On Thursday, December 13, 2018 at 6:49:34 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 13 Dec 2018, at 18:05, agrays...@gmail.com <javascript:> wrote: > > > > On Thursday, December 13, 2018 at 11:34:48 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 12 Dec 2018, at 19:38, agrays...@gmail.com wrote: >> >> >> >> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 3:51:04 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 11 Dec 2018, at 19:32, agrays...@gmail.com wrote: >>> >>> >>> SNIP >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> *No testable hypotheses; conclusios not based on empirical data. AG*. >>>> >>>> >>>> Only since 529. Those proposing theories and empirical verification >>>> modes were persecuted. They escaped in the Middle-East, where >>>> unfortunately >>>> the made “stealing” was made in 1248. >>>> >>>> Of course, I provide a counter-example, by showing that we can test >>>> mechanism/materialism, and the test favour mechanism on materialism. >>>> Physics seems to NOT be the fundamental science. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> In that domain, you can understand that Mechanism is not compatible >>>>> with Materialism, and that the cosmos is not the ultimate reality. Its >>>>> appearance comes from something else, non physical. >>>>> >>>> >>>> *Play it again Sam. Succinctly, how do you define Mechanism and >>>> Materialism, and why are they incompatible? AG * >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Mechanism is the idea that our consciousness results only from the >>>> physical functioning of the brain, or the body (in some generalised >>>> sense). >>>> To be “functioning” (and biologically reproductible) implies digitalness >>>> (or you can assume it outright). >>>> >>>> But then it is easy to understand that a universal machine cannot >>>> distinguish a computation supporting him/her and executed by this or that >>>> Turing complete system. In particular, it cannot distinguish a computation >>>> run by a God, or by Matter, or by arithmetic (which is Turing complete). >>>> This means that to predict anything empirically, it has to emerge from a >>>> statistics on all (relative) computations (seen by the machine). When we >>>> do >>>> the math, we do recover already that the observable of the universal >>>> machine (an arithmetical notion, see Turing) obey a quantum logic, with a >>>> symmetrical hamiltonian, etc. >>>> Up to now, Mechanism won the empirical test, where materialism remains >>>> on the side of the philosophical ontological commitment, without any >>>> evidences. >>>> >>>> Mechanism is just the idea that we can survive with a digital computer >>>> in place of the body or the brain. It assumes the existence of a level of >>>> substitution where we survive a functional digital substitution. >>>> >>> >>> *Let's assume such a substitution is possible. How do you go from that, >>> to some existing "universal machine" doing anything?* >>> >>> You don’t need to assume that we survive such substitution to get the >>> existence of a universal machine. >>> >> >> *You wrote above that we could assume it "outright" -- that mechanism >> implies we can survive a digital substitution? So I think you need >> mechanism to be true for your theory to be viable. * >> >> >> >> I define Mechanism by the hypothesis that we can survive such brain >> Digital transplantation. Yes. >> >> I don’t claim it is true. >> >> I claim it is testable, and indeed, somehow already confirmed because it >> imposed a physics quite similar (up to now) to quantum theory (without >> collapse). >> > > > *I don't believe it's testable. Has that been done to any degree? And if > it were, I don't see how it would predict quantum theory. AG * > > > > That is a quite sane attitude, and rather normal remark, before studying > the argument/proof. > > Now, if instead of not believing, you positively disbelief that Digital > Mechanism is testable, you need to prove or argue for that statement, or > better, to say at which step of my argument you depart from. > > Or you invoke your personal opinion, which is then like abandoning the > scientific attitude in the domain, to sell a “pseudo-religion”. I don’t > think so (I hope). > > > > > *But then you've already solved the problem of consciousness without going >> further, and it seems the conventional, albeit unproved expectation of >> materialism. AG* >> >> >> No, Materialism is refuted when you assume Mechanism. >> > > *Which form of materialism are you referring to? * > > > Weak Materialsim: the idea that we have to *assume* physical things, like > anything whose existence is inferred from observation and is judged to be > not having a simpler explanation which does not invoke a ontological > commitment in (Aristotelian) substance. > > > > > *Not the form or definition used by Stenger. * > > > He is just unclear about that, but he seems to clearly assume analysis and > some physical reality. > > Its book will be very helpful to get the whole physics, when enough of the > arithmetical quantum logic is known. Despite being decidable, the > propositional theology is quickly intractable, today. > > > > > *He never affirms or denies a primal unknown other than possibly energy > underlying matter.* > > > Yes. That is already a lot. > > > > > * If you replace mind by digital machine for a person, mustn't the machine > depend on matter to do any calculations? AG* > > > It does not. By definition, a computation requires only another universal > machine. >
*If you could show how a simple calculation, like 2 + 2 = 4, could be done in the absence of matter, I could become a believer in digital replacement of a person or anything. But to do this calculation, the number 2 must be stored somewhere, presumably in matter. If not stored in matter, then where? Ball in your court. AG * > > You might ask what is the initial machine for all this. > > The answer is that for the initial machine, it does not matter which one. > I could choose the formalism of Turing, the combinators or elementary > arithmetic. > > I use arithmetic, because everyone knows it, and believe in it, unless the > “philosophers”. > > It is more natural to believe in 2+2=4 as true independently of “me”, than > KKK = K, independently of me. But then KKK= K is a theorem in arithmetic, > like 2+2=4 is a theorem in combinatory logic. > > The physics is the same, because whatever universal machinery you start > with, the physical reality will appear as a sum on all (universal > machine)-computational relative histories for all machine introspecting > itself sufficiently. > > > > > > > > Mechanism and Materialism are in complete opposition. >> > > *Do you have a private definition of Mechanism (and Materialism)? AG* > > > “My" version of Mechanism is very weak, as I put no bound on the > substitution level. So its