> On 28 Nov 2018, at 18:40, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Wednesday, November 28, 2018 at 9:03:42 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote: > On Friday, November 9, 2018 at 6:51:06 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote: > From: Brent Meeker <[email protected] <>> >> >> You're dodging my point. The "issue" of how we have subjective experience >> only seems to be an issue because in comparison to the "objective" >> experience of matter where we can trace long, mathematically define causal >> chains down to...a Lagrangian and coupling constants or something similar, >> which is long enough and esoteric enough that almost everyone loses interest >> along the way. But some people (like Vic) are going to say, "But where does >> the Langrangian and coupling constants come from?" and "Why a Lagrangian >> anyway?" My point is that when we can give a similarly deep and detailed >> account of why you think of an elephant when reading this, then nobody will >> worry about "the hard problem of consciousness"; just like they don't worry >> about "the hard problems of matter" like where that Lagrangian comes from or >> why a complex Hilbert space. > > Why can't I worry about those things? Where does the Lagrangian come from? > And why use a complex Hilbert space? I don't think this is the underlying > reason for saying that the "hard problem" of consciousness dissolves on > solving the engineering problems. Solving the engineering problems will > enable us to produce a fully conscious AI -- but will we then know how it > works? We will certainly know where it came from..... > > Bruce > > When it comes to science I have to back what Bruce says here. All knowledge > faces the limits of the Münchhausen trilemma, where we have three possible > types of arguments. The first is the basic axiomatic approach, which > generally is the cornerstone and capstone of mathematics and science. The > second is a "turtles all the way down," where an argument is based on > premises that have deeper reasons, and this nests endlessly. Vic Stenger > found this to be of most interest with his "models all the way down." The > third is a circular argument which would mean all truth is just tautology. > The second and third turn out to have some relevancy, where these are > complement in Godel's theorem. While in general we use the first in science > and mathematics we generally can't completely eliminate the other two. > However, for most work we have an FAPP limitation to how far we want to go. > Because of that if there is ultimately just a quantum vacuum, or some set of > vacua, that is eternal, we may then just rest our case there. > > If one wants to do philosophy or theology that may be fine, but one has to > make sure not to confuse these as categories with the category of science. > Maybe as Dennett says, philosophy is what we do when we do not understand how > to ask the question right. In that setting at best we can only do sort of > "pre-science," but not really science as such. Theology is an even looser > area of thought, and I generally see no connection with science at all. > > LC > > > > The "models almost all the way up ... and ... down" quote ("models" replacing > the original "turtles") came first from the philosopher of science Ronald > Giere [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ronald_Giere ]. > > In his book Scientific Perspectivism he develops a version of perspectival > realism in which he argues that scientific descriptions are somewhat like > colors, in that they capture only selected aspects of reality, and those > aspects are not bits of the world seen as they are in themselves, but bits of > the world seen from a distinctive human perspective.
You can compare this with the consequence of mechanism and incompleteness, which enforces the 8 different self-referential universal (Löbian) machine “perspective” on arithmetic when seen by inside: p (true) Bp (provable). (split in two) Bp & p (knowable) Bp & Dp (observable). (split in two) Bp & Dp & p (sensible). (split in two) It is a form of perspectivism, or modalism. The modal B and D (which is the diamond -B-) obeys the same law for all correct Löbian machine (universal machine aware of its universality), but can be very different form one individual to another. B is Gödel’s beweisbar, or some generalisation for arbitrary > In addition to the color example, Giere articulates his perspectivism by > appeal to maps and to his own earlier and influential work on scientific > models. Maps represent the world, but the representations they provide are > conventional, affected by interest, and never fully accurate or complete. That makes sense, same here, if you know the relation between each mode, and between the modes and arithmetic. > Similarly, scientific models are idealized structures that represent the > world from particular and limited points of view. According to Giere, what > goes for colors, maps, and models goes generally: science is perspectival > through and through. Here science is the simple Bp mode (mathematics) and Bp & Dp (or Bp & Dt) for physics. It is just different view of arithmetic, from the point of view of arithmetical being. Bp & p is the first person singular, and Bp & Dt, is (normally) the first person plural (physics *is* first person plural here, and that is arguably confirmed by the linearity of the tensor product in QM (without collapse). Perspectivism is a form of modalism. Bruno > > - pt > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
