> On 30 Nov 2018, at 08:22, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 11/29/2018 11:08 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 28 Nov 2018, at 18:40, Philip Thrift <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Wednesday, November 28, 2018 at 9:03:42 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote: >>> On Friday, November 9, 2018 at 6:51:06 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote: >>> From: Brent Meeker <[email protected] <>> >>>> >>>> You're dodging my point. The "issue" of how we have subjective experience >>>> only seems to be an issue because in comparison to the "objective" >>>> experience of matter where we can trace long, mathematically define causal >>>> chains down to...a Lagrangian and coupling constants or something similar, >>>> which is long enough and esoteric enough that almost everyone loses >>>> interest along the way. But some people (like Vic) are going to say, "But >>>> where does the Langrangian and coupling constants come from?" and "Why a >>>> Lagrangian anyway?" My point is that when we can give a similarly deep and >>>> detailed account of why you think of an elephant when reading this, then >>>> nobody will worry about "the hard problem of consciousness"; just like >>>> they don't worry about "the hard problems of matter" like where that >>>> Lagrangian comes from or why a complex Hilbert space. >>> >>> Why can't I worry about those things? Where does the Lagrangian come from? >>> And why use a complex Hilbert space? I don't think this is the underlying >>> reason for saying that the "hard problem" of consciousness dissolves on >>> solving the engineering problems. Solving the engineering problems will >>> enable us to produce a fully conscious AI -- but will we then know how it >>> works? We will certainly know where it came from..... >>> >>> Bruce >>> >>> When it comes to science I have to back what Bruce says here. All knowledge >>> faces the limits of the Münchhausen trilemma, where we have three possible >>> types of arguments. The first is the basic axiomatic approach, which >>> generally is the cornerstone and capstone of mathematics and science. The >>> second is a "turtles all the way down," where an argument is based on >>> premises that have deeper reasons, and this nests endlessly. Vic Stenger >>> found this to be of most interest with his "models all the way down." The >>> third is a circular argument which would mean all truth is just tautology. >>> The second and third turn out to have some relevancy, where these are >>> complement in Godel's theorem. While in general we use the first in science >>> and mathematics we generally can't completely eliminate the other two. >>> However, for most work we have an FAPP limitation to how far we want to go. >>> Because of that if there is ultimately just a quantum vacuum, or some set >>> of vacua, that is eternal, we may then just rest our case there. >>> >>> If one wants to do philosophy or theology that may be fine, but one has to >>> make sure not to confuse these as categories with the category of science. >>> Maybe as Dennett says, philosophy is what we do when we do not understand >>> how to ask the question right. In that setting at best we can only do sort >>> of "pre-science," but not really science as such. Theology is an even >>> looser area of thought, and I generally see no connection with science at >>> all. >>> >>> LC >>> >>> >>> >>> The "models almost all the way up ... and ... down" quote ("models" >>> replacing the original "turtles") came first from the philosopher of >>> science Ronald Giere [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ronald_Giere >>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ronald_Giere> ]. >>> >>> In his book Scientific Perspectivism he develops a version of perspectival >>> realism in which he argues that scientific descriptions are somewhat like >>> colors, in that they capture only selected aspects of reality, and those >>> aspects are not bits of the world seen as they are in themselves, but bits >>> of the world seen from a distinctive human perspective. >> >> >> You can compare this with the consequence of mechanism and incompleteness, >> which enforces the 8 different self-referential universal (Löbian) machine >> “perspective” on arithmetic when seen by inside: >> >> p (true) >> Bp (provable). (split in two) >> Bp & p (knowable) >> Bp & Dp (observable). (split in two) >> Bp & Dp & p (sensible). (split in two) >> >> It is a form of perspectivism, or modalism. The modal B and D (which is the >> diamond -B-) obeys the same law for all correct Löbian machine (universal >> machine aware of its universality), but can be very different form one >> individual to another. >> >> B is Gödel’s beweisbar, or some generalisation for arbitrary >> >> >>> In addition to the color example, Giere articulates his perspectivism by >>> appeal to maps and to his own earlier and influential work on scientific >>> models. Maps represent the world, but the representations they provide are >>> conventional, affected by interest, and never fully accurate or complete. >> >> That makes sense, same here, if you know the relation between each mode, and >> between the modes and arithmetic. >> >> >> >>> Similarly, scientific models are idealized structures that represent the >>> world from particular and limited points of view. According to Giere, what >>> goes for colors, maps, and models goes generally: science is perspectival >>> through and through. >> >> Here science is the simple Bp mode (mathematics) and Bp & Dp (or Bp & Dt) >> for physics. It is just different view of arithmetic, from the point of view >> of arithmetical being. >> Bp & p is the first person singular, and Bp & Dt, is (normally) the first >> person plural (physics *is* first person plural here, and that is arguably >> confirmed by the linearity of the tensor product in QM (without collapse). >> >> Perspectivism is a form of modalism. > > Nietzsche is vindicated.
Interesting. If you elaborate, you might change my mind on Nietzche, perhaps! All what I say is very close the Neoplatonism and Negative Theology (capable only of saying what God is not). Bruno > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
