On Thursday, December 13, 2018 at 6:49:34 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 13 Dec 2018, at 18:05, [email protected] <javascript:> wrote: > > > > On Thursday, December 13, 2018 at 11:34:48 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 12 Dec 2018, at 19:38, [email protected] wrote: >> >> >> >> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 3:51:04 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 11 Dec 2018, at 19:32, [email protected] wrote: >>> >>> >>> SNIP >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> *No testable hypotheses; conclusios not based on empirical data. AG*. >>>> >>>> >>>> Only since 529. Those proposing theories and empirical verification >>>> modes were persecuted. They escaped in the Middle-East, where >>>> unfortunately >>>> the made “stealing” was made in 1248. >>>> >>>> Of course, I provide a counter-example, by showing that we can test >>>> mechanism/materialism, and the test favour mechanism on materialism. >>>> Physics seems to NOT be the fundamental science. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> In that domain, you can understand that Mechanism is not compatible >>>>> with Materialism, and that the cosmos is not the ultimate reality. Its >>>>> appearance comes from something else, non physical. >>>>> >>>> >>>> *Play it again Sam. Succinctly, how do you define Mechanism and >>>> Materialism, and why are they incompatible? AG * >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Mechanism is the idea that our consciousness results only from the >>>> physical functioning of the brain, or the body (in some generalised >>>> sense). >>>> To be “functioning” (and biologically reproductible) implies digitalness >>>> (or you can assume it outright). >>>> >>>> But then it is easy to understand that a universal machine cannot >>>> distinguish a computation supporting him/her and executed by this or that >>>> Turing complete system. In particular, it cannot distinguish a computation >>>> run by a God, or by Matter, or by arithmetic (which is Turing complete). >>>> This means that to predict anything empirically, it has to emerge from a >>>> statistics on all (relative) computations (seen by the machine). When we >>>> do >>>> the math, we do recover already that the observable of the universal >>>> machine (an arithmetical notion, see Turing) obey a quantum logic, with a >>>> symmetrical hamiltonian, etc. >>>> Up to now, Mechanism won the empirical test, where materialism remains >>>> on the side of the philosophical ontological commitment, without any >>>> evidences. >>>> >>>> Mechanism is just the idea that we can survive with a digital computer >>>> in place of the body or the brain. It assumes the existence of a level of >>>> substitution where we survive a functional digital substitution. >>>> >>> >>> *Let's assume such a substitution is possible. How do you go from that, >>> to some existing "universal machine" doing anything?* >>> >>> You don’t need to assume that we survive such substitution to get the >>> existence of a universal machine. >>> >> >> *You wrote above that we could assume it "outright" -- that mechanism >> implies we can survive a digital substitution? So I think you need >> mechanism to be true for your theory to be viable. * >> >> >> >> I define Mechanism by the hypothesis that we can survive such brain >> Digital transplantation. Yes. >> >> I don’t claim it is true. >> >> I claim it is testable, and indeed, somehow already confirmed because it >> imposed a physics quite similar (up to now) to quantum theory (without >> collapse). >> > > > *I don't believe it's testable. Has that been done to any degree? And if > it were, I don't see how it would predict quantum theory. AG * > > > > That is a quite sane attitude, and rather normal remark, before studying > the argument/proof. > > Now, if instead of not believing, you positively disbelief that Digital > Mechanism is testable, you need to prove or argue for that statement, or > better, to say at which step of my argument you depart from. > > Or you invoke your personal opinion, which is then like abandoning the > scientific attitude in the domain, to sell a “pseudo-religion”. I don’t > think so (I hope). > > > > > *But then you've already solved the problem of consciousness without going >> further, and it seems the conventional, albeit unproved expectation of >> materialism. AG* >> >> >> No, Materialism is refuted when you assume Mechanism. >> > > *Which form of materialism are you referring to? * > > > Weak Materialsim: the idea that we have to *assume* physical things, like > anything whose existence is inferred from observation and is judged to be > not having a simpler explanation which does not invoke a ontological > commitment in (Aristotelian) substance. > > > > > *Not the form or definition used by Stenger. * > > > He is just unclear about that, but he seems to clearly assume analysis and > some physical reality. > > Its book will be very helpful to get the whole physics, when enough of the > arithmetical quantum logic is known. Despite being decidable, the > propositional theology is quickly intractable, today. > > > > > *He never affirms or denies a primal unknown other than possibly energy > underlying matter.* > > > Yes. That is already a lot. > > > > > * If you replace mind by digital machine for a person, mustn't the machine > depend on matter to do any calculations? AG* > > > It does not. By definition, a computation requires only another universal > machine. >
*If you could show how a simple calculation, like 2 + 2 = 4, could be done in the absence of matter, I could become a believer in digital replacement of a person or anything. But to do this calculation, the number 2 must be stored somewhere, presumably in matter. If not stored in matter, then where? Ball in your court. AG * > > You might ask what is the initial machine for all this. > > The answer is that for the initial machine, it does not matter which one. > I could choose the formalism of Turing, the combinators or elementary > arithmetic. > > I use arithmetic, because everyone knows it, and believe in it, unless the > “philosophers”. > > It is more natural to believe in 2+2=4 as true independently of “me”, than > KKK = K, independently of me. But then KKK= K is a theorem in arithmetic, > like 2+2=4 is a theorem in combinatory logic. > > The physics is the same, because whatever universal machinery you start > with, the physical reality will appear as a sum on all (universal > machine)-computational relative histories for all machine introspecting > itself sufficiently. > > > > > > > > Mechanism and Materialism are in complete opposition. >> > > *Do you have a private definition of Mechanism (and Materialism)? AG* > > > “My" version of Mechanism is very weak, as I put no bound on the > substitution