> On 25 Jun 2018, at 04:31, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 6/24/2018 9:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 22 Jun 2018, at 02:26, Brent Meeker <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 6/21/2018 3:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 5:10 PM, Brent Meeker <[email protected] >>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 6/21/2018 7:47 AM, Jason Resch wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 12:59 AM, Brent Meeker <[email protected] >>>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 6/20/2018 9:48 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 5:24 PM, Brent Meeker <[email protected] >>>>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 6/19/2018 7:10 AM, Jason Resch wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 12:21 AM, Brent Meeker <[email protected] >>>>>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 6/18/2018 4:27 AM, Jason Resch wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 9:57 PM, Brent Meeker <[email protected] >>>>>>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 6/17/2018 4:43 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: >>>>>>>> On 17 June 2018 at 13:26, <[email protected] >>>>>>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Sunday, June 17, 2018 at 10:15:05 AM UTC, Jason wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 12:12 AM, <[email protected] >>>>>>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> why do you prefer the MWI compared to the Transactional >>>>>>>> Interpretation? >>>>>>>> I see both as absurd. so I prefer to assume the wf is just epistemic, >>>>>>>> and/or >>>>>>>> that we have some holes in the CI which have yet to be resolved. AG >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> 1. It's the simplest theory: "MWI" is just the Schrodinger equation, >>>>>>>> nothing else. (it doesn't say Schrodinger's equation only applies >>>>>>>> sometimes, >>>>>>>> or only at certain scales) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> 2. It explains more while assuming less (it explains the appearance of >>>>>>>> collapse, without having to assume it, thus is preferred by Occam's >>>>>>>> razor) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> 3. Like every other successful physical theory, it is linear, >>>>>>>> reversible >>>>>>>> (time-symmetric), continuous, deterministic and does not require >>>>>>>> faster than >>>>>>>> light influences nor retrocausalities >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> 4. Unlike single-universe or epistemic interpretations, "WF is real" >>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>> MWI is the only way we know how to explain the functioning of quantum >>>>>>>> computers (now up to 51 qubits) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> 5. Unlike copenhagen-type theories, it attributes no special physical >>>>>>>> abilities to observers or measurement devices >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> 6. Most of all, theories of everything that assume a reality containing >>>>>>>> all possible observers and observations lead directly to >>>>>>>> laws/postulates of >>>>>>>> quantum mechanics (see Russell Standish's Theory of Nothing, Chapter 7 >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>> Appendix D). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Given #6, we should revise our view. It is not MWI and QM that should >>>>>>>> convince us of many worlds, but rather the assumption of many worlds >>>>>>>> (an >>>>>>>> infinite and infinitely varied reality) that gives us, and explains >>>>>>>> all the >>>>>>>> weirdness of QM. This should overwhelmingly convince us of MWI-type >>>>>>>> everything theories over any single-universe interpretation of quantum >>>>>>>> mechanics, which is not only absurd, but completely devoid of >>>>>>>> explanation. >>>>>>>> With the assumption of a large reality, QM is made explainable and >>>>>>>> understandable: as a theory of observation within an infinite reality. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Jason >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> You forgot #7. It asserts multiple, even infinite copies of an >>>>>>>> observer, >>>>>>>> replete with memories, are created when an observer does a simple >>>>>>>> quantum >>>>>>>> experiment. So IMO the alleged "cure" is immensely worse than the >>>>>>>> disease, >>>>>>>> CI, that is, just plain idiotic. AG >>>>>>>> It is important to make the distinction between our intuition and >>>>>>>> common sense and actual formal reasoning. The former can guide the >>>>>>>> latter very successfully, but the history of science teaches us that >>>>>>>> this is not always the case. You don't provide an argument, you just >>>>>>>> present your gut feeling as if it were the same thing as irrefutable >>>>>>>> fact. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I think Scott Aaronson has the right attitude toward this: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=326 >>>>>>>> <https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=326> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> As such a strong believer in quantum computers (he's staked $100,000 >>>>>>>> of his own money on the future construction of large scale quantum >>>>>>>> computers), I would love to ask Scott Aaronson what he thinks about >>>>>>>> running a conscious AI on such a quantum computer. That trivially >>>>>>>> leads to "many worlds" at least as seen by that AI. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> If it's so trivial maybe you can explain it. