Correction: I meant to say if we *ignore* Boltzmann brain type computations. (And only focus on larger computations that contain self-aware sub-processes).
On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 8:42 PM, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: > > > On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 7:26 PM, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> >> >> On 6/21/2018 3:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> >> >> On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 5:10 PM, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On 6/21/2018 7:47 AM, Jason Resch wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 12:59 AM, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 6/20/2018 9:48 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 5:24 PM, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 6/19/2018 7:10 AM, Jason Resch wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 12:21 AM, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 6/18/2018 4:27 AM, Jason Resch wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 9:57 PM, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 6/17/2018 4:43 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 17 June 2018 at 13:26, <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Sunday, June 17, 2018 at 10:15:05 AM UTC, Jason wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 12:12 AM, <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> why do you prefer the MWI compared to the Transactional >>>>>>>>>>> Interpretation? >>>>>>>>>>> I see both as absurd. so I prefer to assume the wf is just >>>>>>>>>>> epistemic, and/or >>>>>>>>>>> that we have some holes in the CI which have yet to be resolved. >>>>>>>>>>> AG >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> 1. It's the simplest theory: "MWI" is just the Schrodinger >>>>>>>>>> equation, >>>>>>>>>> nothing else. (it doesn't say Schrodinger's equation only applies >>>>>>>>>> sometimes, >>>>>>>>>> or only at certain scales) >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> 2. It explains more while assuming less (it explains the >>>>>>>>>> appearance of >>>>>>>>>> collapse, without having to assume it, thus is preferred by >>>>>>>>>> Occam's razor) >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> 3. Like every other successful physical theory, it is linear, >>>>>>>>>> reversible >>>>>>>>>> (time-symmetric), continuous, deterministic and does not require >>>>>>>>>> faster than >>>>>>>>>> light influences nor retrocausalities >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> 4. Unlike single-universe or epistemic interpretations, "WF is >>>>>>>>>> real" with >>>>>>>>>> MWI is the only way we know how to explain the functioning of >>>>>>>>>> quantum >>>>>>>>>> computers (now up to 51 qubits) >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> 5. Unlike copenhagen-type theories, it attributes no special >>>>>>>>>> physical >>>>>>>>>> abilities to observers or measurement devices >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> 6. Most of all, theories of everything that assume a reality >>>>>>>>>> containing >>>>>>>>>> all possible observers and observations lead directly to >>>>>>>>>> laws/postulates of >>>>>>>>>> quantum mechanics (see Russell Standish's Theory of Nothing, >>>>>>>>>> Chapter 7 and >>>>>>>>>> Appendix D). >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Given #6, we should revise our view. It is not MWI and QM that >>>>>>>>>> should >>>>>>>>>> convince us of many worlds, but rather the assumption of many >>>>>>>>>> worlds (an >>>>>>>>>> infinite and infinitely varied reality) that gives us, and >>>>>>>>>> explains all the >>>>>>>>>> weirdness of QM. This should overwhelmingly convince us of >>>>>>>>>> MWI-type >>>>>>>>>> everything theories over any single-universe interpretation of >>>>>>>>>> quantum >>>>>>>>>> mechanics, which is not only absurd, but completely devoid of >>>>>>>>>> explanation. >>>>>>>>>> With the assumption of a large reality, QM is made explainable and >>>>>>>>>> understandable: as a theory of observation within an infinite >>>>>>>>>> reality. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Jason >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> You forgot #7. It asserts multiple, even infinite copies of an >>>>>>>>> observer, >>>>>>>>> replete with memories, are created when an observer does a simple >>>>>>>>> quantum >>>>>>>>> experiment. So IMO the alleged "cure" is immensely worse than the >>>>>>>>> disease, >>>>>>>>> CI, that is, just plain idiotic. AG >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> It is important to make the distinction between our intuition and >>>>>>>> common sense and actual formal reasoning. The former can guide the >>>>>>>> latter very successfully, but the history of science teaches us that >>>>>>>> this is not always the case. You don't provide an argument, you just >>>>>>>> present your gut feeling as if it were the same thing as irrefutable >>>>>>>> fact. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I think Scott Aaronson has the right attitude toward this: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=326 >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> As such a strong believer in quantum computers (he's staked $100,000 >>>>>> of his own money on the future construction of large scale quantum >>>>>> computers), I would love to ask Scott Aaronson what he thinks about >>>>>> running >>>>>> a conscious AI on such a quantum computer. That trivially leads to "many >>>>>> worlds" at least as seen by that AI. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> If it's so trivial maybe you can explain it. