> On 21 Aug 2018, at 21:25, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > > > > On 8/21/2018 2:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> On 21 Aug 2018, at 07:56, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 8/20/2018 9:54 PM, Russell Standish wrote: >>>> On Mon, Aug 20, 2018 at 09:03:04PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote: >>>>> We must be looking at some different enumeration of the argument. I have: >>>>> >>>> Clearly. I was referring to the enumeration in the SANE2004 paper, which >>>> is kind of canonical: >>> OK. I also have the SANE paper. >>> >>>> 7) The seventh step introduces the Universal Dovetailer (UD). Let N >>>> denotes the set of >>>> natural numbers. A function from N to N is said to be total if it is >>>> defined on all natural >>>> numbers. A function is said to be computable iff there is a programme >>>> FORTRAN which >>>> computes it12. Church thesis (CT) makes the particular choice of FORTRAN >>>> irrelevant. CT >>>> claims that all computable functions, total or not, are computed by >>>> algorithm expressible in >>>> FORTRAN. In particular all total computable functions are computed by such >>>> FORTRAN >>>> program... >>> Yes I understood it introduced the UD and per the C-T inferred that all >>> possible computations are performed by it. >>> >>> Bruno wrote,"In that case consciousness is associated with a digital >>> self-referential entity which cannot distinguish >>> a “bottom” (primary) physical reality from an arithmetical reality" >>> >>> I objected, "But you didn't show that." >>> >>> You responded, "This is directly the result at step 7 of the UDA. And it is >>> pretty much required for the Church Turing thesis to hold." >>> >>> So I still don't see why the UD implies consciousness is associated with a >>> digital self-referential entity which cannot distinguish a “bottom” >>> (primary) physical reality from an arithmetical reality. >> >> It is not the UD which implies this, but just the digital mechanist >> hypothesis. A person whose brain is in a vat, with the right configuration, >> cannot know that she is in a brain in a vat. Similarly, we cannot know if we >> are processed by something primarily physical or not. If I implement the >> combinators in FORTRAN or in LISP, no combinators can distinguish the two >> from their personal experience (that without observation). Same for the >> arithmetical/physical. >> >> The UD is used to formulate the measure problem, not to argue that a digital >> machine cannot distinguish an arithmetical from a physical “master machine”, >> which is a direct consequence of digital mechanism. >> >> >> >>> It seems to me like the rock that computes everything. The UD is >>> effectively running every possible simulation at once >> So to speak. The universal dovetailer has to dovetail, of course. >> >> >> >>> and so is simulating everything at once. Whether some thread within it >>> simulates you or simulates a rock on alpha centauri becomes a matter of >>> interpretation. >> ? If it simulates you, you will feel to be conscious. The point will be that >> there is no rock which could ever be simulable by any computer, except those >> exloiting directly the infinities of computations below our level of >> substitution, like plausibly, a quantum computer. >> >> >> >> >>> The computations of the UD can have no unique interpretation. >> >> A computation *is* an interpretation, made by a universal machine. That is >> what the universal do: computation. > > But that doesn't make it an interpretation.
? A computation is a relation between a universal machine (or machinery) making the universal machine interpreting a program to get some (hopefully) output with some input, or none. > My wristwatch does universal computation. You can run LISP on your wristwatch? I doubt it. Implement K and S on your wristwatch! > >> Then with mechanism, some can be associated to consciousness, when they >> emulate self-referential entity. > > Can you watch a running program and tell that it is emulating a > self-referential entity or not? Only those I can build. To be a program computing the factorial function is already undecidable. > >> If curiosity is conscious on Mars, it has to be conscious in the virtual >> mars during its training on Earth, and it has to be conscious in arithmetic, >> in virtue of the same number relations. > > Exactly my point. The Mars Rover is not conscious simpliciter, it is > conscious of its body and its environment. The program running on it's cpu > could have any interpretation; it is only its connections to the environment > that provide a definite interpretation. Yes. That is where the nuance []p & p, and []p & <>p come from. > The enivronment can be simulated too, but then the closed system cannot > provide its own interpretation. Number relations do not of themselves > provide an interpretation. Yes. Those are higher order dreams, but the physical is bound up by a sort of first person limit on all computations. A curious sum, no doubt. Bruno > > >> >> >> >> >>>> 8) Yes, but what if we don’t grant a concrete robust physical universe? Up >>>> to this >>>> stage, we can still escape the conclusion of the seven preceding reasoning >>>> steps, by >>>> postulating that a ‘‘physical universe’’ really ‘‘exists’’ and is too >>>> little in the sense of not being >>>> able to generate the entire UD*, >>> The entire UD is infinite. So it cannot exist in the physical universe. >> >> Better to not assume a “god" when doing metaphysics; It biases the whole >> reasoning.The idea that seeing is the criterion of reality is the >> Aristotelian speculation that Plato warned us to not fall in. > > Exactly. You are assuming a UD god that is infinite. > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
