On 6/25/2018 4:28 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But then you recognize that the physical world is a necessary
component and must exist to make computationalism meaningful.
But that is exactly what happen. The physical reality is
phenomenologically explained by the inability of the universal
machine to see the equivalence between between []p <->([]p & p) and
([]p & <>p) and ([]p & <>p & p) with p (p sigma-1). The existence
of the observable is explainable by the some modes of self-reference.
You'll excuse me if I don't see that as an explanation of physical
reality. Maybe somebody else on the list does and can explain it.
This should be already obvious at step 7. You are the one using the
magic here. I am the one asking you a question. With the UDA we know
that physics has to be a statistics on many computations. To
understand that this actually works until now, you need to be familiar
with the logic of machine self-reference, and study the observable modes.
You often use the phrase, "...we know that X has to be..." as an invalid
argument; invalid because the unstated premise is "...has to be if my
theory is to be proven right." It's is your theory that is in question.
I'm not using magic. I'm asking for help. Does anyone else understand
how physics is "explained by the inability of the universal machine to
see the equivalence between between []p <->([]p & p) and ([]p & <>p)
and ([]p & <>p & p) with p (p sigma-1)."
Brent
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