> On 21 Aug 2018, at 21:25, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 8/21/2018 2:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> On 21 Aug 2018, at 07:56, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 8/20/2018 9:54 PM, Russell Standish wrote: >>>> On Mon, Aug 20, 2018 at 09:03:04PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote: >>>>> We must be looking at some different enumeration of the argument. I have: >>>>> >>>> Clearly. I was referring to the enumeration in the SANE2004 paper, which >>>> is kind of canonical: >>> OK. I also have the SANE paper. >>> >>>> 7) The seventh step introduces the Universal Dovetailer (UD). Let N >>>> denotes the set of >>>> natural numbers. A function from N to N is said to be total if it is >>>> defined on all natural >>>> numbers. A function is said to be computable iff there is a programme >>>> FORTRAN which >>>> computes it12. Church thesis (CT) makes the particular choice of FORTRAN >>>> irrelevant. CT >>>> claims that all computable functions, total or not, are computed by >>>> algorithm expressible in >>>> FORTRAN. In particular all total computable functions are computed by such >>>> FORTRAN >>>> program... >>> Yes I understood it introduced the UD and per the C-T inferred that all >>> possible computations are performed by it. >>> >>> Bruno wrote,"In that case consciousness is associated with a digital >>> self-referential entity which cannot distinguish >>> a “bottom” (primary) physical reality from an arithmetical reality" >>> >>> I objected, "But you didn't show that." >>> >>> You responded, "This is directly the result at step 7 of the UDA. And it is >>> pretty much required for the Church Turing thesis to hold." >>> >>> So I still don't see why the UD implies consciousness is associated with a >>> digital self-referential entity which cannot distinguish a “bottom” >>> (primary) physical reality from an arithmetical reality. >> >> It is not the UD which implies this, but just the digital mechanist >> hypothesis. A person whose brain is in a vat, with the right configuration, >> cannot know that she is in a brain in a vat. Similarly, we cannot know if we >> are processed by something primarily physical or not. If I implement the >> combinators in FORTRAN or in LISP, no combinators can distinguish the two >> from their personal experience (that without observation). Same for the >> arithmetical/physical. >> >> The UD is used to formulate the measure problem, not to argue that a digital >> machine cannot distinguish an arithmetical from a physical “master machine”, >> which is a direct consequence of digital mechanism. >> >> >> >>> It seems to me like the rock that computes everything. The UD is >>> effectively running every possible simulation at once >> So to speak. The universal dovetailer has to dovetail, of course. >> >> >> >>> and so is simulating everything at once. Whether some thread within it >>> simulates you or simulates a rock on alpha centauri becomes a matter of >>> interpretation. >> ? If it simulates you, you will feel to be conscious. The point will be that >> there is no rock which could ever be simulable by any computer, except those >> exloiting directly the infinities of computations below our level of >> substitution, like plausibly, a quantum computer. >> >> >> >> >>> The computations of the UD can have no unique interpretation. >> >> A computation *is* an interpretation, made by a universal machine. That is >> what the universal do: computation. > > But that doesn't make it an interpretation.
? A computation is a relation between a universal machine (or machinery) making the universal machine interpreting a program to get some (hopefully) output with some input, or none. > My wristwatch does universal computation. You can run LISP on your wristwatch? I doubt it. Implement K and S on your wristwatch! > >> Then with mechanism, some can be associated to consciousness, when they >> emulate self-referential entity. > > Can you watch a running program and tell that it is emulating a > self-referential entity or not? Only those I can build. To be a program computing the factorial function is already undecidable. > >> If curiosity is conscious on Mars, it has to be conscious in the virtual >> mars during its training on Earth, and it has to be conscious in arithmetic, >> in virtue of the same number relations. > > Exactly my point. The Mars Rover is not conscious simpliciter, it is > conscious of its body and its environment. The program running on it's cpu > could have any interpretation; it is only its connections to the environment > that provide a definite interpretation. Yes. That is where the nuance []p & p, and []p & <>p come from. > The enivronment can be simulated too, but then the closed system cannot > provide its own interpretation. Number relations do not of themselves > provide an interpretation. Yes. Those are higher order dreams, but the physical is bound up by a sort of first person limit on all computations. A curious sum, no doubt. Bruno > > >> >> >> >> >>>> 8) Yes, but what if we don’t grant a concrete robust physical universe? Up >>>> to this >>>> stage, we can still escape the conclusion of the seven preceding reasoning >>>> steps, by >>>> postulating that a ‘‘physical universe’’ really ‘‘exists’’ and is too >>>> little in the sense of not being >>>> able to generate the entire UD*, >>> The entire UD is infinite. So it cannot exist in the physical universe. >> >> Better to not assume a “god" when doing metaphysics; It biases the whole >> reasoning.The idea that seeing is the criterion of reality is the >> Aristotelian speculation that Plato warned us to not fall in. > > Exactly. You are assuming a UD god that is infinite. > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