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> 1. A quantum computer is isolated from the environment so as to remain >>>>>>> in a super position of many possible states. >>>>>>> 2. Quantum computers are Turing universal, anything that can be >>>>>>> programmed on a classical computer can be programmed on a quantum >>>>>>> computer >>>>>>> 3. Assuming Computational Theory of mind, a quantum computer can >>>>>>> execute the same conscious program as "Brent Meeker's Brain" >>>>>>> 4. The quantum computer can be arranged to entangle an unmeasured >>>>>>> particle with Brent Meeker's quantum brain emulation, >>>>>>> a) by feeding in spin up as an auditory tone in Brent Meeker's left >>>>>>> auditory nerve >>>>>>> b) by feeding in spin down as an auditory tone in Brent Meeker's right >>>>>>> auditory nerve >>>>>>> 5. The quantum brain simulation, being isolated from the environment, >>>>>>> remains in a super position of the Brent Meeker brain emulation hearing >>>>>>> an auditory tone in his left and right ears. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> You can repeat this process 30 times, with 30 different measurements of >>>>>>> different electrons, and end up with over 1 billion Brent Meeker brain >>>>>>> emulations, each remembering a different pattern of auditory tones. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> For the Brent Meeker quantum brain emulation, many worlds is definitely >>>>>>> true. >>>>>> >>>>>> No. If decoherence occurs when there a many degrees of freedom in which >>>>>> to disperse >>>>>> entanglements then my brain is plenty big enough to decohere the signal; >>>>>> and you seem to assume this when supposing that I form different >>>>>> memories. Otherwise I wouldn't form any definite memory, my memory >>>>>> would merely exist in a superposition of a billion different patterns. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> That is the whole point of (and difficulty) of making a quantum >>>>>> computer. Its qubits must remain isolated from the rest of the >>>>>> environment such that it does not decohere while it is computing >>>>>> something. You seem to be postulating some upperbound on how large >>>>>> quantum computers can get. This is the exact thing Scott Aaronson has >>>>>> staked $100K on (that large scale quantum computers can be built), which >>>>>> is why I find his antipathy towards MWI so paradoxical. If they can be >>>>>> built, then we can create many-experiences by running an AI emulation on >>>>>> a quantum computer, where some of the qubit registers are prepared in an >>>>>> undetermined state. >>>>> >>>>> How will you know it has many experiences? >>>>> >>>>> If computationalism is true (which Aarson has defended), it will have an >>>>> experience. >>>> >>>> An experience is not many experiences. And what does computationalism >>>> mean; it gets used sloppily on this list, sometimes meaning only that >>>> "saying yes to the doctor" is justified, other times meaning that Bruno's >>>> whole theory is true? >>>> >>>> >>>> By computationalism, I mean there exists a computation that if >>>> performed/implemented by any machine, it is sufficient to instantiate a >>>> given conscious experience. > > Independent of any environment with which that machine may interact? That's > the catch. Bruno implicitlys take the physical world for granted in arguing > for "yes doctor". But then he tries to ignore it by referring to "dreams”.
No, I take enough realism in physics to present the thought experience, but that is recharged at step 7 and 8, and, to contrarily to what you say, I don’t ignore the physical reality with the dreams, I how that the physical reality is a statistics of dreams, and how to deduce physics from that statistics, and test mechanism, and it works, where physics does not work at all, except by endowing a primary matter with the magical ability to select some dreams among all of them. > >>>> >>>> By the way, I e-mailed Scott Aaronson asking about the thought experiment >>>> I gave above regarding running a conscious AI/brain emulation on a quantum >>>> computer that enters a superposition, and just got a reply. >>>> >>>> He said that he agrees that if consciousness is inherent to a particular >>>> computation (including a computation restricted to only one branch of the >>>> wave function), and if large-scale quantum computers are possible, then >>>> you could have a superposition of different conscious experiments and this >>>> appears to force one to a many-worlds picture. He said he has made this >>>> same point before in some of his blog posts and writings. >>>> >>>> What he thought what least clear from my proposed thought experiment >>>> concerned what is necessary for a conscious computation, and gave the >>>> examples of alternate theories of consciousness which required coherence, >>>> or irreversibility, for example. >>>> >>>> However, I think from a plain "computational theory of mind", which is >>>> free from any quantum mechanical/physical definitions, he is in general >>>> agreement that Computationalism + Quantum computers large enough to run >>>> conscious programs, yields many-worlds. