> On 10 Nov 2018, at 02:10, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 11/9/2018 4:51 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: >> From: Brent Meeker <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> >>> >>> You're dodging my point. The "issue" of how we have subjective experience >>> only seems to be an issue because in comparison to the "objective" >>> experience of matter where we can trace long, mathematically define causal >>> chains down to...a Lagrangian and coupling constants or something similar, >>> which is long enough and esoteric enough that almost everyone loses >>> interest along the way. But some people (like Vic) are going to say, "But >>> where does the Langrangian and coupling constants come from?" and "Why a >>> Lagrangian anyway?" My point is that when we can give a similarly deep and >>> detailed account of why you think of an elephant when reading >>> this, then nobody will worry about "the hard problem of consciousness"; >>> just like they don't worry about "the hard problems of matter" like where >>> that Lagrangian comes from or why a complex Hilbert space. >> >> Why can't I worry about those things? Where does the Lagrangian come from? >> And why use a complex Hilbert space? I don't think this is the underlying >> reason for saying that the "hard problem" of consciousness dissolves on >> solving the engineering problems. Solving the engineering problems will >> enable us to produce a fully conscious AI -- but will we then know how it >> works? We will certainly know where it came from..... > > I just meant those as current examples. Suppose you find that Lagrangians > come from POVI, as Vic proposed. Then one can ask, "Why POVI?" Vic implied > it was a choice, but that didn't explain why is an available choice. So I > think both the problem of consciousness and the problem of matter are both > "hard"; the problem of matter seems "easy" because we've come a long way in > 400yrs of solving the engineering problems of matter.
If we are interested isn physics, or just in prediction, that is OK. But if we are interested in metaphysics or theology, then we have to solve both hard problems, or if we are dualist 3 hard problems (consciousness, matter, and the relation in between). With computationalism, the consciousness and matter problem are miraculously solved by Theaetetus’s “standard” definition applied on Gödel’s believability (incompleteness makes provability ([]p) into a believability predicate, so we can define knowledge by []p & p, and observable by []p & <>t, and this works fine, as we get intuitionistic logic for the knower, and a quantum logic for observation (not forgetting the sigma_1 computationalist restriction). The quantum logic is richer than the usual inferred from actual observation, leading to new predictions, and moreover, providing new contraints which can be sped to determine the full “probability calculus/physics”. It is still an open problem if we can determine the Hamiltonian. If we cannot, it makes the Hamiltonian into a contingent reality. But some informal reasoning suggest already that the Hamiltonian, if it exists, has to be highly symmetrical, bases on linearity, etc. This is not so far from the quantum linear lambda calculus, but here it is extracted from G and G*, allowing to distinguish the quanta and qualia (which might appear only with the []p & <>t & p nuances making the physical reality a bit more subjective than I thought). Bruno > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
