> On 12 Sep 2018, at 16:44, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote: > > > On Tue, Sep 11, 2018 at 5:32 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> >>> Matter = observable > >>Speed is observable, is speed matter? > > >Yes, > > So adjectives are made of matter.
Speed is a physical attribute. Matter is used in this context for physical. Speed is based on physical notion, like position and time, which are material things, like space-time. It should be clear that we have used matter and physical as quasi synonym. That is why I say always that mechanism is incompatible with materialism or physicalism. The point is that mechanism is incompatible with the idea that the physical notion have to be primitive, that is: assumed in the fundamental theory. I think you know that, and are only joking. > > >and it belong to the realm of the quanta. > > So numbers are made of numbers too. In some set theoretical rendering of the numbers, that is true, like when n is the set of m with m < n. But usually, numbers are simply the (transitive) successor of zero, and are not conceived as being made of something. > > >>The qualia red is observable, is red matter? > > >Yes, > > Wow, even qualia is matter! Yes, sensible matter, indeed. They appear in the material hypostase. With mechanism physics is immaterial ontologically, and material phenomenologically. Cf (with [] = Gödel’s arithmetical provability predicate, and of course <> = ~[]~. (And p is a sigma_1 proposition). p truth []p belief []p & p (knowledge) []p & <>t (observable) []p & <>t & p (sensible) > Meaning needs contrast, if everything is X then X means nothing. Sure. > > >There is no evidence that a brain, or an amoeba, is made of primary matter. > > In a way that's true, you say everything is made of matter I did not say that. You inferred this wrongly. Just study the paper or read the Post, but you just read with one goal: to mock a theory. That is very easy. Try perhaps to understand instead. > and that is equivalent to saying nothing is made of matter. > > >It is “physical”, but not in physics. > > That sounds like something you'd read in a fortune cookie but if true then > art is not in artistic, politics is not in political, number theory is not in > numbers, and intellect is not in intelligence. > > >>You can't have a Turing Machine without a machine > > >That contradicts all papers on Turing machine. > > I have no doubt it contradicts all your papers, but not those of Mr. Turing’s. Not at all. I meant that your definition of machine and computation contradicts the paper of Turing, and all books and papers in the domain. > > > A Turing machine is finite set of quadruplets, > > A finite set of quadruplets can't compute a thing or do anything else without > the help of matter that obeys the laws of physics, if they could Intel > wouldn't be so interested in the element with atomic number 14. Please inform yourself. There is no physical assumption in any of the papers trading this subject. I suspect you do again the confusion of level that I have decorticated in detail before. You beg the question by defining a machine and a computation by the physical machine and the physical computations, but that is your theory. > > > >Robison arithmetic can prove the existence of richer theories like PA and > >ZF. > > Without the help of a brain made of matter, like the one in Mr. Robinson's > head, Robinson arithmetic can't prove PA or ZF or anything else. If you want > something to happen, like completing a proof, mathematics is not enough, > you're going to need physics to help you. > > >You commit an ontological commitment to defeat a theory. That is how the > >creationist criticise the theory of evolution. > > Yeah yeah we've heard that stale insult a thousand times before, I'm just one > super religious dude. Bruno, you've really got to get some new material. It is hard as you repeat the same confusion. I wait argument, not insults. > > > Quantum mechanics shows, at the least, that the notion of matter is unclear, > > There is a lot about Quantum Mechanics that is unclear, but you are not > helping to clarify things. > > > There is no atoms, once we postulate Mechanism. > > So you advise if physics is to advance it should first move backwards about > 130 years. I think I'll pass on that. > > >That is the result of the informal UDA, > > You have forgotten IHA. > > > That is not obvious, especially if you are stuck at the easiest step > (step 3). > > So I guess the other steps are even dumber, but I'll never know for sure > because I'll never read them until you fix the colossal blunder you made in > step 3. That “colossal blunder” has been debunked more than once, but if you want ridicule yourself once more for the newbees, you are my guess. We can ask Grayson to be the arbiter, for example. All the others have got the point. > > >my conscious experience cannot be associate with any particular > >computational state, but with an infinity of them, > > There is no evidence that at the fundamental level the human mind works on > analog principles, and given the large amount of noise in the brain its very > hard to see how it could. Noise is the mortal enemy of analog computing. I totally agree with you on this. But again, you attribute me something I have never said. I use an idea that you have even defended yourself, which is that if two computers are computing the same (supporting consciousness) program, there is only one consciousness, and it is not localised. Then I use the fact that if the subject is aware of that situation, like the H-man, after the reconstitution has been done, but the doors are still closed, and there is only one person, which has no algorithm to decide what she will see when opening the door. Then in arithmetic, we are distributed on infinitely many computations. Bruno > > John K Clark > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. 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