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> 1. A quantum computer is isolated from the environment so as to remain >>>>> in a super position of many possible states. >>>>> 2. Quantum computers are Turing universal, anything that can be >>>>> programmed on a classical computer can be programmed on a quantum computer >>>>> 3. Assuming Computational Theory of mind, a quantum computer can >>>>> execute the same conscious program as "Brent Meeker's Brain" >>>>> 4. The quantum computer can be arranged to entangle an unmeasured >>>>> particle with Brent Meeker's quantum brain emulation, >>>>> a) by feeding in spin up as an auditory tone in Brent Meeker's left >>>>> auditory nerve >>>>> b) by feeding in spin down as an auditory tone in Brent Meeker's right >>>>> auditory nerve >>>>> 5. The quantum brain simulation, being isolated from the environment, >>>>> remains in a super position of the Brent Meeker brain emulation hearing an >>>>> auditory tone in his left and right ears. >>>>> >>>>> You can repeat this process 30 times, with 30 different measurements >>>>> of different electrons, and end up with over 1 billion Brent Meeker brain >>>>> emulations, each remembering a different pattern of auditory tones. >>>>> >>>>> For the Brent Meeker quantum brain emulation, many worlds is >>>>> definitely true. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> No. If decoherence occurs when there a many degrees of freedom in >>>>> which to disperse entanglements then my brain is plenty big enough to >>>>> decohere the signal; and you seem to assume this when supposing that I >>>>> form >>>>> different memories. Otherwise I wouldn't form any definite memory, my >>>>> memory would merely exist in a superposition of a billion different >>>>> patterns. >>>>> >>>>> >>>> That is the whole point of (and difficulty) of making a quantum >>>> computer. Its qubits must remain isolated from the rest of the environment >>>> such that it does not decohere while it is computing something. You seem >>>> to be postulating some upperbound on how large quantum computers can get. >>>> This is the exact thing Scott Aaronson has staked $100K on (that large >>>> scale quantum computers *can* be built), which is why I find his >>>> antipathy towards MWI so paradoxical. If they can be built, then we can >>>> create many-experiences by running an AI emulation on a quantum computer, >>>> where some of the qubit registers are prepared in an undetermined state. >>>> >>>> >>>> How will you know it has many experiences? >>>> >>> >>> If computationalism is true (which Aarson has defended), it will have an >>> experience. >>> >>> >>> An experience is not many experiences. And what does computationalism >>> mean; it gets used sloppily on this list, sometimes meaning only that >>> "saying yes to the doctor" is justified, other times meaning that Bruno's >>> whole theory is true? >>> >> >> >> By computationalism, I mean there exists a computation that if >> performed/implemented by any machine, it is sufficient to instantiate a >> given conscious experience. >> >> By the way, I e-mailed Scott Aaronson asking about the thought experiment >> I gave above regarding running a conscious AI/brain emulation on a quantum >> computer that enters a superposition, and just got a reply. >> >> He said that he agrees that if consciousness is inherent to a particular >> computation (including a computation restricted to only one branch of the >> wave function), and if large-scale quantum computers are possible, then you >> could have a superposition of different conscious experiments and this >> appears to force one to a many-worlds picture. He said he has made this >> same point before in some of his blog posts and writings. >> >> What he thought what least clear from my proposed thought experiment >> concerned what is necessary for a conscious computation, and gave the >> examples of alternate theories of consciousness which required coherence, >> or irreversibility, for example. >> >> However, I think from a plain "computational theory of mind", which is >> free from any quantum mechanical/physical definitions, he is in general >> agreement that Computationalism + Quantum computers large enough to run >> conscious programs, yields many-worlds. >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> It won't be able to say what they are. >>>> >>> >>> Sure it can, within its virtual reality it can say or do anything. >>> Whether or not it can tell us what it sees is another question. I would >>> say if we decide to cause the quantum computer to decohere and entangle >>> ourselves with its state, we will hear what it is saying (but in each >>> branch we will hear it say only one thing). >>> >>> >>> Exactly my point. >>> >>> >> But if those other computations (which we know must exist, as they are >> necessary to explain the functioning of quantum computers) to say they are >> not conscious is to abandon Computationalism. >> >> >> I don't think that follows. I think consciousness (and thought in >> general) is a classical phenomenon. >> > > We are talking about classical computations through. (The same form that > classical computers implement). The only difference is, we are using a > quantum computer to perform those classical computations in parallel. > > >> So a superposition of different computations would only be a bunch of >> parallel consciousnesses (which I think Scott discounts) if each existed in >> a parallel classical world. >> > > I am not sure I follow what you are saying here. I agree a super position > of different computations would only be a bunch of parallel > consciousnesses. (Scott seemed to