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> It won't be able to say what they are. >>>>> >>>>> Sure it can, within its virtual reality it can say or do anything. >>>>> Whether or not it can tell us what it sees is another question. I would >>>>> say if we decide to cause the quantum computer to decohere and entangle >>>>> ourselves with its state, we will hear what it is saying (but in each >>>>> branch we will hear it say only one thing). >>>> >>>> Exactly my point. >>>> >>>> >>>> But if those other computations (which we know must exist, as they are >>>> necessary to explain the functioning of quantum computers) to say they are >>>> not conscious is to abandon Computationalism. >>> >>> I don't think that follows. I think consciousness (and thought in general) >>> is a classical phenomenon. So a superposition of different computations >>> would only be a bunch of parallel consciousnesses (which I think Scott >>> discounts) if each existed in a parallel classical world. But in that case >>> only one could communicate with us. >>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> It won't be able to act intelligently in more than one world. Scott >>>>> also notes that quantum computers solve problems by having destructive >>>>> interference zero out the probability of incorrect solutions...which >>>>> means computation all happens in the same world. >>>>> >>>>> That is when quantum computers are used to obtain a single definite >>>>> result in all branches. This is what can make quantum computers more >>>>> powerful. But I am not using this, I am merely riding off the quantum >>>>> computer's ability to maintain a large scale superposition by virtue of a >>>>> quantum computer's ability to remain isolated from its environment while >>>>> it computes what it does. >>>> >>>> But then it doesn't actually compute anything. In the words of >>>> Schroedinger it is jellified. >>>> >>>> It must have computed that trace, and by computationalism, that execution >>>> trace in that branch must have been conscious. You can't explain quantum >>>> computers without assuming those executions in the other branches all >>>> exist. >>>> >>>> Unless you think wave function collapse has the power to delete an >>>> already-had experience out of existence, >>> >>> No, I'm saying there is no experience except classical experiences...we >>> never experience superpositions. In the real world "collapse" is >>> continuous except in carefully contrived experiments. Those other branches >>> exist in a quantum computer because they interfere, all in this world and >>> produce one classical result. I see no reason to suppose there is any >>> experience apart from classical results. That's one on my complaints about >>> Bruno's step 8 "proof", he claims to have shown computationalism >>> inconsistent with materialism. But it only seems that way because he >>> ignores the necessity of having a whole physical environment to have >>> experience in. >> >> How could a digital universal machine differentiate between being program X >> run by this or that approximation of the physical laws, executed in a >> physical reality (and what is that?) and an arithmetical reality? > > I'm not saying it could. I'm saying indistinguishables are indentical (and > what is arithmetical reality?). Indistinguishable are identical from the local 1p view, but not necessarily in the 3p view. That is illustrated with the first person indeterminacy. The same brain (at the relevant level) can be in tow places, but will have different statistics on some possible outcome, like when opening the door of the reconstitution box. > >> That looks like invoking a God with magical power. >> >> >>> But then you recognize that the physical world is a necessary component and >>> must exist to make computationalism meaningful. >> >> But that is exactly what happen. The physical reality is phenomenologically >> explained by the inability of the universal machine to see the equivalence >> between between []p <->([]p & p) and ([]p & <>p) and ([]p & <>p & p) with p >> (p sigma-1). The existence of the observable is explainable by the some >> modes of self-reference. > > You'll excuse me if I don't see that as an explanation of physical reality. > Maybe somebody else on the list does and can explain it. This should be already obvious at step 7. You are the one using the magic here. I am the one asking you a question. With the UDA we know that physics has to be a statistics on many computations. To understand that this actually works until now, you need to be familiar with the logic of machine self-reference, and study the observable modes. > >> >> That can be understood intuitively, with some confidence in Church’s thesis >> for the step 8. But that can be understood mathematically, and indeed, by >> all “Gödel-Löbian-Solovay” universal machine. All relatively >> self-referentially correct machine having enough induction axioms in its >> beliefs is "Gödel-Löbian-Solovay”. They obey to G and G* and get all those >> intensional variants. >> >> It is up to the materialist metaphysician to provide an evidence for >> physicalism or primary matter. Even without mechanism, we could still bet >> that the physical reality has a mathematical origin. Mathematics is full of >> machines and gods, > > That's its problem. I am not sure. It works until now, and suggest how to constantly verified that fact. Physicalism does not. Physicalism has to, not only to take into account the “gods”, but has to invoke very special one to not eliminate consciousness from the picture. (Of course by gods I mean any entities whose beliefs are not recursively enumerable). Bruno > > Brent > >> once you add the infinity axioms (like in ZF). But with mechanism, we don’t >> need that axiom. >> >> Bruno >> >> >>> >>>> out of the past, in a manner such that it never existed, and we were wrong >>>> to believe that it ever did exist. But this seems magical to me. >>> >>> I know. But having worlds coming into existence on a continuum seems just >>> fine. >>> >>> Brent >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >>> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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