level. So its consequences apply to all versions of (classical > and intuitionist) Mechanism. Materialist computationalism (Materialist > Digital Mechanism) is shown inconsistent. > > It is Digital: which means I use the digital machine as defined by Post, > Church, Kleene, Turing, etc.That notion admits a notion of universal > machine, immune to cantor diagonalisation, but with a big price: > uncontrollability. > > I could avoid Church’s thesis, but it makes everything much smooth, and it > avoids the distracting “what if Church’s thesis is false”, which would > entail philosophical rebuke based on very speculative different form of > digital mechanism, may be consistent with some materialism (cf Philip > Thrift). > > I don’t try to defend the truth of Mechanism, just that under that lamp, > we can transform the philosophical question into mathematical question, and > then into observable prediction. > > Then up to now, QM is explained, and even extended into a mathematics of > qualia and consciousness. > > One motivation is to show that we can do *some* metaphysics and *some* > theology with the scientific method. > > Bruno > > > > You need high infinities in the observable world to attach a piece of >> matter to a mind. >> We can come back on this when you study the UD-Argument (UD = Universal >> Dovetailer) step by step. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >>> The existence of such machine is already a theorem in any >>> Turing-complete theory with a bit of induction. It is feature of the >>> arithmetical reality. >>> >>> *As for physicists being materialists in the sense of believing there is >>> nothing underlying matter as its cause, I have never heard that position >>> articulated by any physicist, in person or on the Internet.* >>> >>> You are right. My conclusion has never been problematical with any >>> physicists. Only metaphysician or theologian who want to assume the >>> existence of a primary physical universe have a problem with this. My >>> “enemy” are pseudo-religious believers for whom physicalism is a dogma. >>> They are never physicists. The physicists are usually aware that the whole >>> story on matter is not yet told, and that the foundation of physics are >>> still problematical. Only those who believe they know have such dogma. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> *AG * >>> >>>> >>>> Non-mechanism assumes actual infinities in nature, and is inconsistent >>>> with Darwinism, molecular biology, thermodynamic, quantum mechanics. >>>> >>>> If the logic of matter (Z1*) extracted from the universal machine >>>> structure was violating the empirical physical reality, that would be >>>> extraordinary, but, thanks to QM, it fits better with the facts than >>>> materialism, which has never succeeded nor even propose an experimental >>>> test. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> The god of Plato and the neoplatonist is by definition the fundamental >>>>> reality. >>>>> >>>> >>>> *I read some Plato as an undergraduate. Don't recall any "god" in his >>>> writings, * >>>> >>>> >>>> He uses the term God. But Plato’s God is simply the truth that we >>>> search, with the understanding it is above us. Plato identified it at some >>>> point with the “world of ideas”, but the neoplatonist will consider that >>>> the world of ideas emanates from some absolute and non describable truth. >>>> With Mechanism, the arithmetical truth is enough (and at some point, even >>>> a >>>> quite tiny part of it will be enough, but in a non provable way). >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> *or from any source that it defines "fundamental reality". AG * >>>> >>>> >>>> Many scholars agree on this. See the little book by Hirschberger for >>>> example. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> Today most christians are materialist, and, as I said, materialism is >>>>> incompatible with mechanism (in a testable way). >>>>> But before 529, many educated christians were still more platonism >>>>> than Aristotelian, which are dogmatic on (primitive) matter. >>>>> >>>>> For a neoplatonist, christianism and atheism is very much alike. >>>>> >>>> >>>> *Then the neoplatonists are totally misinformed and unworthy of trust. >>>> AG* >>>> >>>> >>>> Not at all. It is obvious that strong-atheists (non agnostic atheism) >>>> always defend the same conception of God than the christians (even if it >>>> is >>>> just to deny it), and have the same belief in the second God of Aristotle >>>> (parity matter). >>>> >>>> And the strong-atheists helps a lot the christians in bashing the >>>> scientific theology of the greeks. Stron-atheism is really basically the >>>> same as christianity: it is materialism. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Same conception of god >>>>> >>>> >>>> *No way! Christians believe in a personal god who came to Earth to >>>> redeem their sins, a form of theism, and atheists don't believe in any >>>> god, >>>> * >>>> >>>> >>>> But then conclude that there is no god at all, and that the notion of >>>> God available is only the christian one. >>>> >>>> When we say that God cannot be omniscient (for pure logical reason), >>>> the atheists replies by saying that we cannot change the definition. They >>>> would have said that Earth does not exist when it was discovered that it >>>> is >>>> round! Of course, in science we change the definition *all the time*. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> *but for you their beliefs are the same? How ridiculous this is! AG* >>>> >>>> >>>> Same belief in Matter (which is the God incompatible with Mechanism). >>>> Same belief that God = the Christian God only (total oversight of a >>>> millenium of scientific theology!). >>>> >>>> They don’t have the same belief in God, but they share the same >>>> definition (curiously enough). Then, they do share the same belief in the >>>> creation. >>>> >>>> In the Aristotelian view, Mechanism is super-atheists: no Creator, no >>>> Creation. >>>> >>>> In the Plationcian view, Mechanism is super-religious: only God exist >>>> (arithmetical truth), the rest emerges from it from internal indexical >>>> (given by the logic of self-reference). >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> (even if the atheist uses it only to deny it), and same dogmatic >>>>> attitude for the existence of some matter not reducible to immaterial >>>>> notions (like in mathematics). >>>>> >>>>> Bruno >>>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >>> >>> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> >> >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] <javascript:>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <javascript:>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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