> On 13 Sep 2018, at 19:54, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Wed, Sep 12, 2018 Bruno Marchal <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote > > >>>Matter = observable > > >>So adjectives are made of matter > > > Speed is a physical attribute. > > Then numbers are physical attributes too because 1 Hydrogen atom behaves > differently than 2 Hydrogen atoms.
The number of atoms is physical, yes, but that does not mean that a number is physical per se. > > > Speed is based on physical notion, like position and time, which are > > material things, like space-time. > > So you say nouns, verbs, adjectives, numbers, time and space are all matter. That does not follow. Are you playing dumb? > > >>Wow, even qualia is matter! > > > >Yes, > > So now qualia, the last remaining holdout, joins the ranks of "physical > attributes" and the term loses the last shred of meaning it had. Please quote the whole sentence. Qualia are physical sensation. The greeks, and the universal machine have two notions of matter: intelligible matter and sensible matter, which are given by two different modes of self-reference by immaterial machine. > > > The point is that mechanism is incompatible with the idea that the > > physical notion have to be primitive, that is: assumed in the fundamental > > theory. > > An assumption, just like a theory or a brain, can't exist without matter and > the laws of physics that govern how it moves. In your Aristotelian metaphysics, I guess. > > > you just read with one goal: to mock a theory. That is very easy. > > Yes, some theories are very easy to mock. > > > A Turing machine is finite set of quadruplets, > > A finite set of quadruplets can't compute a thing because it can not change > in time or space without the help of matter that obeys the laws of physics, > if they could Intel wouldn't be so interested in the element with atomic > number 14. Still the same confusion between a computation (a purely mathematical notion) and a physical computation, which assumes a universe, and a Turing universal subpart of that universe, capable of implementing the computation relatively to us. That does not makes those relative implementations physical. Physical becomes a relative notion when we assume mechanism, a bit like the distinction software/hardware, which is made relative by the Turing-Kleene enumeration theorem. > > > Please inform yourself. There is no physical assumption in any of the > > papers trading this subject. > > I don't give a damn what any paper assumes, if you know how to make a > calculation without using a neuron or a microchip or a vacuum tube or a bunch > of gears and ratchets or matter of any sort then stop talking about it and > just do it and become the greatest scientist and richest man who ever lived. I think you just play dumb. Bruno > > > >You beg the question by defining a machine and a computation by the physical > >machine and the physical computations, > > Until you show us otherwise with a example (not another definition!) the > term "physical computation" is redundant because all computation is physical. > And if you know how to make a non-physical machine then give us all a > non-physical car and put Ford, General Motors and Toyota out of business. > > >Robison arithmetic can prove the existence of richer theories like PA and > >ZF. > > How happy for Mr. Robison. > > >That “colossal blunder” has been debunked more than once, > > Bullshit. > > >I use an idea that you have even defended yourself, which is that if two > >computers are computing the same (supporting consciousness) program, there > >is only one consciousness, and it is not localised. > > Yes. > > >Then I use the fact that if the subject is aware of that situation, like the > >H-man, after the reconstitution has been done, but the doors are still > >closed, and there is only one person, > OK. > > >which has no algorithm to decide what she will see when opening the door. > > This is not limited just to issues concerning mind or consciousness. There is > also no algorithm for answering the question "what one and only one thing > will happen to one banana after one banana becomes 2 bananas?". And the > reason there is no such algorithm for a mind of a banana is exactly the same, > it is a idiotic question. > > John K Clark > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
