a conscious computation, and gave the
examples of alternate theories of consciousness which required
coherence, or irreversibility, for example.
However, I think from a plain "computational theory of mind", which is
free from any quantum mechanical/physical definitions, he is in
general agreement that Computationalism + Quantum computers large
enough to run conscious programs, yields many-worlds.
It won't be able to say what they are.
Sure it can, within its virtual reality it can say or do
anything. Whether or not it can tell us what it sees is another
question. I would say if we decide to cause the quantum computer
to decohere and entangle ourselves with its state, we will hear
what it is saying (but in each branch we will hear it say only
one thing).
Exactly my point.
But if those other computations (which we know must exist, as they are
necessary to explain the functioning of quantum computers) to say they
are not conscious is to abandon Computationalism.
I don't think that follows. I think consciousness (and thought in
general) is a classical phenomenon. So a superposition of different
computations would only be a bunch of parallel consciousnesses (which I
think Scott discounts) if each existed in a parallel classical world.
But in that case only one could communicate with us.
It won't be able to act intelligently in more than one
world. Scott also notes that quantum computers solve
problems by having destructive interference zero out the
probability of incorrect solutions...which means computation
all happens in the same world.
That is when quantum computers are used to obtain a single
definite result in all branches. This is what can make quantum
computers more powerful. But I am not using this, I am merely
riding off the quantum computer's ability to maintain a large
scale superposition by virtue of a quantum computer's ability to
remain isolated from its environment while it computes what it does.
But then it doesn't actually compute anything. In the words of
Schroedinger it is jellified.
It must have computed that trace, and by computationalism, that
execution trace in that branch must have been conscious. You can't
explain quantum computers without assuming those executions in the
other branches all exist.
/*Unless*/ you think wave function collapse has the power to delete an
/already-had/ experience out of existence,
No, I'm saying there is no experience except classical experiences...we
never experience superpositions. In the real world "collapse" is
continuous except in carefully contrived experiments. Those other
branches exist in a quantum computer because they interfere, all in this
world and produce one classical result. I see no reason to suppose
there is any experience apart from classical results. That's one on my
complaints about Bruno's step 8 "proof", he claims to have shown
computationalism inconsistent with materialism. But it only seems that
way because he ignores the necessity of having a whole physical
environment to have experience in. But then you recognize that the
physical world is a necessary component and must exist to make
computationalism meaningful.
out of the past, in a manner such that it never existed, and we were
wrong to believe that it ever did exist. But this seems magical to me.
I know. But having worlds coming into existence on a continuum seems
just fine.
Brent
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