consequences apply to all versions of (classical > and intuitionist) Mechanism. Materialist computationalism (Materialist > Digital Mechanism) is shown inconsistent. > > It is Digital: which means I use the digital machine as defined by Post, > Church, Kleene, Turing, etc.That notion admits a notion of universal > machine, immune to cantor diagonalisation, but with a big price: > uncontrollability. > > I could avoid Church’s thesis, but it makes everything much smooth, and it > avoids the distracting “what if Church’s thesis is false”, which would > entail philosophical rebuke based on very speculative different form of > digital mechanism, may be consistent with some materialism (cf Philip > Thrift). > > I don’t try to defend the truth of Mechanism, just that under that lamp, > we can transform the philosophical question into mathematical question, and > then into observable prediction. > > Then up to now, QM is explained, and even extended into a mathematics of > qualia and consciousness. > > One motivation is to show that we can do *some* metaphysics and *some* > theology with the scientific method. > > Bruno > > > > You need high infinities in the observable world to attach a piece of >> matter to a mind. >> We can come back on this when you study the UD-Argument (UD = Universal >> Dovetailer) step by step. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >>> The existence of such machine is already a theorem in any >>> Turing-complete theory with a bit of induction. It is feature of the >>> arithmetical reality. >>> >>> *As for physicists being materialists in the sense of believing there is >>> nothing underlying matter as its cause, I have never heard that position >>> articulated by any physicist, in person or on the Internet.* >>> >>> You are right. My conclusion has never been problematical with any >>> physicists. Only metaphysician or theologian who want to assume the >>> existence of a primary physical universe have a problem with this. My >>> “enemy” are pseudo-religious believers for whom physicalism is a dogma. >>> They are never physicists. The physicists are usually aware that the whole >>> story on matter is not yet told, and that the foundation of physics are >>> still problematical. Only those who believe they know have such dogma. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> *AG * >>> >>>> >>>> Non-mechanism assumes actual infinities in nature, and is inconsistent >>>> with Darwinism, molecular biology, thermodynamic, quantum mechanics. >>>> >>>> If the logic of matter (Z1*) extracted from the universal machine >>>> structure was violating the empirical physical reality, that would be >>>> extraordinary, but, thanks to QM, it fits better with the facts than >>>> materialism, which has never succeeded nor even propose an experimental >>>> test. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> The god of Plato and the neoplatonist is by definition the fundamental >>>>> reality. >>>>> >>>> >>>> *I read some Plato as an undergraduate. Don't recall any "god" in his >>>> writings, * >>>> >>>> >>>> He uses the term God. But Plato’s God is simply the truth that we >>>> search, with the understanding it is above us. Plato identified it at some >>>> point with the “world of ideas”, but the neoplatonist will consider that >>>> the world of ideas emanates from some absolute and non describable truth. >>>> With Mechanism, the arithmetical truth is enough (and at some point, even >>>> a >>>> quite tiny part of it will be enough, but in a non provable way). >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> *or from any source that it defines "fundamental reality". AG * >>>> >>>> >>>> Many scholars agree on this. See the little book by Hirschberger for >>>> example. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> Today most christians are materialist, and, as I said, materialism is >>>>> incompatible with mechanism (in a testable way). >>>>> But before 529, many educated christians were still more platonism >>>>> than Aristotelian, which are dogmatic on (primitive) matter. >>>>> >>>>> For a neoplatonist, christianism and atheism is very much alike. >>>>> >>>> >>>> *Then the neoplatonists are totally misinformed and unworthy of trust. >>>> AG* >>>> >>>> >>>> Not at all. It is obvious that strong-atheists (non agnostic atheism) >>>> always defend the same conception of God than the christians (even if it >>>> is >>>> just to deny it), and have the same belief in the second God of Aristotle >>>> (parity matter). >>>> >>>> And the strong-atheists helps a lot the christians in bashing the >>>> scientific theology of the greeks. Stron-atheism is really basically the >>>> same as christianity: it is materialism. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Same conception of god >>>>> >>>> >>>> *No way! Christians believe in a personal god who came to Earth to >>>> redeem their sins, a form of theism, and atheists don't believe in any >>>> god, >>>> * >>>> >>>> >>>> But then conclude that there is no god at all, and that the notion of >>>> God available is only the christian one. >>>> >>>> When we say that God cannot be omniscient (for pure logical reason), >>>> the atheists replies by saying that we cannot change the definition. They >>>> would have said that Earth does not exist when it was discovered that it >>>> is >>>> round! Of course, in science we change the definition *all the time*. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> *but for you their beliefs are the same? How ridiculous this is! AG* >>>> >>>> >>>> Same belief in Matter (which is the God incompatible with Mechanism). >>>> Same belief that God = the Christian God only (total oversight of a >>>> millenium of scientific theology!). >>>> >>>> They don’t have the same belief in God, but they share the same >>>> definition (curiously enough). Then, they do share the same belief in the >>>> creation. >>>> >>>> In the Aristotelian view, Mechanism is super-atheists: no Creator, no >>>> Creation. >>>> >>>> In the Plationcian view, Mechanism is super-religious: only God exist >>>> (arithmetical truth), the rest emerges from it from internal indexical >>>> (given by the logic of self-reference). >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> (even if the atheist uses it only to deny it), and same dogmatic >>>>> attitude for the existence of some matter not reducible to immaterial >>>>> notions (like in mathematics). >>>>> >>>>> Bruno >>>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >>>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >>>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >>> >>> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> >> >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>. > To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com > <javascript:>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
