On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 11:29:13 AM UTC-6, Brent wrote: > > > > On 12/11/2018 12:31 AM, Philip Thrift wrote: > > > > On Monday, December 10, 2018 at 7:05:17 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote: >> >> >> >> No one is refuting the existence of matter, only the idea that matter is >> primary. That is, that matter is not derivative from something more >> fundamental. >> >> Jason >> > > > I can understand an (immaterial) computationalism (e.g. *The universal > numbers. From Biology to Physics.* Marchal B [ > https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26140993 ]) as providing a purely > informational basis for (thinking of) matter and consciousness, but then > why would *actual matter* need to come into existence at all? Actual > matter itself would seem to be superfluous. > > If actual matter is not needed for experientiality (consciousness), and > actual matter does no exist at all, then we live in a type of simulation of > pure numericality. There would be no reason for actual matter to come into > existence. > > > If it feels like matter and it looks like matter and obeys the equations > of matter how is it not "actual" matter? Bruno's idea is that > consciousness of matter and it's effects are all we can know about matter. > So if the "simulation" that is simulating us, also simulates those > conscious thoughts about matter then that's a "actual" as anything gets. > Remember Bruno is a theologian so all this "simulation" is in the mind of > God=arithmetic; and arithmetic/God is the ur-stuff. > > Brent >
I suppose that one can argue that *simulata* can replace *materia* until the cows come home <https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/until_the_cows_come_home> . (Simulata people think they are materia. Materia people think they are simulata. ...) But pragmatically, I'm not sure where this leads. Engineers still think they are pushing matter around to make things. Not simulations of the things they think are material. (For Kant, it was *noumena*.) - pt -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