agree this would be the result under > standard computationalism, but might not under some non-standard form of > computationalism that additionally required some necessary bit of > physicalism--I would call this physicalism rather than computationalism). > > >> But in that case only one could communicate with us. >> >> > Well, unless we too decide to join the superposition (which I argue we do > when the quantum computer decoheres). Again, no one consciousness gets to > interview all the others (beyond whatever interference might permit). > > >> >> >>> >>> >>> >>>> It won't be able to act intelligently in more than one world. Scott >>>> also notes that quantum computers solve problems by having destructive >>>> interference zero out the probability of incorrect solutions...which means >>>> computation all happens in the same world. >>>> >>> >>> That is when quantum computers are used to obtain a single definite >>> result in all branches. This is what can make quantum computers more >>> powerful. But I am not using this, I am merely riding off the quantum >>> computer's ability to maintain a large scale superposition by virtue of a >>> quantum computer's ability to remain isolated from its environment while it >>> computes what it does. >>> >>> >>> But then it doesn't actually compute anything. In the words of >>> Schroedinger it is jellified. >>> >> >> It must have computed that trace, and by computationalism, that execution >> trace in that branch must have been conscious. You can't explain quantum >> computers without assuming those executions in the other branches all exist. >> >> *Unless* you think wave function collapse has the power to delete an >> *already-had* experience out of existence, >> >> >> No, I'm saying there is no experience except classical experiences...we >> never experience superpositions. >> > > Each branch of the superposition represents a classical computation. Are > you saying this computation doesn't exist, or that a computation can only > be conscious if it is constantly interacting with its environment? If I > isolate my laptop computer from the rest of the environment for a few hours > while it works on some problem, and then check it after it is done, will it > not still have computed the expected result? Do you reject the reality of > the intermediate steps of the computation? > > > >> In the real world "collapse" is continuous except in carefully contrived >> experiments. Those other branches exist in a quantum computer because they >> interfere, all in this world and produce one classical result. I see no >> reason to suppose there is any experience apart from classical results. >> > > Either you reject the reality and efficacy of the intermediate per-branch > computations (which is an anti-realist position that fails to explain how > quantum computers can produce final results, if the intermediate per-branch > computational states don't compute what they're supposed to such that they > interfere correctly at the end to yield the expected result) > > Or you are rejecting computationalism and replacing it with your own > theory, which says, conventional computation is insufficient. Only a > computation performed by a physical computer that frequently (how > frequently?) interacts with its environment (how big does the environment > need to be, how do you define where the computer ends and the environment > begins?) can be conscious. This theory seems a bit ad hoc, and whose sole > motivation is to zombify the AIs in the branches of the quantum computer. > > >> That's one on my complaints about Bruno's step 8 "proof", he claims to >> have shown computationalism inconsistent with materialism. But it only >> seems that way because he ignores the necessity of having a whole physical >> environment to have experience in. But then you recognize that the >> physical world is a necessary component and must exist to make >> computationalism meaningful. >> > > I will let Bruno reply to this, but I think we need to be very careful > about the subtle role physics plays. To be clear Bruno does not reject the > existence of a physical reality, but says its existence is made a theorem > in arithmetic and becomes a necessary role in relating experiences between > different machines. > There is also the difference between the appearance of the physical world > and the infinity of computations below us competing with each other in that > appearance. If we look at the Boltzmann bran computations, some of those > are larger programs that may contain many conscious sub-computations, and > if in one of those computations we build a computer which itself manifests > as a sub-routine of that larger computation you could say we have realized > a new conscious entity. But is conscious computation exists as > arithmetical computations, and appears infinitely often in the UD, so we > should not confuse a local incarnation of a computation with the observer, > whose future experiences are not bound to the evolution of the > locally-realized computation. I think this is why Bruno says we cannot > physically create an observer, only locally instantiate one relatively to > us. But the two forms: the single deterministic machine instantiation, and > the observers first person point of view supported by infinite > computations, remain distinct. > > >> >> >> out of the past, in a manner such that it never existed, and we were >> wrong to believe that it ever did exist. But this seems magical to me. >> >> >> I know. But having worlds coming into existence on a continuum seems >> just fine. >> > > So you reject QM on that basis? > > Jason > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
