On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 7:26 PM, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> > > On 6/21/2018 3:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 5:10 PM, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> > wrote: > >> >> >> On 6/21/2018 7:47 AM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> >> >> On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 12:59 AM, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> >> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On 6/20/2018 9:48 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 5:24 PM, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 6/19/2018 7:10 AM, Jason Resch wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 12:21 AM, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 6/18/2018 4:27 AM, Jason Resch wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 9:57 PM, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 6/17/2018 4:43 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> On 17 June 2018 at 13:26, <agrayson2...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Sunday, June 17, 2018 at 10:15:05 AM UTC, Jason wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 12:12 AM, <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> why do you prefer the MWI compared to the Transactional >>>>>>>>>> Interpretation? >>>>>>>>>> I see both as absurd. so I prefer to assume the wf is just >>>>>>>>>> epistemic, and/or >>>>>>>>>> that we have some holes in the CI which have yet to be resolved. >>>>>>>>>> AG >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> 1. It's the simplest theory: "MWI" is just the Schrodinger >>>>>>>>> equation, >>>>>>>>> nothing else. (it doesn't say Schrodinger's equation only applies >>>>>>>>> sometimes, >>>>>>>>> or only at certain scales) >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> 2. It explains more while assuming less (it explains the >>>>>>>>> appearance of >>>>>>>>> collapse, without having to assume it, thus is preferred by >>>>>>>>> Occam's razor) >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> 3. Like every other successful physical theory, it is linear, >>>>>>>>> reversible >>>>>>>>> (time-symmetric), continuous, deterministic and does not require >>>>>>>>> faster than >>>>>>>>> light influences nor retrocausalities >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> 4. Unlike single-universe or epistemic interpretations, "WF is >>>>>>>>> real" with >>>>>>>>> MWI is the only way we know how to explain the functioning of >>>>>>>>> quantum >>>>>>>>> computers (now up to 51 qubits) >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> 5. Unlike copenhagen-type theories, it attributes no special >>>>>>>>> physical >>>>>>>>> abilities to observers or measurement devices >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> 6. Most of all, theories of everything that assume a reality >>>>>>>>> containing >>>>>>>>> all possible observers and observations lead directly to >>>>>>>>> laws/postulates of >>>>>>>>> quantum mechanics (see Russell Standish's Theory of Nothing, >>>>>>>>> Chapter 7 and >>>>>>>>> Appendix D). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Given #6, we should revise our view. It is not MWI and QM that >>>>>>>>> should >>>>>>>>> convince us of many worlds, but rather the assumption of many >>>>>>>>> worlds (an >>>>>>>>> infinite and infinitely varied reality) that gives us, and >>>>>>>>> explains all the >>>>>>>>> weirdness of QM. This should overwhelmingly convince us of MWI-type >>>>>>>>> everything theories over any single-universe interpretation of >>>>>>>>> quantum >>>>>>>>> mechanics, which is not only absurd, but completely devoid of >>>>>>>>> explanation. >>>>>>>>> With the assumption of a large reality, QM is made explainable and >>>>>>>>> understandable: as a theory of observation within an infinite >>>>>>>>> reality. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Jason >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> You forgot #7. It asserts multiple, even infinite copies of an >>>>>>>> observer, >>>>>>>> replete with memories, are created when an observer does a simple >>>>>>>> quantum >>>>>>>> experiment. So IMO the alleged "cure" is immensely worse than the >>>>>>>> disease, >>>>>>>> CI, that is, just plain idiotic. AG >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> It is important to make the distinction between our intuition and >>>>>>> common sense and actual formal reasoning. The former can guide the >>>>>>> latter very successfully, but the history of science teaches us that >>>>>>> this is not always the case. You don't provide an argument, you just >>>>>>> present your gut feeling as if it were the same thing as irrefutable >>>>>>> fact. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> I think Scott Aaronson has the right attitude toward this: >>>>>> >>>>>> https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=326 >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> As such a strong believer in quantum computers (he's staked $100,000 >>>>> of his own money on the future construction of large scale quantum >>>>> computers), I would love to ask Scott Aaronson what he thinks about >>>>> running >>>>> a conscious AI on such a quantum computer. That trivially leads to "many >>>>> worlds" at least as seen by that AI. