On Wednesday, November 28, 2018 at 9:03:42 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> On Friday, November 9, 2018 at 6:51:06 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>>
>> From: Brent Meeker <[email protected]>
>>
>>
>> You're dodging my point. The "issue" of how we have subjective
>> experience only seems to be an issue because in comparison to the
>> "objective" experience of matter where we can trace long, mathematically
>> define causal chains down to...a Lagrangian and coupling constants or
>> something similar, which is long enough and esoteric enough that almost
>> everyone loses interest along the way. But some people (like Vic) are
>> going to say, "But where does the Langrangian and coupling constants come
>> from?" and "Why a Lagrangian anyway?" My point is that when we can give a
>> similarly deep and detailed account of why you think of an elephant when
>> reading this, then nobody will worry about "the hard problem of
>> consciousness"; just like they don't worry about "the hard problems of
>> matter" like where that Lagrangian comes from or why a complex Hilbert
>> space.
>>
>>
>> Why can't I worry about those things? Where does the Lagrangian come
>> from? And why use a complex Hilbert space? I don't think this is the
>> underlying reason for saying that the "hard problem" of consciousness
>> dissolves on solving the engineering problems. Solving the engineering
>> problems will enable us to produce a fully conscious AI -- but will we then
>> know how it works? We will certainly know where it came from.....
>>
>> Bruce
>>
>
> When it comes to science I have to back what Bruce says here. All
> knowledge faces the limits of the Münchhausen trilemma, where we have three
> possible types of arguments. The first is the basic axiomatic approach,
> which generally is the cornerstone and capstone of mathematics and science.
> The second is a "turtles all the way down," where an argument is based on
> premises that have deeper reasons, and this nests endlessly. Vic Stenger
> found this to be of most interest with his "models all the way down." The
> third is a circular argument which would mean all truth is just tautology.
> The second and third turn out to have some relevancy, where these are
> complement in Godel's theorem. While in general we use the first in science
> and mathematics we generally can't completely eliminate the other two.
> However, for most work we have an FAPP limitation to how far we want to go.
> Because of that if there is ultimately just a quantum vacuum, or some set
> of vacua, that is eternal, we may then just rest our case there.
>
> If one wants to do philosophy or theology that may be fine, but one has to
> make sure not to confuse these as categories with the category of science.
> Maybe as Dennett says, philosophy is what we do when we do not understand
> how to ask the question right. In that setting at best we can only do sort
> of "pre-science," but not really science as such. Theology is an even
> looser area of thought, and I generally see no connection with science at
> all.
>
> LC
>
The "models almost all the way up ... and ... down" quote ("models"
replacing the original "turtles") came first from the philosopher of
science *Ronald Giere* [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ronald_Giere ].
*In his book Scientific Perspectivism he develops a version of perspectival
realism in which he argues that scientific descriptions are somewhat like
colors, in that they capture only selected aspects of reality, and those
aspects are not bits of the world seen as they are in themselves, but bits
of the world seen from a distinctive human perspective. In addition to the
color example, Giere articulates his perspectivism by appeal to maps and to
his own earlier and influential work on scientific models. Maps represent
the world, but the representations they provide are conventional, affected
by interest, and never fully accurate or complete. Similarly, scientific
models are idealized structures that represent the world from particular
and limited points of view. According to Giere, what goes for colors, maps,
and models goes generally: science is perspectival through and through.*
- pt
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