On 11/30/2018 1:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Perspectivism is a form of modalism.
Nietzsche is vindicated.
Interesting. If you elaborate, you might change my mind on Nietzche,
perhaps!
All what I say is very close the Neoplatonism and Negative Theology
(capable only of saying what God is not).
Bruno
From https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nietzsche/
6.2 Perspectivism
Much of Nietzsche’s reaction to the theoretical philosophy of his
predecessors is mediated through his interest in the notion of
perspective. He thought that past philosophers had largely ignored the
influence of their own perspectives on their work, and had therefore
failed to control those perspectival effects (/BGE/6; see/BGE/I more
generally). Commentators have been both fascinated and perplexed by what
has come to be called Nietzsche’s “perspectivism”, and it has been a
major concern in a number of large-scale Nietzsche commentaries (see,
e.g., Danto 1965; Kaulbach 1980, 1990; Schacht 1983; Abel 1984; Nehamas
1985; Clark 1990; Poellner 1995; Richardson 1996; Benne 2005). There has
been as much contestation over exactly what doctrine or group of
commitments belong under that heading as about their philosophical
merits, but a few points are relatively uncontroversial and can provide
a useful way into this strand of Nietzsche’s thinking.
Nietzsche’s appeals to the notion of perspective (or, equivalently in
his usage, to an “optics” of knowledge) have a positive, as well as a
critical side. Nietzsche frequently criticizes “dogmatic” philosophers
for ignoring the perspectival limitations on their theorizing, but as we
saw, he simultaneously holds that the operation of perspective makes a
positive contribution to our cognitive endeavors: speaking of (what he
takes to be) the perversely counterintuitive doctrines of some past
philosophers, he writes,
Particularly as knowers, let us not be ungrateful toward such
resolute reversals of the familiar perspectives and valuations with
which the spirit has raged against itself all too long… : to see
differently in this way for once,/to want/to see differently, is no
small discipline and preparation of the intellect for its future
“objectivity”—the latter understood not as “disinterested
contemplation” (which is a non-concept and absurdity), but rather as
the capacity to have one’s Pro and Contra/in one’s power/, and to
shift them in and out, so that one knows how to make precisely
the/difference/in perspectives and affective interpretations useful
for knowledge. (/GM/III, 12)
This famous passage bluntly rejects the idea, dominant in philosophy at
least since Plato, that knowledge essentially involves a form of
objectivity that penetrates behind all subjective appearances to reveal
the way things really are, independently of any point of view
whatsoever. Instead, the proposal is to approach “objectivity” (in a
revised conception) asymptotically, by exploiting the difference between
one perspective and another, using each to overcome the limitations of
others, without assuming that anything like a “view from nowhere” is so
much as possible. There is of course an implicit criticism of the
traditional picture of a-perspectival objectivity here, but there is
equally a positive set of recommendations about how to pursue knowledge
as a finite, limited cognitive agent.
Brent
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