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> If it's so trivial maybe you can explain it. >>>>> >>>> >>>> 1. A quantum computer is isolated from the environment so as to remain >>>> in a super position of many possible states. >>>> 2. Quantum computers are Turing universal, anything that can be >>>> programmed on a classical computer can be programmed on a quantum computer >>>> 3. Assuming Computational Theory of mind, a quantum computer can >>>> execute the same conscious program as "Brent Meeker's Brain" >>>> 4. The quantum computer can be arranged to entangle an unmeasured >>>> particle with Brent Meeker's quantum brain emulation, >>>> a) by feeding in spin up as an auditory tone in Brent Meeker's left >>>> auditory nerve >>>> b) by feeding in spin down as an auditory tone in Brent Meeker's right >>>> auditory nerve >>>> 5. The quantum brain simulation, being isolated from the environment, >>>> remains in a super position of the Brent Meeker brain emulation hearing an >>>> auditory tone in his left and right ears. >>>> >>>> You can repeat this process 30 times, with 30 different measurements of >>>> different electrons, and end up with over 1 billion Brent Meeker brain >>>> emulations, each remembering a different pattern of auditory tones. >>>> >>>> For the Brent Meeker quantum brain emulation, many worlds is definitely >>>> true. >>>> >>>> >>>> No. If decoherence occurs when there a many degrees of freedom in >>>> which to disperse entanglements then my brain is plenty big enough to >>>> decohere the signal; and you seem to assume this when supposing that I form >>>> different memories. Otherwise I wouldn't form any definite memory, my >>>> memory would merely exist in a superposition of a billion different >>>> patterns. >>>> >>>> >>> That is the whole point of (and difficulty) of making a quantum >>> computer. Its qubits must remain isolated from the rest of the environment >>> such that it does not decohere while it is computing something. You seem >>> to be postulating some upperbound on how large quantum computers can get. >>> This is the exact thing Scott Aaronson has staked $100K on (that large >>> scale quantum computers *can* be built), which is why I find his >>> antipathy towards MWI so paradoxical. If they can be built, then we can >>> create many-experiences by running an AI emulation on a quantum computer, >>> where some of the qubit registers are prepared in an undetermined state. >>> >>> >>> How will you know it has many experiences? >>> >> >> If computationalism is true (which Aarson has defended), it will have an >> experience. >> >> >> An experience is not many experiences. And what does computationalism >> mean; it gets used sloppily on this list, sometimes meaning only that >> "saying yes to the doctor" is justified, other times meaning that Bruno's >> whole theory is true? >> > > > By computationalism, I mean there exists a computation that if > performed/implemented by any machine, it is sufficient to instantiate a > given conscious experience. > > By the way, I e-mailed Scott Aaronson asking about the thought experiment > I gave above regarding running a conscious AI/brain emulation on a quantum > computer that enters a superposition, and just got a reply. > > He said that he agrees that if consciousness is inherent to a particular > computation (including a computation restricted to only one branch of the > wave function), and if large-scale quantum computers are possible, then you > could have a superposition of different conscious experiments and this > appears to force one to a many-worlds picture. He said he has made this > same point before in some of his blog posts and writings. > > What he thought what least clear from my proposed thought experiment > concerned what is necessary for a conscious computation, and gave the > examples of alternate theories of consciousness which required coherence, > or irreversibility, for example. > > However, I think from a plain "computational theory of mind", which is > free from any quantum mechanical/physical definitions, he is in general > agreement that Computationalism + Quantum computers large enough to run > conscious programs, yields many-worlds. > > > > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> It won't be able to say what they are. >>> >> >> Sure it can, within its virtual reality it can say or do anything. >> Whether or not it can tell us what it sees is another question. I would >> say if we decide to cause the quantum computer to decohere and entangle >> ourselves with its state, we will hear what it is saying (but in each >> branch we will hear it say only one thing). >> >> >> Exactly my point. >> >> > But if those other computations (which we know must exist, as they are > necessary to explain the functioning of quantum computers) to say they are > not conscious is to abandon Computationalism. > > > I don't think that follows. I think consciousness (and thought in > general) is a classical phenomenon. > We are talking about classical computations through. (The same form that classical computers implement). The only difference is, we are using a quantum computer to perform those classical computations in parallel. > So a superposition of different computations would only be a bunch of > parallel consciousnesses (which I think Scott discounts) if each existed in > a parallel classical world. > I am not sure I follow what you are saying here. I agree a super position of different computations would only be a bunch of parallel consciousnesses. (Scott seemed to agree this would be