On 11/28/2018 9:40 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:


On Wednesday, November 28, 2018 at 9:03:42 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:

    On Friday, November 9, 2018 at 6:51:06 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:

        From: *Brent Meeker* <meek...@verizon.net>

        You're dodging my point.  The "issue" of how we have
        subjective experience only seems to be an issue because in
        comparison to the "objective" experience of matter where we
        can trace long, mathematically define causal chains down
        to...a Lagrangian and coupling constants or something
        similar, which is long enough and esoteric enough that almost
        everyone loses interest along the way.  But some people (like
        Vic) are going to say, "But where does the Langrangian and
        coupling constants come from?"  and "Why a Lagrangian
        anyway?" My point is that when we can give a similarly deep
        and detailed account of why you think of an elephant when
        reading this, then nobody will worry about "the hard problem
        of consciousness"; just like they don't worry about "the hard
        problems of matter" like where that Lagrangian comes from or
        why a complex Hilbert space.

        Why can't I worry about those things? Where does the
        Lagrangian come from? And why use a complex Hilbert space? I
        don't think this is the underlying reason for saying that the
        "hard problem" of consciousness dissolves on solving the
        engineering problems. Solving the engineering problems will
        enable us to produce a fully conscious AI -- but will we then
        know how it works? We will certainly know where it came from.....

        Bruce


    When it comes to science I have to back what Bruce says here. All
    knowledge faces the limits of the Münchhausen trilemma, where we
    have three possible types of arguments. The first is the basic
    axiomatic approach, which generally is the cornerstone and
    capstone of mathematics and science. The second is a "turtles all
    the way down," where an argument is based on premises that have
    deeper reasons, and this nests endlessly. Vic Stenger found this
    to be of most interest with his "models all the way down." The
    third is a circular argument which would mean all truth is just
    tautology. The second and third turn out to have some relevancy,
    where these are complement in Godel's theorem. While in general we
    use the first in science and mathematics we generally can't
    completely eliminate the other two. However, for most work we have
    an FAPP limitation to how far we want to go. Because of that if
    there is ultimately just a quantum vacuum, or some set of vacua,
    that is eternal, we may then just rest our case there.

    If one wants to do philosophy or theology that may be fine, but
    one has to make sure not to confuse these as categories with the
    category of science. Maybe as Dennett says, philosophy is what we
    do when we do not understand how to ask the question right. In
    that setting at best we can only do sort of "pre-science," but not
    really science as such. Theology is an even looser area of
    thought, and I generally see no connection with science at all.

    LC




The "models almost all the way up ... and ... down" quote ("models" replacing the original "turtles") came first from the philosopher of science *Ronald Giere* [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ronald_Giere ].

/In his book Scientific Perspectivism he develops a version of perspectival realism in which he argues that scientific descriptions are somewhat like colors, in that they capture only selected aspects of reality, and those aspects are not bits of the world seen as they are in themselves, but bits of the world seen from a distinctive human perspective. In addition to the color example, Giere articulates his perspectivism by appeal to maps and to his own earlier and influential work on scientific models. Maps represent the world, but the representations they provide are conventional, affected by interest, and never fully accurate or complete. Similarly, scientific models are idealized structures that represent the world from particular and limited points of view. According to Giere, what goes for colors, maps, and models goes generally: science is perspectival through and through./

And I would add that this is true of all thought, not just "scientific" ideas.  We evolved to see the world in certain ways conducive to survival and reproduction.  But as Vic used to say science works so it has something to do with reality.

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Reply via email to