> On 11 Dec 2018, at 07:50, [email protected] wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 4:51:57 AM UTC, Jason wrote:

> 
> <SNIP>


> Jason
> 
> Supposing every thing you write above is true, how does this produce the 
> illusion of matter? TIA, AG 
>  
> 
> This is explained in Bruno's work: 
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.htm 
> <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.htm>
> 
> Also in a recent paper by Markus Muller: https://arxiv.org/pdf/1712.01826.pdf 
> <https://arxiv.org/pdf/1712.01826.pdf>
> 
> So you are unable to explain it succinctly. AG 
> 
> 
> Succinctly your experience is included in the set of all the experiences 
> generated by all computations.
> 
> If you want to know why this should leads to stable experiences within a 
> larger environment that ruled by simple laws with a simpler time in the past, 
> you will need to do some reading.  Not every question can be expected to have 
> a succinct answer.
> 
> Jason
> 
> Concerning QM, GR, and SR, one can give succinct summaries that are 
> informative even if incomplete, but you can't do it about your theory on the 
> origin of matter. So I can't take it seriously. AG
>  
> 
> That explains a lot, doesn't it?
> 
> In fact it does, albeit imperfectly. I can make many meaningful, informative 
> statements about those theories, but I don't see anything resembling that in 
> the theory that everything is derivable from arithmetic. Concerning the claim 
> that matter is primary and not derivable from anything else, I don't think 
> that's the prevailing pov among physicists. They're really not Aristotelian 
> if that means believing there's nothing underlying matter as its cause. I 
> don't see any pervasive denial of the possibility that matter being observed 
> and measured, stands by itself without any deeper cause. I therefore reject 
> Bruno's position of some Aristotelian bias among physicists. AG
> 
>  
> <https://www.google.com/imgres?imgurl=https://image.slidesharecdn.com/03bvirtuearistotle-150310103616-conversion-gate01/95/aristotelian-virtue-ethics-27-638.jpg?cb%3D1426018992&imgrefurl=https://www.slideshare.net/johanautio/aristotelian-virtue-ethics&h=479&w=638&tbnid=-sIPVBeXVy60LM:&q=aristotelian+ethics&tbnh=120&tbnw=159&usg=AI4_-kQd68AmZbkde2uGE60k0evfjjgMDQ&vet=1&docid=QK1A1SH7zxvvmM&itg=1&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj2tu_AlZffAhXAIjQIHZmBDH0Q_B0wH3oECAIQEA>


Actually, during the 30 years of work for the derivation, my work was 
criticised as being not original, and I realised indeed that I was proposing 
what a millenium of theology did already proposed (from Pythagorus (-500)  to 
Damascius (+500)).

And indeed, I have never had any problem with physicists and logicians, or any 
scientists. I got only (big) problems with materialist philosophers, who equate 
physics and metaphysics, and are dogmatic in metaphysics. Serious physicists 
are cautious when talking metaphysics, as they are aware that many problems are 
not solved in that field, and they do have evidence that a notion of primary 
matter is problematical, if only due to Bell, Kochen and Specker, and the hard 
problems physics is confronted with. Usually, most physicists I met (especially 
those I have worked with, like François Englert), were quite open to the 
conclusion, if only because it solves easily the problem of why mathematics is 
so useful in physics).

Now you ask for a succinct explanation, but this works only if you are enough 
open. If the goal is to dismiss an idea, any succinct presentation will be 
useful for that. But don’t worry, the Universal Dovetailer Argument gives 
already a succinct presentation of the main result. Have you read SANE04 up to 
step 3? Have you still some problem with the Mechanist hypothesis? Just ask 
question. Usually people understand mechanism easily. It is exploited (with 
diverse degree of rigour) in the sc. fit. literature: my favorite one is Daniel 
F. Galouye: Simulacron III.
https://www.amazon.com/Simulacron-3-Daniel-F-Galouye/dp/1612420206

Bruno






>  
> 
> Jason
> 
>  
> The main conclusions are confirmed by experience, namely:
> “What I observe seems to be fundamentally nondeterministic; it seems that 
> that there is irreducible randomness that governs my experience.”
> “But it seems that this randomness is itself subject to simple laws, which I 
> can write down in concise equations. I can feed these equations into a 
> computer and use them to predict future observations quite successfully, even 
> if only probabilistically.”
> It also predicts a "Big Bang":
> 
> In particular, we will see that our theory predicts (under the assumption 
> just mentioned) that observers should indeed expect to see two facts which 
> are features of our physics as we know it: first, the fact that the observer 
> seems to be part of an external world that evolves in time (a “universe”), 
> and second, that this external world seems to have had an absolute beginning 
> in the past (the “Big Bang”).
>  
>  Jason
> 
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