the result under standard computationalism, but might not under some non-standard form of computationalism that additionally required some necessary bit of physicalism--I would call this physicalism rather than computationalism). > But in that case only one could communicate with us. > > Well, unless we too decide to join the superposition (which I argue we do when the quantum computer decoheres). Again, no one consciousness gets to interview all the others (beyond whatever interference might permit). > > >> >> >> >>> It won't be able to act intelligently in more than one world. Scott >>> also notes that quantum computers solve problems by having destructive >>> interference zero out the probability of incorrect solutions...which means >>> computation all happens in the same world. >>> >> >> That is when quantum computers are used to obtain a single definite >> result in all branches. This is what can make quantum computers more >> powerful. But I am not using this, I am merely riding off the quantum >> computer's ability to maintain a large scale superposition by virtue of a >> quantum computer's ability to remain isolated from its environment while it >> computes what it does. >> >> >> But then it doesn't actually compute anything. In the words of >> Schroedinger it is jellified. >> > > It must have computed that trace, and by computationalism, that execution > trace in that branch must have been conscious. You can't explain quantum > computers without assuming those executions in the other branches all exist. > > *Unless* you think wave function collapse has the power to delete an > *already-had* experience out of existence, > > > No, I'm saying there is no experience except classical experiences...we > never experience superpositions. > Each branch of the superposition represents a classical computation. Are you saying this computation doesn't exist, or that a computation can only be conscious if it is constantly interacting with its environment? If I isolate my laptop computer from the rest of the environment for a few hours while it works on some problem, and then check it after it is done, will it not still have computed the expected result? Do you reject the reality of the intermediate steps of the computation? > In the real world "collapse" is continuous except in carefully contrived > experiments. Those other branches exist in a quantum computer because they > interfere, all in this world and produce one classical result. I see no > reason to suppose there is any experience apart from classical results. > Either you reject the reality and efficacy of the intermediate per-branch computations (which is an anti-realist position that fails to explain how quantum computers can produce final results, if the intermediate per-branch computational states don't compute what they're supposed to such that they interfere correctly at the end to yield the expected result) Or you are rejecting computationalism and replacing it with your own theory, which says, conventional computation is insufficient. Only a computation performed by a physical computer that frequently (how frequently?) interacts with its environment (how big does the environment need to be, how do you define where the computer ends and the environment begins?) can be conscious. This theory seems a bit ad hoc, and whose sole motivation is to zombify the AIs in the branches of the quantum computer. > That's one on my complaints about Bruno's step 8 "proof", he claims to > have shown computationalism inconsistent with materialism. But it only > seems that way because he ignores the necessity of having a whole physical > environment to have experience in. But then you recognize that the > physical world is a necessary component and must exist to make > computationalism meaningful. > I will let Bruno reply to this, but I think we need to be very careful about the subtle role physics plays. To be clear Bruno does not reject the existence of a physical reality, but says its existence is made a theorem in arithmetic and becomes a necessary role in relating experiences between different machines. There is also the difference between the appearance of the physical world and the infinity of computations below us competing with each other in that appearance. If we look at the Boltzmann bran computations, some of those are larger programs that may contain many conscious sub-computations, and if in one of those computations we build a computer which itself manifests as a sub-routine of that larger computation you could say we have realized a new conscious entity. But is conscious computation exists as arithmetical computations, and appears infinitely often in the UD, so we should not confuse a local incarnation of a computation with the observer, whose future experiences are not bound to the evolution of the locally-realized computation. I think this is why Bruno says we cannot physically create an observer, only locally instantiate one relatively to us. But the two forms: the single deterministic machine instantiation, and the observers first person point of view supported by infinite computations, remain distinct. > > > out of the past, in a manner such that it never existed, and we were wrong > to believe that it ever did exist. But this seems magical to me. > > > I know. But having worlds coming into existence on a continuum seems just > fine. > So you reject QM on that basis? Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
